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Recent research has led to a growing awareness that the
dominant method of settling criminal cases in the United States
involves disposition without trial.

The ovenoJhelming majority of

criminal cases are settled by guilty pleas, and the majority of
guilty plea dispositions involve some kind of bargain on the
charge or sentence.

The purpose of the present study was to

2
examine and analyze the phenomenon of negotiating the guilty plea
in terms of its relationship to the functional needs and ideal
goals of the court system.
A basic assumption of this study was that case disposition
through a bargaining process provides for both functional needs
and ideal goals which are not clearly provided for in the trial
system.

A detailed examination of felony case disposition without

trial in one Pacific Northwest urban court system was undertaken
to ascertain the precise nature of the bargaining process.

Records

regarding the nature and outcomes of felony dispositions in 1976
and 1977 were researched, along with information on the formal
structure, procedures and pOlicies of the court organization.
Interviews with prosecutors, public defenders and judges in the
felony court system provided attitudinal data.

Observations of

guilty plea hearings and negotiation conferences allowed the
researcher to record actual activities in the disposition process.
The data indicated that the majority of cases were settled
by guilty pleas and that the majority of guilty pleas involved some
kind of bargain.

Plea negotiation in this court system was

routinized, formalized and highly structured.

The bargaining

process was prosecutor-dominated, in part due to the District
Attorney Office policy which was noticeably inflexible in terms of
bargaining criteria.

The one commodity of power held by the defense

attorney was strength of case.

If the defense could find legal

"loopholes" in the state I s case, the chances of the defendant
getting a good deal improved.

Tnis emphasis on legal factors
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appeared to strengthen the professional orientation as well as
the adversary perspective of the opposing attorneys.
Pleading guilty to a reduced charge resulted in the greatest
likelihood of a defendant receiving a non-incarceration sentence.
The majority of reductions were to offenses necessarily included
in the initial charge.

Conviction by trial resulted in the highest l

proportion of incarceration sentences of all closing types.

However,

there was evidence that circumstances of the case and the defendant
were influential regarding the likelihood of incarceration at the
sentencing stage.
A balancing factor aFpeared to be at work according to
comparisons of the 1976 and 1977 data.

Changes in the District

Attorney Office policy instituted in 1977 expanded the list of
non-reducible offenses.

While the proportion of trial closings

consequently increased for these non-reducible offenses, this
increase was offset by a decrease in the proportion of trials for
offenses not included in the non-reducible category.
Generally, the findings supported the theoretical assumption
that disposition by guilty plea negotiation could fulfill functional
needs of the court system within a legalistic framework.
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CHAPTER I
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM:
SETTLING CASES THROUGH THE GUILTY PLEA
INTRODUCTION
Concomitant with the growth of urbanism and industrialism
in modern society was a growth in the social scientific study of
formal organizations.

Following Max Weber's early treatise

delineating the characteristics of formal organizations, sociologists began to look at greater depth into the social reality
of such organizations.

The result has been an increasing awareness

of the multi-faceted complexity which pervades these organizations
in modern society.

This complexity is still not fully understood,

and thus there remains a need for exploratory studies of particular
organizations.

The present study offers an analysis of the social

reality of the case disposition process in one type of formal
organization--that of the criminal court system in American society.
The social scientific study of legal organizations is
relatively new within the larger field of formal organizations
research.

In particular, the structured activities of the court

system have" received little in-depth study until quite recently.
However, in the last decade, several major works on the American
court system have opened up the way for further study (Newman, 1966;
Skolnick, 1966; Neubauer, 1974).
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As

a sub-system of the criminal justice system in the

United states, the courts are responsible for achieving justice
through formally charging alleged law violators, establishing the
guilt or innocence of those individuals, and meting out legal
punishment to persons found guilty.

Both substantive and procedural

laws provide the rules by which these activities are to be carried
out.

Rules regarding charges, pleas and punishments are delineated

in substantive law.

Substantive law attends to the criminal

justice system's goals of crime control, protection of the public
good and achieving justice by defining criminal acts and the
appropriate punishments for such behaviors.

Procedural law deals

with another major criminal justice goal, i.e., insuring due process
by guaranteeing alleged law violators the right to presumed
innocence until guilt has been proved, the right to counsel, and
the right to trial.
It would be a mistake, however, to view the court system
solely in terms of its legal mandate to work toward these goals
by means of the formal rules.

The court is a formal organization

which also responds to its own functional needs to maintain stability
and viability.

Since the ideal system, based upon substantive and

procedural law, does not consider explicitly the functional needs
of the organization it has created, the organization must develop
its own processes through which stability and viability can be
achieved.

In order to maintain its legitimacy, however, the court

must achieve these functional imperatives without forsaking its
responsibility for achieving justice.

In addition, legitimacy

3

requires a commitment to the larger system's goals of crime control,
protection of the public good, and due process.
The ideal process for criminal case disposition within the
court system involves the following elements:

formal charges are

made based exclusively on substantive law; the guilt issue is
resol\red through adversary proceedings in a trial by jury or judge;
for those adjudicated guilty, punishment is set based exclusively
on substantive law.

However, this is not the dominant method of

case settlement in American courts.

Rather, the overwhelming

majority of cases are settled by guilty pleas prior to the trial
stage.

Although there are variations among jurisdictions, studies

indicate that from 70 percent to 90 percent of criminal cases in
which fonnal charges are filed are settled by guilty pleas rather
than trials (Newman, 1956; Mather, 1973; Mulkey, 1974; Heumann, 1975).
Moreo'Jer, many of the cases disposed of by guilty pleas involve some
kind of bargain on the charge or sentence which may not be based
exclusively on substantive law (Sudnow, 1965; Newman, 1966).

These

findings have led to a social-scientific interest in examining the
case disposition process within the court system.
The purpose of the present study was to explore and analyze
the phenomenon of negotiating the guilty plea and its relationship
to the ideal and actual process of criminal case disposition within
an organizational setting.

~he

study involved a detailed examination

of the felony case disposition process in one urban court system,
located in a metropolitan area in the Pacific Northwest.
collected from several sources.

Data were

Records and case files were used to

~,--.,~~

.............. , .•.. ,.. , ...... ",.... .

~~.
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gather data regarding the nature and outcomes of felony dispositions
in 1976 and 1977.

Official documents yielded information on the

formal structure, procedures and policies of the court organization.
Interviews with prosecutors, public defenders and judges in the
felony court system provided attitudinal data from the key actors
in the disposition process.

Finally, observations of guilty plea

hearings and plea negotiation conferences allowed the researcher to
record actual activities relevant to the research focus.
Regarding the precise nature of the case disposition process
through negotiation in this particular court system, the study can
be appropriately described as exploratory.

A preference for

"exploring" rather than "testing" resulted from 1) the recognition
'that the area of study is relatively new and thus lacks extensive
research and 2) an awareness that the negotiation

process in this

court system has certain formal characteristics which differ from
those in court systems previously researched.

However, the research

problem was approached from a specific theoretical perspective
\vhich has provided the framework for the analysis of the data.
Based upon organizational and exchange theories, as well as prior
studies of plea negotiation, a functional argument has been offered
as an explanation of plea negotiation as the dominant method of case
disposition in the American court system.
study then was three-fold:

1)

The ultimate goal of the

to construct, based upon the data, a

model of case disposition without trial in one urban court system;
2) to analyze this model from a theoretical perspective; 3) to
compare the findings from this research with those from prior
research.
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The theoretical framework of the study is introduced in the
next section, followed by a discussion of the findings from prior
studies in which case disposition through negotiation has been
researched.

The final part of the chapter is devoted to an explicit

descr:iption of the research questions to be subjected to empirical
examination.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A conceptualization of the court as a formal organization
is useful in order to understand the case disposition process.

One

of the primary defining characteristics of an organization is its
okientation to the achievement of formal goals (Parsons, 1956).
Etzioni has suggested that organizations may be classified
according to their orientation to one of three borad categories of
goals:

maintenance of social order; maintenance of cultural

conditions; economic production.
Organizations with order goals attempt to control
actors who are deviants in the eyes of some social
unit the organization is serving (frequently society)
by segregating them from society and by blocking them from
further deviant activities.
Organizations that have culture goals institutionalize
conditions needed for the creation and preservation of
symbolic objects, their application, and the creation
of reinforcement of commitments to such objects.
Organizations with economic goals produce commodities
and services supplied to outsiders (Etzioni, 1975: 104105) •
While some organizations may be easily placed into one or another
of these categories, the court organization is difficult to classify
in terms of its goal orientation.

It appears that courts attempt to
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contend with all three categories of goals.

First, there are the

order and culture goals of the superordinate system which the
courts must consider.

The courts, as part of the superordinate

system of criminal justice, must work toward the maintenance of
rule by law, crime control, protection of the public good, and
due process.

Second, there are order and culture goals which are

specifically assigned to the organization in terms of its role in
the superordinate system.

The courts are assigned the specific

goal of achieving justice by formally charging the alleged violator,
resolving the guilt/innocence issue, and meting out the appropriate
punishment to the guilty.

Although economic goals may not be

construed as a major orientation of the court system, they are
functionally important to the maintenance of the system; that is,
efficient production of settled cases is imperative.
Order and culture goals best describe the ideal goal
orientation of the court system.

There are also the functional

goals of stability and viability which must be attained if the
organization is to survive.

Stability and viability are dependent

on the satisfaction of the functional needs and requirements of
the organization.

Such needs often take priority over the ideal

goals, for without the satisfaction of the former, the latter have
little chance of being realized.

According to one theorist:

• . . a given empirical system is deemed to have
basic needs, essentially related to self-maintenance;
t.ile system develops repetitive means of self-defense;
and day-to-day activity is interpreted in terms of the
flIDctions served by that activity for the maintenance
defense of the system (Selznick, 1948: 25).
In order to enhance its stability and viability, an organization
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must satisfy production and efficiency needs.

stability is

further enhanced by routinization and cooperation within a
system.

Another functional necessity is that key actors exhibit

compliance with and commitment to the system.
Production and Efficiency
An organization is a system which "produces an identifiable

something which can be utilized in some way by another system"
(Parsons, 1956:
reflect justice.

64).

The courts "produce" settled cases which

The individual, as a component of the product, is

either released to society or moved on into the correctional system.
Production must be efficient.

To be efficient the court must

conserve scarce resources (time, labor, money) by settling cases
quickly and thus avoiding overload (Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and Cressey,
1976).

Case dispositions through guilty pleas advance both production

ru1d efficiency goals.

In fact, a high proporation of guilty pleas

is essential to the survival of large, urban

COUl:t

systems, which

are constantly threatened with collapse due to case overload (Newman,
1956).

The importance of production and efficiency to the stability

and viability of the court organization leads to the recognition that
the utilitarian nature of this formal organization and its pursuit
of economic goals cannot be overlooked.
Routinization
Routinization, which refers to the standardization, institutionalization and legitimation of processes and norms, is another
fW1ctional requirement.

First, routinization enhances production

8

and efficiency.

Second, it strengthens the security of system

members by spelling out norms for interaction which can be learned
and relied upon:
The security of all participants, and of the system
as a whole, generates a persistent pressure for the
institutionalization of relationships, which are thus
removed from the uncertainties of individual fealty
or sentiments (Selznick, 1948: 20).
l·ierton suggested that a formal, rationally organized social
structure involved "clearly defined patterns of activity in which,
ideally, every series of actions is functionally related to the
purposes of the organization" (1957:
forn~l

195).

However, neither the

rules of the criminal justice system, nor those of the

court sub-system, provide adequately for the production and
efficiency needs of the court.
needs of system members.

Nor do they provide for the security

Therefore, it is understandable that

an informal process for case disposition emerges ann becomes
routinized.

Although the routinized process vcu :.es with the needs

of specific courts, prior empirical studies of court systems
indicate that it centers around bargaining to achieve a guilty plea.
It has been found that this routinized process includes:
1.

A classification scheme of offenses/offenders
and appropriate punishments which are deemed
"just" (Sudnow, 1965; Newman, 1966; Mather, 1973;
Neubauer, 1974).

2.

Identifiable factors which guide decisions to
charge, plea and bargain (Newman, 1956; Blumberg,
1967; Cole, 1970; Neubauer, 1974; Mulkey, 1974;
Rosett and Cressey, 1976).

3.

Procedural norms for interaction through a
bargaining process (Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and
Cressey, 1976).

----~~L---·-·-·-··
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Cooperation
To attain its functional goals, an organization must operate
as a cooperative system.

Organizational theory posits that a

formal organization is made up of interdependent parts which must
function as a unit to achieve organizational purposes (Selznick,
1948; Etzioni, 1961).

However, the ideal rules for case disposition

in the court system emphasize adversary proceedings, in which
prosecuting and defense attorneys represent the opposing interests
of their clients or publics.

The bargaining process, on the

other hand, allows prosecuting and defense attorneys to work in
cooperation with one another with the goal of speedy case
disposition through guilty pleas.

Prior studies indicate that

the routinized plea bargaining process includes norms for cooperation
among key actors in the system (Feeley, 1973; Neubauer, 1974).
Compliance and Commitment
The stability and viability of the organization also require
that the needs of system members be taken into consideration.

A

fW1ctional organization relies upon the compliance and commitment
of its members (Etzioni, 1961).

Compliance is facilitated when

system members are motivated to participate willingly in organizational
activities and to be committed to organizational goals (March and
Simon, 1958).

Compliance thus motivated is, in turn, facilitated

when an organization acknowledges its members' needs and provides
incentives in accordance with those needs.
The ideal system of criminal justice does not attend adequately
to the provision of incentives for system members:

----Ia!J~,---"--""
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• • • what one finds in the system of criminal
justice is a highly formalized and defined set of
rules, norms, and goals, but also an organization
which possesses no corresponding set of incentives
and sanctions which act systematically to enforce
them (Feeley, 1973: 422).
Case disposition through bargaining can be seen as providing
inducements for key court actors to comply with, willingly
participate in, and be committed to the court system.

The way in

which this is accomplished can be understood by examining the
case disposition process in the context of exchange theory.
Exchange theory posits that interaction between persons
consists of an exchange of material and non-material goods.

The

exchm1ge process is functional for the organization because it
meets system-member needs for cooperation, security, involvement
and rewards.

Bargaining is an exchange process which allows for

frequent interaction between key court actors (particularly between
prosecuting and defense attorneys).

The

reciprocit~'

inherent in

the exchange process also provides an atmosphere of cooperation
~ld

trust.

Reciprocity may be defined as a cooperative, mutually

gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and services (Gouldner, 1960).
Coope:cation and trust are also advanced through norms which routinize
,~nteraction,

in that attitudes and behaviors can be anticipated.

The

bargaining process serves members' needs for security by reducing
the risks and uncertainties of outcomes.

Risks are reduced through

the avoidance of trial, and uncertainties are reduced through the
routinization of the process (Church, 1976).

Bargaining also allows

prosecuting and defense attorneys to play active roles in case
disposition.

This is important for several reasons:

1)

it allows

--~t---.-t";
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actors to experience a sense of autonomy and control in the decisionmaking process; 2) it contributes to individual feelings of se1fworth and usefulness; 3) it allows actors to consider ideal goals
as they make decisions.

Finally, the exchange process provides

benefits for both prosecuting and defense attorneys.

Unlike the

adversary system, the outcomes are not zero-sum, i.e., there is not
a total win for one side accompanied by a total loss for the
other side.
The commodities exchanged in the bargaining process are
charges, pleas and punishments.

The defense attorney has command

(through his or her client) of the plea commodity.

Since the

guilty plea is the desired outcome, this commodity gives the
defense attorney considerable leverage.
has command of the charge commodity.

However, the prosecutor

Since punishments are

formally related to charges, the prosecutor also has some
control over the punishment commodity.

In addition to influencing

punishment through the charge, the prosecutor also gains power
through his or her right to recommend punishment to the judge.
Prior studies indicate that the issue of punishment is of primary
concern in the bargaining process (Rosett and Cressey, 1976;
Sudnow,1965).

The threat of severe punishment, which is consider-

able under the law, may reduce the bargaining power of the defense
attorney.

Studies show that the balance of power is tipped in

favor of the prosecutor in the exchange process (Newman, 1956;
Mulkey, 1974; Neubauer, 1974).

",".
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Bargains may be of several types:

charge reduction, dismissal

of one or more charges or counts, punishment reduction, or charge
or punishment concurrency.

This variety of possibilities leads to

a number of benefits and costS.

What is important to remember is

that benefits and costs are not zero-sum; all actors can receive
some of both.

For example, the defense attorney may decide to

e}cchange a guilty plea for a reduced charge.

Although the defense

attorney suffers some costs through this exchange (both in terms of
the interests of his or her client and in terms of his or her
professional role as advocate for the accused), he or she also gains
a benefit in the form of the reduction of the severity of the
charge (and most likely punishment) against the client.

The

prosecutor, on the other hand, suffers a cost in giving up the
full potential of the charge and punishment commodities, but benefits
in getting a convicition in the interests of the state.

Blumberg

(1967) has suggested that rewards in the form of prestige and
approval are given attorneys who advance the instrumental goals of
the court by settling cases quickly through the routinized
bargaining process.

These rewards may further personal and career

concerns of attorneys and thus act as a further incentive for
complying with the system.
Thus far, ways in which case disposition through bargaining
contributes to the satisfaction of functional needs of the courts
have been discussed.

While functional theories go a long way

toward explaining why plea bargaining is the dominant method of
case disposition in American courts, examinations of the precise

i-
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nature of the disposition process reveal that other elements are
also involved in plea bargaining as well.

The following section

elaborates upon this point by reviewing the findings of prior
research.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION
While the precise nature of the bargaining process varies
among court systems, studies to date indicate that it exists in
some form in virtually all systems.

Since the actual process may

no·t have formal status or may deviate from formal policy, considerable probing is required in order to capture the essence and
implications of the actual process.

Prior research points to

several problems which are in need of further exploration.

First,

there is a need to examine the way in which the actual process
does or does not reflect formal policies and laws.

A second

problem has to do with the way in which plea bargaining reflects
functional and/or ideal goals.

Finally, the nature of the exchange

relationship between key court actors needs further clarification.
Plea Bargaining:
Process

Relationships Between the Informal and Formal

'l'he extent to which plea bargaining is formally recognized
varies among court systems.

The recent acknowledgement of plea

bargaining at the national level (President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1968; Brady v. U.S.,
397 U.S. 742, 1970) is likely to lead to increased formal
recognition at state and local levels.

Since the widespread use

of plea bargaining is conceded by most authorities, there has been
i.
i'·
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a recen't movement to see plea bargaining given uniform formal
status.

However, in court systems where formal policy does exist,

there is little information regarding the way in which the informal
process does or does not deviate from formal policy.
A related problem has to do with the way in which the plea
bargaining process relates to substantive and procedural law.

For

example, consider Sudnow's study on charge reduction in plea
bargaining.

He argued that the classification scheme by which

offenses and offenders along with appropriate punishments are
delineated is not based upon substantive law:
. . . in searching an instant case to decide what
to reduce it to, there is no analysis of the statutorily
referable elements of the instant case; instead, its
membership in a class of events, the features of which
cannot be described by the penal code, must be
decided (Sudnow, 1965: 259).
The classification scheme, according to Sudnow, outlines categories
of "normal" crimes.

Normal crimes share certain features:

a

typical manner in which offenses are committed, social characteristics of persons who regularly commit them, typical setting in
which they occur, and types of victims typically involved.

For

example, Sudnow reported that public defenders view normal
burglaries as involving repetitive violators, no weapons, inexpensive items, little property damage, lower class establishments,
black defendants, and a non-professional orientation to the offense.
Normal crimes, according to Sudnow, are easily settled by routinized
bargains, legitimated by the belief that the bargain outcome is
reasonable and just because of the typical nature of the crime.

He

also concluded that the bargained charge on a normal crime is often
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neither necessarily or situationally included in the original
charge, i.e., neither statutorily included in the initial offense
whereby the commission of one crime includes the commission of
another, e.g., murder and attempted murder--nor situationally
included as a part of the offense behavior, e.g., loitering and
public indecency.

Rather, normal crimes are often reduced on

the basis of their typical features to lesser offenses not
necessarily or situationally included in the original offense, e.g.,
burglary to petty theft.

Such reductions are deemed reasonable,

however, if the offense/offender fits the typical description.
It is obvious that plea bargaining deviates from formal
procedural law for case disposition.

Through plea bargaining

the trial process for resolution of guilt is circumvented.

The

issue of importance to the key actors in plea bargaining is not
guilt/innocence, but rather punishment.

For the bargaining process

to work, some guilt must be presumed at the outset; the focus is on
what will be done to the offender in terms of punishment (Heumann,
1975; Rosett and Cressey, 1976).

By giving up the right to trial,

the defendant gives up the right to presumed innocence, the protection
against self-incrimination, and the right to confront his or her
accusers.

Recent court decisions have ruled that this is legal

provided the defendant is advised of the rights he or she is
waiving by pleading guilty (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 1969).
Thus, the shortened procedure is gaining legitimacy •.
Mather (1973) has suggested that case disposition through
bargaining deviates from the ideal process in another way.

From
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his research, he concluded that the way in which a case is to be
settled depends primarily on two factors--seriousness of offense
and strength of case.

"Dead-bang" cases--those in which the

offense is not extremely serious, the punishment not extremely
severe, and the case against the accused is strong--are routinely
settled through a plea of guilty on the original charge, although
·the defense may receive some benefit (e.g., recormnendation for
ptmishment reduction or concurrency) in exchange for cooperation.
"Reasonable doubt" cases, in which the offense is not extremely
serious, the case for the original charge is weak, but the case
is strong for guilt on a lesser charge, can be quickly settled
by routinized bargain reductions.

More troublesome cases are those

in which the offense and/or punishment are considered to be
extremely severe and in which there is reasonable doubt in terms
of the strength of the case.

Such cases, of which there are

relatively few, are unlikely to be settled by a bargained guilty
plea, for the costs to the defense attorney and her or her client
outweigh the benefits of a guilty plea.

These are the cases

which most often go to trial.
The examination of relationships of the bargaining process
to substantive and procedural law gives considerable insight into
the way in which plea bargaining
goals.

Yet there are other factors to be considered in examining

the goals issue.

,, .

reflects functional and ideal

L

17

I

V',

r!:!"

Plea Bargaining and Goal Achievement
Case disposition through bargaining does not discount ideal
justice goals.

Although these goals may be modified in line with

functional requirements for stability and viability, the notions
of crime control, due process and justice are incorporated into
the routinized process for case disposition (Mulkey, 1974; Rosett
and Cressey, 1976).

In fact, it has been suggested that the nature

of routinized plea bargaining in American court systems provides for
the achievement of ideal justice goals which are less likely to be
achieved through strict adherence to the formal rules.

Rosett and

Cressey (1976) concluded that plea bargaining processes outline
uniform standards of justice while allowing for a consideration of
mitigating factors which are not included in the formal penal code.
They also argued that the range of punishments provided by law is
reduced, thus limiting the broad discretionary powers of judges in
sentencing.

Crime control is taken into account by separating

serious from non-serious cases and delineating reasonable punishments
for both types.

Also, plea bargaining practices can be geared to

the needs of particular jurisdictions regarding crime control and
justice.
While it does appear that the goals of crime control and
justice may be served by plea bargaining practices, serious questions
have been raised regarding the due process goal.

Legally a plea

of guilty can only be entered if the defendant assures the judge
that he or she is pleading guilty willingly and with full knowledge
of the consequences of such a plea.
~'

"

,

Yet such formal assurances are
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of questionable value.

The defendant most often does not have

adequate knowledge of either the informal or the formal system.
Lacking complete knowledge, lacking power, and threatened by severe
punishment, the defendant may be at least implicitly coerced into
compliance with the recommendations of his or her counsel.

The

evidence suggests that public defense attorneys are likely to
advise clients to plead guilty if a bargain can be obtained
(Newman, 1956, 1966; Blumberg, 1967).
While there are obvious due process problems when the trial
process is circumvented and guilt is presumed from the outset,
participants in the bargaining process do endeavor to attend to
justice norms of "appropriateness" and "fairness" in terms of
punishment.

Also, bargains usually do appear to reduce the severity

of punishment allowable under maximum sentencing.

Finally, the

defense attorney does have a commitment to a professional role, i.e.,
representing the interests of the defendant (Mather, 1973).

Thus,

the defense attorney has an interest in "getting a good deal" for
the client.
As

was pointed out earlier, the achievement of ideal

criminal justice goals is not the sole orientation of the court
organization.

Functional goals (perhaps more appropriately labeled

needs and requirements) cannot be overlooked.
Conservation of limited resources is the most often cited
advantage of plea bargaining (Mulkey, 1974).

In their study,

Rosett and Cressey (1976) found that prosecutors and defense
attorneys consistently mentioned conservation of resources and
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administrative expediency when asked what purposes plea bargaining
serves.

Thus , it appears that, from the perspeci:ives of key court

'.

f

actors, organizational needs are of paramount importance in case
disposition.

Conservation of resources is increasingly important

to all three of the criminal justice sub-systems (law enforcement,
courts, corrections).

Since the activities of any of the three

sub-systems have consequences for the others (e.g., limiting arrests
reduces the load of the court; dismissing cases and reducing
sentences in the court reduces the load of corrections), it seems
likely that an important factor to be considered in the disposition
process is the needs of law enforcement and corrections.
The police have considerable discretionary power in making
arrest decisions and thus are influential in selecting offenses/
offenders to be handled by the courts (Skolnick, 1966; Wilson,
1968).

Law enforcement helps curb court overload by not arresting

all suspected offenders and by dismissing approximately one third
of felony cases after arrest but prior to initial prosecutorial
screening (Rosett and Cressey, 1976).

The police also have come

influence regarding the formal charge decision, for the report of
the arresting officer is taken into consideration by the prosecutor.
Findings on the extent of police influence in the charge decision
are somewhat unclear, as influence varies among particular jurisdictions.

However, prior studies indicate that the police experi-

ence some frustration in what they perceive as their inability to
play a more active role in settling cases for which they are initially
responsible (Banton, 1964; Wilson, 1968).

Corrections plays a role

- - - - -......
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in the case disposition process through the pre-sentence investigation conducted by the probation department.

Like the police, the

probation officer's role in case dispositions is essentially
~.

advisory.

However, the court system needs the cooperation of law

.

enforcement and corrections in order to coordinate activities in
line with the functional stability and ideal goals of the superordinate criminal justice system.

Thus, it is advisable for key

court actors to take into account these sub-systems in the decisionmaking process.
There are also interests outside of the criminal justice
system which must be attended to by the courts.

Related systems,

e.g., social work, mental health, are affected by and attempt to
affect court activities.

Community attitudes toward law, order and

justice may also be influential in court activities.

There is some

evidence that special interest groups have and exercise the pOWer to
impinge on court operations in order to satisfy their own vested
interests.

In his study, Cole (1970) found that prosecutors invariably

consider the demands of community influentials in making charge
decisions.

While more research is in order, it does appear that the

needs and demands of extraorganizations are important in terms of
the functional stability of the courts.

Since these various needs

are often conflicting, decisions pertaining to court structure and
process may be continually problematic:
Each subculture [of a court] is thus a crystallized
solution to the problems given courthouse workers by
specific groups whose conflicting demands and conceptions
of justice must all be somehow worked into the scheme of
things. Each is a negotiated social order--a set of
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rules, understandings and customs--that has developed
as courthouse workers have accommodated themselves
to the demands of these various groups (Rosett and
Cressey, 1976: 94).
The extent to which personal needs of key court actors
influence charge, plea and bargain decisions has received little
empirical attention.

There are some indications that prosecuting

and defense attorneys who settle cases quickly by obtaining guilty
pleas and being clever bargainers are perceived by other actors in
the system as "good" attorneys, thus enhancing career possibilities
(Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and Cressey, 1976).

It has also been

suggested that attorneys who learn the routinized system quickly
and proficiently are rewarded with approval from superiors within
the system (Blumberg, 1967).

Further research is needed to assess

the l/lay in which key court actors perceive the court system as
meeting their own personal needs.
There is also a lack of agreement regarding whether or not
o·ther factors influencing charge, plea and bargain decisions are
consistent with criminal justice goals.

The strength of the state's

case has been identified as the most important factor in the
prosecutor's charge and bargain decisions (Alshuler, 1968; McIntyre,
1967; Mulkey, 1974).

The strength of case factor can be perceived

as reflecting criminal justice goals, for a strong case is likely
to end in conviction, thus furthering crime control.

However,

strength of case is a variable which can also be used to facilitate
speedy case settlement.
i·.
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with a strong case, the prosecutor has a

good chance of getting defense counsel to agree to a guilty plea.
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In agreeing to a guilty plea, the defense may only receive a
minimal concession, but avoid, however, the actual risks of trial.
On the other hand, if the state's case is not strong, the state

still gains from getting a quick and certain guilty plea conyiction;
the defense--likely to be offered a good deal--also may opt for
the speedy and sure guilty plea disposition.

Since the overwhelming

majority of cases are settled by guilty pleas, it can be speculated
that strength of case factors are more often used as levers in the
negotiation process than as mechanisms for achieving ideal justice
goals.

Although the data are conflicting, some studies suggest that

prosecutors may overcharge, anticipating that charge reduction will
be necessary to obtain a guilty plea (Newman, 1966; Blumberg, 1967;
Alshuler, 1968; Cole, 1970).

Such a move on the part of the

prosecutor can be viewed as an attempt to further functional
imperatives.
One category of factors which has been found to have subst~1tial

influence regarding charge, plea and bargain decisions

attends (at least theoretically) to criminal justice goals.

This

category includes nature of offense and nature of offender factors.
The seriousness of the offense has been found to be extremely
influential in the disposition process.

The most serious offenses

are those least likely to be settled through the bargaining process;
also, the most serious offenses are most llkely to be subjected to
the full charge potential (Mulkey, 1974).
t,

Additionally, cases

which deviate from the norm (are not typical) are less likely to be
settled through the bargaining process.

Apparently the justice
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norms which have been informally established for typical cases
cannot be easily applied to atypical cases, and thus trial is
felt to be necessary in the interests of justice.

The value of

property losses and the costs (material and non-material) to
victims are also important elements in the nature of the offense
(Subin, 1966; McIntyre, 1968).
Previous research has indicated that attributes of the
offender are influential in determining the nature of case
dispositions.

Prior criminal record of the defendant appears

to be of particular importance.

Like seriousness of the offense,

prior record increases the likelihood of certainty ann severity of
punishment for the defennant and thus gives the prosecutor an
advantage in the bargaining process.

Severe treatment of criminal

repeaters may be perceived by key court actors as furthering the
crime control goal.

Data also suggest that defendant characteristics

such as appearance, demeanor, sex, race, education and socio-economic
status influence case disposition (Piliavin and Briar, 1958;
Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1975; Gibbons, 1977; Chiricos
and Waldo, 1970).

Discriminatory treatment of defendants is

difficult to rationalize on the basis of criminal justice goals.
While there is general agreement that case disposition through
plea bargaining meets functional needs and requirements of the
system, there are conflicting opinions regarding the extent to which
plea bargaining serves ideal criminal justice goals (Neubauer, 1974).
Critics point out that defendants' rights to due process and equal
treatment are threatened through the plea negotiation process.

i
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They also argue that functional needs take precedence in the

,.

bargaining process, thus subverting ideal goals:
In short, critics of plea bargaining maintain that
reliance upon bargaining involves an emphasis upon
administrative convenience which subverts achievement of criminal justice goals, including the suppression of crime, the rehabilitation of offenders,
and the maintenance of procedural due process
(Mulkey, 1974: 57).
'l'he Relationship Between Key Actors in the Bargaining Process
Further research is in order regarding the nature of the
relationship between key actors in the bargaining process,
partic~larly

the primary actors,

defense attorney.

As

i~e.,

the prosecutor and the

mentioned earlier, the relationship between

the prosecutor and defense attorney is increasingly being described
as a cooperative one, thus calling into question the ideal concept
of case disposition through adversary proceedings.

When the

defense attorney is a member of the public court orjanization,
i.e., a public defender, his or her role is particularly problematic.
Ideally, the public defender represents the interests of the accused
~ld

thus stands in opposition to the attempts of the state to

prosecute fully a given case.

Yet the public defender is also part

of an organization which requires coordination and cooperation in
order to satisfy functional needs.

Blumberg (1967) argued that the

public defender acts as an agent-mediator who helps the accused
"redefine the situation and restructure perceptions concomitant
with a plea of guilty."

According to Rosett and Cressey:

it becomes a breach of etiquette for a lawyer
to take a stance so adversary that it disturbes the
conditions of peaceful co-existence (Rosett and
Cressey, 1976: 105).
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In addition, both prosecutors and public defenders belong to the

I

i·'

same professional system, thus promoting cooperation in the
protection of shared professional norms (Sudnow, 1965).

Another

argwnent in favor of the cooperative model is that frequent interaction among members of the public court organization promotes
cooperation (Mulkey, 1974).

Many of these claims are based

primarily on theory; further empirical data are needed to ascertain
the extent to which prosecutors and public defenders share the
same values and perspectives regarding plea bargaining as well as
the fW1ctions and goals of the court system.

Data are also needed

to assess the extent to which key actors perceive of cooperation
as functionally necessary.

In addition to surveying the opinions

of key court actors, the nature and extent of cooperation can be
explored by observing the bargaining process in action, with
attention to the content and frequency of interactions.
While the relationship of the prosecutor and public defender
is of paramount interest in examining the plea bargaining process,
there are other court actors with whom the attorneys must interact.
One obvious key actor in the process is the judge, who has the
ultimate decision power in setting of punishments.

Although, as

a result of the bargaining process, the prosecutor's charge may
reduce the legal limits of punishment, within those limits the
prosecutor can only make sentence recommendations.

In addition to

those recommendations, the judge receives inputs from the police,
the probation department, and the defense attorney.

Although in

theory the final decision regarding punishment is guided by the
neutrality of law, in actuality it is also guided by system needs.

I

It is likely, therefore, that the judge will playa cooperative
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role in the routinized case disposition process.

From their

lengthy study, Rosett and Cressey concluded:
for a guilty plea system to work there must
be some reliable expectation of what the sentence
\>lill be if the defendant pleads guilty, and this
expectation inevitably must come explicitly or
tacitly from the judge who will impose sentence
(Rosett and Cressey, 1976: 80).
There is evidence that prosecutors and defense

atto~~eys

attempt

to become familiar with attitudes and behaviors of individual
judges, ru1d that expectations of particular judges' actions is
an influential factor in charge, plea and bargain decision (Cole,
1970).

Also, Church (1976) found in his study of a mid-western

urban court system that when bargains on a charge are not allowed,
bargains on punishment occur in which the judge becomes a focal
actor in the exchange process.
There is also a need for further research on the nature of
the role of the defendant in the negotiation process.

Although it is

the fate or future of the defendant which is being decided in the
case disposition process, there is evidence that the accused plays
a minor role in the bargaining process (Rosett and Cressey, 1976).
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Propositions
It was the assumption of this study that case disposition
through a bargaining process in which commodities are exchanged
(charges, pleas, punishments) by key court actors (prosecutors,
defense attorneys, judges) with the goal of obtaining a guilty
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plea without trial has become the dominant "method of action" in
American court systems due to its provisions for both functional
I,

f· .

and ideal goals which are not clearly provided for in the ideal
I'

i
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system.

This assumption, based upon organization and exchange

!

theories, as well as prior studies of American court systems, was
subjected to empirical examination through a research focus on the
following four general propositions.
Proposition I.

The majority of felony cases which result

in formal charges are settled by guilty pleas, and the majority
of guilty plea dispositions are the result of some kind of bargain
which explicitly or implicitly invovles punishment reduction.
Proposition II.

Case disposition through negotiation is

routinized, i.e., there are identifiable patterns both in the
substance of the bargain and in the procedures for the exchange
which are known to and accepted by key court actors.
Proposition III.

Key actors in the negotiation process,

the prosecutor and the defense

~ttorneYI

work in cooperation

with one rulother and interact frequently.
Proposition IV.

The negotiation process provides for the

needs of key actors to be active participants, to work toward ideal
goals, and to receive rewards for their work.

\

Exploratory Areas
;

It has also been suggested that a thorough analysis of case
disposition through negotiation requires further exploration of
certain features of the process.

By examining in detail the case

disposition process in one urban court system, such an exploration
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was achieved.

Based upon the findings, a model of the court system

under study was constructed which was analyzed both in terms of its
theoretical relevance and in terms of its similarities and dissimilarities to previously researched systems.

Additionally, formal

plea negotiation policies in the system under study underwent
certain changes between 1976 and 1977 ltlhich allowed for the incor-·
poration of intra-system comparisons into the analytical model.
The following aspects of court operations and plea negotiations
have been explored and the findings included in the model of felony
disposition in one court system:
The formal organization.
Structure, procedure, policy.
Intra-organization comparisons.
The nature of the process of case disposition through
negotiation.
Relationship between the formal and actual proces~.
Routinization in the process.
The nature of the exchange relationship.
Cooperative and adversary roles.
Facilitation of compliance and commitment.
The nature of the substance of ca.se disposition.
Characteristics of offenses, offenders and dispositions.
Relationships between offenses, offenders and dispositions.
Types of bargains.
Relationship of bargains to substantive law.
Routinization of bargains.
Factors which influence disposition decisions.
Relationships between bargains and punishment.
Other factors which influence punishment.
Relationship between beliefs about and actualities of the
process and substance of case disposition through negotiation.
Policy changes aimed at restricting bargaining.
Effects on production and efficiency.
Effects on disposition outcomes.
Effects on the exchange relationship.

29

The way in which case disposition without trial satisfies
functional needs and ideal goals.
Attitudes and actualities.

Summary
Chapter I has introduced the research problem, set forth the
theoretical framework, and discussed prior research.

,

Additionally,

the research problem has been explicitly defined in the form of

t

i'

four general propositions and an outline of the exploratory areas
which have been subjected to empirical investigation.

,
t

The research

methodology of the study is described in detail in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER II
RESEARCHING THE PROBLEM:
DESIGN, SETTING, SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The purpose of this study was to examine a particular process,
i.e., case disposition without trial, within an organizational
context, i.e., the public court system.

Although the study had an

explicit theoretical focus as well as a set of initial propositions
based upon theory and previous research, the general orientation
of the study was exploratory.

In order to grasp fully the nature

and meaning of the case disposition process, a decision was made
to do an in-depth study of the social reality of this phenomenon in
one urban court system.

The intent of the study was not purely

descriptive; rather, description was used to facilitate interpretative
and explanatory analyses of the topic under study.

Comparisons of

the findings with those from similar studies as well as assessments
of the theoretical relevance of the data further facilitated such
analyses.

Considering the purpose and the nature of the study, it

seemed appropriate to adopt field research as the methodological
model.
Field research is a broad label which covers a variety of
scientific endeavors utilizing a number of specific methodological
techniques.

The field research design deemed to be appropriate for
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the present study has the following characteristics.

First, it

attempts to comprehend the social reality of a total field area.
The research design must incorporate techniques for examining the
"total picture," for the focus is not on isolated parts of the
whole, but rather on the way in which the parts fit into a model
of the whole.

In the present study, the "total picture" referred

to case disposition within a formal organization.
parts which formed the whole were:

The component

the formal and informal

structures, procedures and norms of the organization; the formal
and informal process of case disposition without trial; the substance
and outcomes of case disposition; the attitudes and behaviors of key
actors in the disposition process.
A second characteristic of this methodological model is that
it is non-experimental.

Neither the setting nor the other variables

lmder study are controlled or manipulated.

Whereas an experimental

study tests relationships by comparing data on experimental and
control groups, the field study examines relationships as they
occur naturally.

Without an experimental design, the testing of

pre-determined hypotheses is at the least problematic.

When the

orientation of the study is exploratory, the testing of hypotheses
is even less appropriate.
Although direct observation is the data-collection technique
most often associated with field research, a growing number of
field studies combine observations with other techniques in order
to strengthen the likelihood of accurately depicting the total
reality of the field of study.

The use of multiple data sources
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(often referred to as triangulation) is thus another characteristic

I

!
f

!

of the model used in the present study.

The use of multiple methods

for data collection lends itself to a mixture of qualitative and
quantitative methods of data analysis.

This mixture is another

component of the methodology utilized in the current study.

For

a further elaboration of the advantages of the field research model
in an eJcploratory study see Appendix A.

THE RESEARCH SETTING

The research took place in an urban county in the Pacific
Northwest.

The 1970 Census data provided a general description

of the population of the county (although the actual statistics
obviously have changed since 1970, the overall profile remains the
same).

The total population of the county numbered 556,667.

Slightly over half of the population was female, and 30 percent
of the population was under age 35.
the residents were white.

The overwhs1itling majority of

Blacks made up only 4 percent of the

population, and those defined as "persons of Spanish language" made
up another 2 percent.

There was a small percentage (5 percent) of

foreign born individuals.
The popUlation was also relatively stable.
not changed residences between 1965 and 1970.

Another 28 percent had

changed residences, but remained in the same SMSA.

,!

!

Fifty percent had

Of all housing

units, 58 percent were owner-occupied.
The population also showed relative stability regarding income
and employment.

Only 8 percent of families had an income below the
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poverty level.
, ..
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Seventy-six percent of males over 16 were employed,

as were 45 percent of females over 16 years of age.

Table I

indicates the distribution of employee groups.

TABLE I

PERSONS 16 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER EMPLOYED IN SELECTED
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, BY PERCENT:
1970 COUNTY CENSUS DATA

Occupational Category
Professional, technical and kindred workers
Manager and administrators, except farm
Sales workers
Clerical and kindred workers
Craftsmen, formen and kindred workers
Operatives, except transport
Transport equipment operatives
Laborers, except farm
Farm workers
Service workers
Private household workers

15%
9%
9%
22%
13%
10%
4%
5%
1%
13%
1%

Finally, the education level of the population further
suggested stability.

Only 10 percent of the people between the

ages of 16 and 21 were not high school graduates or not enrolled
in school.

Over 24,000 of the residents under age 35 were enrolled

in college.
The general population of the county in which the research took
place, then, did not appear to suffer overall from the deprivations
indicated in the statistics on many other urban jurisdictions in
the country.

3<1

DATA COLLECTION:

SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES

Four types of data were collected, two from secondary sources
and two from primary sources.
official documents.

The first secondary source was

Information regarding the formal structures,

procedures and policies of case disposition within the court
organization was collected from official documents produced within
i

l

l
f

,
f.

the system.

The Offices of the District Attorney and Public Defender

provided information about the formal organization of their offices.
Info~nation

about the formal organization was also collected from

state statutes.
The other secondary source was records kept by the organization
on felony cases settled in 1976 and 1977.

Two random samples were

taken from the Criminal Court records of cases settled in 1976 and
1977.
dra~1

Ten percent samples (one for 1976 and one for 1977) were
from a master list of felony cases alphabetized by defendants'

last names.

The drawing of every tenth case for which an arrest and

closing took place in 1976 yielded a sample of 306 cases for this
year.

'!'he method for drawing a sample of 1977 was the same; however,

only cases for which there was an arrest and closing from June
through December were included in the 1977 sample.

The decision to

use only the population from July through December in 1977 was based
on the fact that new policies instituted by the Office of the District
Attorney expanding the list of non-negotiable felonies went into
effect in July of 1977 (see Chapter III).

Although this decision

meant that the sample size for 1977 would be considerably smaller
(n = 163), it was felt that comparisons would more accurately reflect
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the case settlement process before and after the policy changes.
Data were collected on 33 variables (see Appendix B for a list of
variables and codings).
all the variables.

,

1.

r~ .

Not all case files contained information on

There are no apparent reasons to suspect, however,

that these omissions were not randomly distributed.

In addition to

r·f

these random samples, summary statistics compiled by Criminal Court

:.
,,

~

on the number and type of closings for the total populations of

l'
,l .

felony cases in 1976 and 1977 were used as a check on the reliability

,

of the samples.

r

I.
~ '.
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These summary statistics did indicate that the

!

i

f

samples were indeed representative of the total popUlations.
The researcher attempted to collect data from the case files
of the Office of the Public Defender of the county on 17 variables
(see Appendix C for a list of variables and codings) for the total
populations of initial charge Burglary I and Forgery I cases which
were closed by the Public Defender's Office between July and
December of 1977.

Since a number of these files were in use by

attorneys and thus not available for researching, the total population
goal was not reached.

Of the population of 46 Burglary I cases,

data were collected on 33.

Of the population of 59 Forgery I cases,

data were collected on 47.

In addition, data were not available on

type closing, judge or sentence for the 10 Burglary I cases and the
8 Forgery I cases in which there was a change of attorney after
assignment (and thus a public defender did not handle the case
through to closing).

Data were also missing on other variables for

these latter cases, particularly when the change of attorney took
place early in the process.

Summary statistics were also taken
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from Public Defender records on type offense and type closing for
the July to December period in 1977.
The selection of the variables on which data were collected
from case files was based on the research problem as outlined in
the propositions and the areas for exploration.

The choice of

variables was also determined in part by the findings from other
studies of case disposition in which relevant relationships were
indicated.

Finally, of course, the selection was limited by the

information provided in the case files.

For example, the researcher

had hoped to collect data on the race of the defendant; however, race
was not recorded in the Criminal Court files.

While race was

recorded in the Public Defender files, the small number of cases
investigated in this data set rendered conclusions regarding race
tenuous at best.
Interviews were the source of the third type of data.

Three

groups of court actors were interviewed by the researcher:
public defenders, prosecutors and judges.

These three groups were

selected because of their roles as key actors in the disposition
process in general and in the negotiation process in particular.
Although it is recognized that both private and public attorneys are
key actors in the bargaining process, the focus of this study was on
the way in which members of the public court system perceived this
system.

In addition, it was necessary to set some limits on the

number of people interviewed.

Since nearly half of all felony

cases in this county were handled by the public defender system, the
,',;

decision was made to interview only this group of public defense
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attorneys.

The intent was to interview all public defenders,

prosecutors and judges who handled felony cases in this county.

All

felony public defenders in the county (plus five who had recently
left the office) were interviewed, resulting in a total population
of 15.

Due to time constraints on their office, the District

Attorney decided that only five full interviews could be granted.
The interviewees, all high-level deputy district attorneys, were
selected by the D.A.'s Office.

In addition to these five complete

interviews, nine prosecutors from the coUnty office responded to
the questionnaire segment of the interview form.

These latter

respondents were also selected by the D.A.'s Office.

Eleven of the

13 Circuit Court judges who handled felony cases agreed to be and
were interviewed, but only 8 of them agreed to fill out the questionnaire.
The interviews consisted of two parts.

At the beginning of the

interview, respondents were given a questionnaire which called for
written responses to questions using a five-point rating scale.
with the exception of the nine prosecutors who filled out this form
on their own, respondents completed the questionnaire in the presence
of the researcher.

This afforded an opportunity to make written

notes on comments made by the interviewees as they filled out the
form.

The second part of the interview called for open-ended

verbal responses to a standard set of questions asked of the
respondent by the interviewer.

The questions calling for verbal

responses are stated in full in Chapter VI.
naire form is found in Appendix D.

A copy of the question-
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The construction of the interview instrument was accomplished
by identifying the key concepts outlined in the propositions and
exploratory areas and then operationalizing these concepts with the
aid of instruments used in previous studies of the same concepts.
The interview was pre-tested by giving it to three attorneys who
work or have worked in the court system of this county.

Their

suggestions (as well as those of academic experts in the field) led
to some modifications in the interview form.

In spite of these

checks, it became clear as the interviews proceeded that certain
questions were consistently problematic, in that the meaning or
wording was unclear or unfamiliar to the respondents.

A discussion

of these problematic questions is included in Chapter VI.
Overall, the data-collection process took the researcher
(working alone) five months.

During this five-month period (from

November, 1976 through March, 1977), the investigation included
continual observations of the case disposition process within the
court system.

Casual conversations with court actors yielded

various pieces of information which have been incorporated into the
analysis of the findings.

Also, a variety of general impressions

were recorded from the direct observation of a number of trials,
hearings and informal exchanges between court actors.
In addition to these exploratory observations, standardized
schedules were constructed and used for recording data on observations
of two activities in the case disposition process.
for the observations of pre-trial conferences.

The first was

These conferences,

mandatory for all felony cases, represent the setting in which the
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formal negotiation process takes place.

Although generally the

only people allowed in the room during a pre-trial conference were
the attorneys and the defendant, the investigator was granted
permission by the attorneys and defendants involved in five different
cases to sit in as an observer.

The observation schedule (see

Appendix E) called for the recording of each comment in the sequence
in which it took place.

Recorded for each comment were the following:

the speaker; the content, coded as one of 16 categories; whether
the verbalization was a statement or a question.

Additional nota-

tions were made regarding the conversations as time allowed, and
finally, the duration time of each conference was recorded.
The second set of observations made with a pre-determined
schedule was of guilty plea hearings and sentencings in Chief Criminal
Court.

Recordings were made as the observer sat as a spectator

in the courtroom.

Since these hearings were open

t~

anyone,

permission to observe was not necessary, nor was invasion of privacy
a concern.

The great majority of hearings were completed within

five minutes, with several more minutes elapsing prior to the next
hearing.

The entire conversation of each hearing was recorded

(either by a summary of each comment or by a direct quotation).
Observations of 25 hearings were made in this manner.
METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS
Data collected from written documents describing the formal
structures, procedures and policies of case disposition within the
court system were analyzed qualitatively.

This information was
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used to describe the formal organization and to point out the way
in which the formal organization (as depicted by the organization
itself) did or did not differ from the informal organization.
Data from the case files on settled felony cases were subjected to quantitative analysis.

First, the frequency distributions

of the coded variables were prepared.

Second, relationships between

variables were ascertained through cross tabulations and computation of chi square values.

Some relationships, while not reaching

statistical significance, nevertheless indicated trends or patterns
which were described with the use of percentage statistics.

Through-

out the analysis of the findings from the case files data, percentage
descriptions were used generously, based upon the belief that this
kind of numerical description had the distinct advantage of presenting the data in a manner which could be clearly communicated to
the court actors and to the public in general.

Since a major goal

of this research undertaking was to provide system members and the
general public with information about the reality of the case disposition process, easy communication was a methodological priority.
In addition to frequencies, percentages and tests of statistical
significance, relationships were described qualitatively in order
to analyze the meaning of the findings in terms of the total picture
of case disposition.
The questionnaire part of the interview yielded interval
level data.

However, the use of inferential sample statistics

for analysis of these data was inappropriate since the respondent
groups were not random or representative samples (in fact, one group
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was a total population and another group was just short of a total
population).

Thus, these data were presented with the use of

descriptive statistics:

means, modes, ranges and standard deviations.

Inferential analysis was done qualitatively.
For the open-ended, conversational part of the interview, each
question was separately analyzed.

Between and within group differ-

ences were pointed out by noting the numbers of respondents who
held similar or opposing views.

The content of the responses was

qualitatively described and relationships were noted between attitudes
of the interviewees and the data on case disposition collected from
other sources.

Again, the ultimate purpose was to show the way in

which the parts fit into a picture of the whole.
While the analysis of the pre-trial observations included
numerical accounts of the frequency and order of comments, the
major analytical focus of the observational data was on the content
of the activities.

The content of the observations was analyzed

qualitatively, again with an eye toward relationships to data from
the other sources and toward the overall picture of the case
disposition process.

Particular care was taken to distinguish

between the description of events and observer impressions or
interpretations of those events.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preceding discussions of the field research model and
the specific methodology for this study indicate that this type
of research is no small undertaking.

It is not surprising,
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therefore, that a number of questions have been raised regarding the
"methodological soundness" of the field research model on which this
study was based.

Appendix A is devoted to a discussion of these

questions and reflects the author's confidence in the appropriatenesss
of this methodology for the present study.
In this chapter, the research design, setting and methods for
data collection and analysis have been described.

Beginning with the

next chapter, the remainder of the dissertation is given over to a
presentation and analysis of the research findings.
organization is described in Chapter II.

The formal

The findings from records

and case files are presented in Chapters IV and V.

Chapter VI deals

with the interview data, and Chapter VII focuses on the observational
data.

In the final chapter, a model of the case disposition process

in the court system under study is set forth.

Accompanying the

model is a detailed analysis of the findings in terms of their
relationship to theory and previous research.

CHAPTER III
THE FORMAL ORGANIZATION:
STRUCTURES, PROCEDURES AND POLICIES
INTRODUCTION
The formal organization under study was the felony court
system in one urban county.

The specific research focus was on

three parts of the formal organization:

(1) felony court, in

which accused felons were processed from initial charge to final
disposition; (2) the Office of the District Attorney, through which
the prosecution process took place; (3) the Office of the Public
Defender, through which the defense process for approximately half
of accused felons took place.

Although all three were inter-

dependent parts of the overall public court system, the formal
organization of each was independently examined in order to assess
the relationship of the parts to the whole.
The court system which had as its jurisdiction the county
under study was located in the central city of the county.

The

building which housed the courtrooms, judges' chambers, records
divisions and District Attorney's Office (plus a number of other
county offices) was the County Courthouse.

The top floor of this

building was a jail, used primarily as a temporary holding center

,
for accused offenders at various stages of the court process.

The

county office of the public defender system was located in a separate
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office building several blocks away from the c0arthouse.

Also,

a separate building in the immediate area provided a second office
site for the district attorney system.

Following is a description

of the formal organization of felony court, the Office of the District
Attorney and the Office of the Public Defender.
FELONY COURT
Felony defendants moved in and out of various locations within
the courthouse as their cases proceeded toward final disposition.
The first appearance of the defendant took place in a courtroom
(with easy access to the jail) over which different District Court
judges presided on assignment.

This appearance--at which time the

formal charge was gone over, the defendant was assured of an attorney,
and the date for a preliminary hearing was set--was required by law
to take place within 24 hours of the defendant's arrest.

The second

appearance was at the preliminary hearing (held in a different
courtroom), the purpose of which was to determine whether or not
the evidence warranted a formal arraignment on the charge.

If the

decision was affirmative, the defendant appeared in the Chief
Criminal Courtroom for the formal arraignment.

At the arraignment,

the defendant entered a not-guilty plea (if he or she refused to
enter such a plea, one was automatically entered), and the dates for
the pre-trial conference (the plea negotiation session) and the
actual trial were set.

The pre-trial conference date must be within

15 days of the formal arraignment.

After the pre-trial conference,

the defendant could enter a petition to change the plea of guilty
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either to a plea of not-guilty or to a plea to a bargained charge.
If the accused had entered a plea to a misdemeanor rather than to
the original felony (or if the judge decided to grant misdemeanor
status at the plea hearing), he or she could waive sentence postponement and be sentenced at the same time that the plea was
entered and accepted by the judge.

The guilty plea hearing did

not, of course, take place if the defendant maintained the notguilty position.

If the individual plead guilty to a felony, a

pre-sentence investigation was required prior to sentencing.
an investigation then took from four to six weeks.
cou~letion

Such

Following the

of the pre-sentence report, the offender either returned

to Chief Criminal Court for sentencing or had his or her case
assigned out to one of the other felony judges for sentencing.
After the initial court appearance in front of a District Court
judge, felony cases was handled by 13 felony court judges who held
the Circuit Court positions (an additional Circuit Ccurt position
was created after the research had been completed).

At all times

one of these 13 judges was sitting on the bench in Chief Criminal
Court.

Through a rotation system, the judges were assigned to

this latter position for a duration of from two to three months.
The result of this system was that the majority of cases was heard
and settled by only a few judges in any given year.

Another Circuit

Court judge was elected to serve as Presiding Judge; his or her
responsibilities were the handling of civil cases, administrative
activities, and the assignment of trials to judges.
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The judges as a group played an active role in the structuring
of the case disposition process.

Through this administrative role,

they had set up the mandatory pre-trial conference, the mandatory
pre-sentence investigation for convicted felons, and the guidelines
for speedy disposition of cases.
for~mal

State statutes gave further

recognition to the procedures for plea bargaining and speedy

case disposition.

In addition to the procedures for plea negotiation,

policy on plea bargaining is outlined in the state statutes (see
Appendix F).

The Speedy Trial Act passed by the legislature states

that cases must be disposed of within 60 days or dismissed.
The courtrooms were physically designed in such a way as to
create an aura of awe and respect.

The rooms were very large; the

ceilings were high; the decor was austere.

The judge sat at the

back of the room, set off from others by a raised platform and
podimo--both effective boundaries.

The hard-back spectator benches

were similar to those found in churches.

All court authorities

were formally dressed, but the dress of the judge indicated the
highest status.

Beginning with the entrance of the judge into

the courtroom, a number of verbal rituals followed which further
added to the atmosphere of austerity and formality.
The only courtroom which deviated from the above description
was the Chief Criminal Court.
than the other courtrooms.
thus the

spectato~s

This room was considerably smaller

The spectator section was very small, and

were situated quite close to the judge.

The

pre-trial conference rooms could only be entered from the inside of
this courtroom, and the entrance was located between the spectator
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section and the judge's podium.

There was continual traffic in and

out of these rooms while cases were being heard.

The enormous

amount of continual activity provided for an atmosphere which was
much less austere than in the other courtrooms.
Overall, then, the organization of felony court was highly
formalized and structured.

The judges played an active administrative

role (formalizing and structuring the disposition process) as well
as the traditional judicial role.

The formal organization was

backed up by state statutes which provide not only procedural rules
but also policy guidelines for case disposition through guilty pleas.
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Formal Structure
The Office of the District Attorney is responsible for
prosecuting all criminal cases.

With the aid of federal monies,

the Office had expanded its operations considerably in recent
years.

Two separate buildings in the central city provided office

sites.

Headed by the elected District Attorney, the Office staff

consisted of 152 deputy district attorneys, investigators, and other
professional and clerical staff.

The staff size had increased

noticeably over the last 20 years.

In 1956, the Office had a staff

of 27, consisting only of deputy district attorneys and clerical
personnel.
Along with the increase in size, the Office had become specialized in its division of labor.
felony cases.

Seventeen deputy attorneys handled

Additionally, two attorneys were assigned to the

Intake Office, their task being to review all misdemeanor cases and

:~'

,

48

decide whether or not to proceed with prosecution.

The professional

staff were also assigned to special units and divisions within the
Office.

There were six units handling different offense types.

Unit A handled arson, felony driving and some burglary cases;
unit B was assigned drug, pornography and prostitution cases; Unit C
handled burglary, robbery, weapon offenses and negligent homicide;
sex crimes and assaults were assigned to Unit D; and finally cases
handled by unit E were described as fraud and white collar offenses.
Unit U was the Career Criminal Dnit, which handled a variety of
offenses in which the defendant had been declared by the Office to
be a career criminal.
Two special divisions within the Office were Child Support and
Juvenile Justice.

The Child Support Unit was responsible for

the enforcement of child support obligations and for trying
paternity suits in the county.

The Juvenile Justice Division handled

cases against juvenile defendants and acted as an advocate for
children involved in abuse, neglect and termination of parental
rights cases.
There were two relatively new programs in which Office
personnel expressed particular pride.
program which included three projects:

The first was a victims' aid
Victim's Assistance Project;

Rape Victim Assistance Project; Project Repay (all established in
the last five years).

The other program was composed of three special

prosecution units, aimed at "taking a hard line" against certain
offenses/offenders.

The No Plea Bargaining Unit initiated in 1973

directed its efforts toward the reduction or elimination of plea
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bargaining on certain cases.

Initially, this unit focused on

burglary and robbery cases, but recently expanded its operations
to include other offenses (see following section on plea bargaining
policy).

The Career Criminal unit discussed above was funded by

the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1976 and was
another of the "hard line" programs aimed at controlling crime.
This program was carried out by five deputy attorneys and support
staff who, according to the Office manual
. • • devote their full energies and special
prosecution techniques toward building solid cases
and securing substantial sentences for those
offenders whose criminal career poses, and continues
to pose, a threat to the lives and property of the
citizens in our community.
The Negligent Homicide Unit, funded by the state Traffic Safety
Commission, was the responsibility of specially trained deputy
attorneys whose duty was to aid in investigation and prosecution
of cases in which traffic accidents resulted in fatalities.
Recent re-organization of the D.A.'s Office emphasized a
team approach to the handling of cases.

The manual stated:

The felony attorneys are divided into crirnespecific teams that correspond to and work with
crime-specific police investigative units. With
this reorganization, the team which makes the
initial decision to file charges also tries the
case.
There are two ways in which felony cases may be initiated.

The first

is to present a case to a Grand Jury, which decides whether or not
the facts suggest that there is enough evidence for issuing a charge
against a defendant.

The second method is the filing of charges

through the District Attorney's Information of Felony, which gives
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the formal decision-making power to the District Attorney.

The

majority of felony cases were initiated by Information, and the use
of the Information was increasing (in 1976, initiation by Information
increased by 53 percent, whereas Grand Jury initiations decreased
by 28 percent).
It was clear that the District Attorney's Office in this
county had a complex social structure characterized by specialization.
Documents compiled by the Office clearly depic'ted the formal organization by delineating statuses, roles and procedures within the
structure.

Additionally, care had been taken by the Office to set

down in writing lengthy descriptions of Office policy.

Of relevance

to the present study was the Office's description of plea bargaining
policy.
Plea Bargaining:

Formal Policy

The Office of the District Attorney had formally recognized
plea bargaining as a method in case disposition.

The policy manual

included a section entitled "Plea Negotiation Policy--Adult Felony
Charges," in which the philosophy and guidelines for plea bargaining
were explicitly stated.

In the first paragraph of this section, plea

bargaining was given formal recognition:
As a part of its professional responsibilities, the
office is ethically required to make known its general
policy of a willingness to consult with the defense concerning disposition of charges by a plea and to establish
criteria for those discussions and potential agreements.
It has been recognized, of course, that during these
discussions bargaining concerning criminal charges
between defense and prosecution takes several forms.
Sentence bargaining and the dropping of indicted and
unindicted counts (many of which may merge into one
offense regardless) are but two methods of bargaining.

----~.
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Of interest is the fact that bargaining by charge reduction was not
mentioned in this paragraph.

This omission reflected current

efforts by the Office to limit and in some cases eliminate charge
reduction bargains.

Initially, these efforts were formalized by

policy which disallowed bargaining for charge reduction on robbery
and burglary offenses, but the restrictions have been expanded.

As

of June 1, 1977, charge reduction bargains were prohibited for the
following felonies:

(1) Robbery I; (2) Robbery II (committed with

simulated weapon; (3) Burglary I; (4) Burglary II; (5) Theft I;
(6) Furnishing heroin or cocaine; (7) Supplying contraband; (8)
Forgery I; (9) Escape I;
of a firearm;

(10) Escape II; (11) Ex-convict in possession

(12) All cases where the defendant had been designated

as a career criminal by the District Attorney's Career criminal
Project's staff.

The formal policy did, however, include a clause

which made charge reduction permissible for special cases of these
offenses.

This clause read:

This policy recognizes that there will be times when
it is in the interest of justice for a reduction of a
non-reducible charge to occur. It is anticipated that
this will not occur in more than five percent of the
cases in the non-bargainable categories. These
reductions may only occur with the written consent of
the District Attorney or his designate.
The ultimate decision on charge reduction, then, lay with the
District Attorney himself.
The target offenses for the "campaign" to reduce plea
bargaining were either property offenses or victimless crimes.

The

rationale for not including crimes against persons in the nonreducible category had to do with the needs and interests of victims.
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The Office perceived of itself as playing a major role in
victim advocacy:
Because of the District Attorney's policy of total
victim involvement and the consideration of the
victim's needs in the cases of violent crimes against
persons such as rape, sodomy, sex abuses and assault,
the prosecutor shall retain the discretion in these
cases to plea negotiate. The prosecutor is required,
however, to have contact with the victim and take
into consideration the victim's needs and desires in
the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion to
negotiate.
In addition to charge reduction bargaining, formal policy
allowed for the following sentence and charge dismissal bargains
for all felonies:
To make or not oppose favorable recommendations
concerning the sentence which may be imposed if the
accused enters a plea of guilty.
To seek or not to oppose dismissal of the offense
charged if the accused enters a plea of guilty to
another offense reasonably related to the accused
conduct.
To seek or not oppose dismissal of other charges or
potential charges against the accused if the defendant
enters a plea of guilty.
The selection of the words "reasonably related" in the second type
of bargain implied a recognition that not all guilty pleas would
be to a charge necessarily included in the initial charge.
There were also explicit statements concerning criteria which
were not to be considered in deciding to negotiate for a plea.

It

was strongly stated that plea negotiation should not be undertaken
to meet production needs:
Plea negotiations, however, shall never be used to reduce
case backlogs or reallocate manpower. This would constitute
a flagrant abuse of the process and the inherent responsibility and discretionary powers of the prosecutor.
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However, there were other policy statements which implied a concern
for organizational needs.

For example, it was stated that one

criterion to be used in deciding whether or not to bargain was
the advancement of other prosecution goals through non-prosecution
of certain charges.

It was also stated that plea bargaining could

be undertaken in cases where it appeared that the interests of
effective administration of criminal justice would be served.
These rather vague statements would appear to allow for considerable
flexibility in the decision-making process.
Another criterion which was not to guide plea negotiation
decisions referred to the relationship between the prosecutor and
defense attorney handling a given case:
The choice of defense counsel shall not be a factor in a
deputy district attorney's decision to negotiate or not
negotiate with a defendant. A defendant shall not receive
favorable advantages or unfavorable treatment in negotiations
based upon past or present relationships between defense
counsel and the District Attorney's Office.
This statement implied a concern for equal treatment of cases.

An

equal treatment approach was emphasized in another policy statement:
Similarly situated defendants shall be afforded
equal plea agreement opportunities.
Yet, in still another section, individual ratehr than equal treatment
was emphasized:
The deputy district attorney shall be certain that all
cases are determined individually and on their own' unique
facts and circumstances.
In fact, formal policy outlined criteria which were to be considered
in determining the "availability and acceptance of a guilty plea" for
each individual case.

These criteria included:

seriousness of offense;
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mitigating circumstances; age; background; prior record, attitude
and mental state of the defendant; nature and needs of victims;
attitudes of witnesses; strength of case; arrest circumstances and
attitudes of the arresting officer.
In addition to criteria for deciding whether or not to plea
bargain, formal policy also outlined procedure for plea bargaining.
In line with state law, Office policy was that plea negotiations were
to be carried on only in the presence of defense counsel.

A bargain

could not be offered a defendant without defense counsel's approval.
While this policy was seen by its makers as a due process safeguard,
it did lend support to the contention that the prosecutor and
defense attorney were formally viewed as the key actors in the
bargaining process.

It was the interaction between these two parties

which was essential in order for a bargain to eventually take place.
Procedural policy also stated that the deputy district attorneys
should make known to defense counsel the general policy and willingness of the Office to plea negotiate and to set aside times and
places for negotiation discussions.

Policy statements warned

deupty district attorneys that they were not to make any promises
regarding sentence.
of a recommendation.

Sentence bargaining could only take the form
Again in line with state law, policy stated that

if the prosecutor was unable to fulfill an understanding previously
agreed upon in a plea negotiation, the defense could withdraw the
guilty plea.

It must be assumed that this included sentence agree-

ments; however, since sentence bargains were only recommendations,
the meaning of the plea withdrawal policy for sentence bargains was
unclear.
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This detailed description of plea bargaining policy issued by
the Office of the District Attorney was indicative of the importance
which was attached to the role of plea negotiation in the case
disposition process.

Although they were given lesser space in the

policy manual, guidelines for screening and charging criminal cases
were also explicitly outlined.

These guidelines are described in

the following section.
Screening and Charging:

Formal Policy

Screening refers to a decision not to charge or to dismiss a
charge(s) early in the process.

The policy manual defines screening

as a "process by which a person is removed from the criminal justice
system prior to trial or plea."
prosecution goals.

Screening was alleged to meet two

The first had to do with efficiency needs of the

system:
The first is to eliminate cases which
knows are futile--futile due to lack of
case necessities--and a continuation of
would be fruitless and result in wasted

the prosecution
evidence or other
prosecution process
economic resources.

The second goal was to stop action against people who were found to
be falsely accused.

If either of these criteria applied to a given

case, it would be screened out of the system.

A case might also

be screened out for the following reason:
Specific laws and elements that constitute crime are
legislative responsibilities, but prosecutorial discretion
must be applied in granting "immunity" by screening special
individuals due to extenuating circumstances, i.e.,
individuals who aid law enforcement in the apprehension
of criminals and who participate in certain crimes in doing
so.
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This description is ambiguous.

The suggested reference was to

individuals who had been asked to aid law enforcement and in so
doing had to be involved in a criminal offense.

However, it is

unlikely that individuals acting under the auspices of law enforcement will be subsequently charged with a crime which is part of an
assistance plan.

Whether or not this clause applied to individuals

who first committed an offense and then aggred to assist the system
in exchange for immunity was unclear.
Formal policy emphasized the discretionary power of the
prosecutor in making charge decisions (although a list of factors
to be considered in charge decisions similar to factors to be
considered in bargaining decisions was given).

The following

statements were indicative of the formal policy of discretion:
Within his discretion, the prosecutor shall determine
what charges shall be filed, how many charges shall be
filed, and how charges shall be presented.
The prosecutor is not obligated to file all possible
charges which available evidence might support. The
prosecutor may properly exercise his discretion to
present only those charges which he considers to be
consistent and in the best interest of justice.
While the charging policy was much less restrictive than the plea
bargaining policy, there were two charging restrictions which were
relevant to the present study.

The first implied a concern for

getting convictions:
The prosecutor shall file only those charges which
he believes can be reasonably substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial.
The second referred to the ethical issue of overcharging in
anticipation of plea bargaining:

t~
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The prosecutor shall not attempt to utilize charging
decisions only as a leverage device in obtaining guilty
pleas to lesser charges.
The policies of the District Attorney's Office concerning plea
bargaining, charging and screening were numerous and well-delineated.
They attended to a variety of needs and goals of the criminal justice
system.

The complexity of the formal policies complemented the

complexity of the formal structure of the Office.
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
While the Office of the Dis·trict Attorney was a part of the
county court system and was allocated funding as a part of the system,
the Office of the Public Defender was a non-profit private corporation
operating under contract with the county.

As such, the Public

Defender's Office was an independent organization and not vunerable
to changes in funding allocations in the same way as was the District
Attorney's Office.

Under contract, the Public Defender's Office

agreed to handle a certain number of civil and criminal cases in a
given year for a set fee.

Thus, the Office knew in advance what

its case load would be for the year and could plan accordingly.

From

June 30, 1977 to June 30, 1978, the designated caseload for the Office
in this county was 1,520 felonies, 1,200 misdemeanors and up to
1,000 civil commitments.
The formal title of the Office was the Metropolitan Public
Defender Office, and the Office under study was actually a branch
(although it was the central and largest branch) of the metropolitan
organization.

The individual who headed the entire Metropolitan
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Office was called the Public Defender (his office was in the central
Office under study).

Staff attorneys were not called public defenders,

but rather were referred to as attorneys who work for the Public
Defender's Office (in the text of this paper, however, they are
referred to as public defenders for the purpose of role identification).
The Public Defender's Office of the county under study was
located in an office building several blocks away from the County
Courthouse.

Offices were located on two floors in this building.

In addition to the Public Defender, there were 13 attorneys in this
Office, 8 of whom worked specifically on felony cases.

In addition,

there were investigators, attorney assistants and clerical staff-the entire staff consisting of approximately 80 individuals.
The eight felony attorneys, working in teams of two, were
responsible for a designated number of cases on a weekly basis.
Case assignment was randomly carried out through a rotation system.
A team appeared in District court for two weeks, during which time
it picked up 18 cases.

The third week, the team appeared in Circuit

Court and picked up another eight cases.

The fourth week was known

as "free week," and during this time the team picked up no new cases.
In any given week, then, there were two teams in District Court and
one team in Circuit Court for case assignment.

The only cases which

were not randomly picked up through this sytem were those declared
as "major cases," i.e., homicides or others so declared due to their
need for greater time and effort than routinely expected.

Major

cases were assigned only to senior attorneys; however, within this
group, assignment was done on a rotation basis.

The Public
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Defender himself did not have a caseload; his role was administrative
(he also appeared to be counted on quite heavily as an advisor to the
staff attorneys).
It was the researcher's impression that the Public Defender's
Office operated under an atmosphere of informality and intimacy
(particularly in comparison to the Courthouse or the District
Attorney's Office).

All levels of staff referred to one another on

a first-name basis, and interactions suggested no feelings of
superiority/inferiority.

In fact, this lack of hierarchical

structure apparent to the observer was promoted by the Public Defender
and was an integral part of formal Office policy.
The underlying philosophy of the Public Defender's Office was
that attorneys and their professional assistants were independently
responsible for the entire handling of a case once it was assigned
to them.

The way in which the case was to be handled from start to

finish was decided by the attorney and assistants to which it had
been assigned.

Beyond the legal rules, the attorneys were free

to make their own judgments as to the way in which the case would
be handled.

This philosophy, then, was really the Office policy.

Unlike the Office of the District Attorney, the Office of the Public
Defender had no policy manual.
of purposes and goals.

What it did have was a brief statement

According to this statement, the Public

Defender's Office was concerned with the following:
Providing the best possible legal defense services
to indigents as determined and appointed by the courts.
Providing those services at a savings to governmental
units entering into service contracts with the
Metropolitan Public Defender Services.

:
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Extending specialized knowledge of defense counseling
to the benefit of clients, judicial system and the
private bar.
The philosophy of independence and individual responsibility was
formalized in these words:
• • • that which best serves the client and office
is what is expected of every employee, limited only by
a commitment to working within and improving the criminal
justice system.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A description of the formal organization of the public court
system indicated both similarities and differences between the subparts.

Both Felonly Court and the Office of the District Attorney

were highly formalized and structured.

By comparison, the Office

of the Publi.c Defender appeared informal.

Role specialization was

dominant in the structure of the Office of the District Attorney.
Role generalization better characterized the activities of Circuit
Court judges and attorneys in the Office of the Public Defender.
It was clear that the Offices of the District Attorney and
Public Defender in this county differed both in structure and policy.
The larger District Attorney's Office had a noticeably more complex
structure which was basically hierarchical.

Formal policy statements

were detailed and lengthy, allowing for little decision-making at
the lower staff levels.

Both the structure and the philosophy which

guided the Public Defender's Office emphasized individual responsibility for decision-making; policy guidelines were general and brief.
Whereas plea bargaining was given specific attention in the policy
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manual of the District Attorney's Office (and showed a close
relationship to the statutory guidelines), it was not directed by
formal policy in the Public Defender's Office.
The formal organization provides the setting in which felony
cases are processed and settled.

The substance of the disposition

process, i.e., characteristics of offenses, offenders and outcomes,
is the subject of the next two chapters, in which the findings from
case records and files are discussed.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF OFFENSES, OFFENDERS AND DISPOSITIONS:
CRIMINAL COURT FELONY CASES
INTRODUCTION
Essential to the understanding of the totality of the case
settlement process in a given court system is a statistical
description of the nature of offenses, offenders and dispositions
processed through the system during the time of the research
undertaking.

A descriptive profile of the populations of offenses,

offenders and dispositions--presented in the first part of this
chapter--was constructed on the basis of frequency distributions of
the variables listed in Table II.
The next task was an analytical examination of the descriptive
data relevant to the specific inquiries of the research endeavor.
This examination was done by identifying statistical relationships
between certain variables which were meaningful for the analytical
purpose of this study.

The findings from this examination are

discussed under five headings--each of which attends directly to the

,
form and/or outcome of case disposition through negotiation.
areas are:

These

(1) the relationships between closing types (straight

guilty pleas, bargained guilty pleas, trials and dismissals) and
offense/offender characteristics; (2) the relationships between
closing types, offense/offender characteristics and punishment; (3)
the relationship of original charges to reduced charges; (4) the
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TABLE II
VARIABLES ON WHICH DATA WERE COLLECTED
FROM CRIMINAL COURT FELONY CASE FILES
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.
10.
ll.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Initial most serious charge
Initial charge: 2nd count
Initial charge: 3rd count
Initial charge: 4th count
Number initial counts
Number initial felony counts
Settled most serious charge
Settled charge: 2nd count
Settled charge: 3rd count
Settled charge: 4th count
Number settled counts
Number settled felony counts
No contest plea
Type closing
Number setovers
Type attorney
Judge

lB.
19.
20.
2l.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
2B.
29.
30.
3l.
32.
33.

Pre-trial custody status
Sentence: incarceration
Fine
Drug or alcohol program
Mental health program
Restitution
Community services
Month arrest
Total disposition time
Sex of defendant
Age of defendant
Prior record of defendant
Education of defendant
Employment of defendant
Residence of defendant
D.A. unit (1977 only)

relationship between closing types and efficient production; (5)
changes in patterns from 1976 to 1977.
Ultimately, these findings from the Criminal Court case files
were interwoven with the findings from other data sources to form the
model of case disposition in one urban court system which is presented
in the final chapter.
Data discussed in this chapter were collected from individual
case files from the County Criminal Court Records Division.

Two 10

percent samples (one for 1976 and one for the latter half of 1977)
were drawn from a master list of felony cases settled in these years
(see Chapter II).
in Table II.

Data were collected on the 33 variables listed

Not all case files contained information on all the

variables, and, in particular, the number of cases with missing

i
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data on defendant characteristics was relatively high.

There is no

reason to suspect, however, that missing data were not random.
In the following pages, certain offense types are referred
to by an abbreviated label.

These labels, described in Table III,

not only serve the interests of brevity, but also were used commonly
within the court system.
TABLE III
ABBREVIATIONS FOR OFFENSE TYPES
CAID:
CDP:
Burg:
Forg:
Rob:
UUV:

ECPFA:
DUlL:
DWS:
Sod:
Att:

Criminal Activity in Drugs
Criminal Drug Promotion
Burglary
Forgery
Robbery
Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle
Ex-Con in Possession of a Firearm
Driving Under the Influence of Liquor
Driving While Suspended
Sodomy
Attempted
A PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE POPULATIONS

The Nature of Offenses
Drug and petty property offenses accounted for the majority of
initial charge offenses and the overwhelming majority of settled
charge offenses in both years.

Tables IV and V present the frequency

distributions of most serious initial and settled charges for both
years.

Due to the small number of cases in 1977, robberies and

other property crimes were not broken down further as they were for
1976.

Crimes against the person were divided for 1976 into homicides,

kidnaps, assaults and sex crimes.

For 1977, sex crimes were coded

separately, but homicides, kidnaps and assaults were placed into one
category.
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TABLE IV

MOST SERIOUS INITIAL CHARGE:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER of 1977,
BY PERCENT
1977

1976
CAID

19%

CAID

19%

Theft I

12%

Burg I

12%

Burg I

8%

Forg I

10%

other Burg

8%

Traffic

10%

UUV

7%

Other Property

9%

Rob I

7%

Theft I

7%

Assaults

7%

Rob

7%

Forg I

5%

Misc.

5%

Homicides/
Assau1ts/
Kidnaps

7%

other Rob

5%

Misc.

6%

Escape/ECPFA

4%

Escape/ECPFA

4%

Sex Crimes

4%

Other Burg

4%

Traffic

3%

Sex Crimes

3%

Homicides

3%

Other Drug

1%

Other Property

2%

Kidnaps

2%

Other Drug

1%

TOTAL

100% (306)

TOTAL

100% (163)
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TABLE V
MOST SERIOUS SETTLED CHARGE:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
1977

1976
Other Drug

11%

Other Property

11%

Theft I

9%

Traffic

11%

other Burg

9%

CAID

11%

UUV

8%

Forg

11%

Misc.

H

Theft I

10%

Rob I

7%

Other Drug

9%

Assaults

7%

Burg I

8%

CAID

7%

Misc.

8%

Other Property

6%

Other Rob

6%

Homicides/
Assaults/
Kidnaps

7%

Burg I

6%

Other Burg

7%

Escape/ECPFA

4%

Sex Crimes

4%

Forg

4%

Rob

4%

Sex Crimes

4%

Escape/ECPFA

1%

Traffic

4%

Homicides

2%

TOTAL

TOTAL

100% (253)

100%

(141)

----.~-
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As these tables indicate, CAID was the most cammon initial
charge, accounting for 19 percent of the total initial charges in
both years.

From Tables VI and VII it can be seen that the majority

of cases were property offenses.

Crimes against the person made up

a small minority of the offense types.

Noticeable was the increase

in the proportion of traffic offenses from 1976 to 1977, largely
due to a legislative change making some traffic offenses felonies
rather than misdemeanors.

Relatively uncommon as settled charges

were the most serious, Class A felonies (for a listing of the
felony and misdemeanor levels of different offenses see Appendix G).
TABLE VI
INITIAL CHARGE CATEGORIES:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
1977

1976
Property (include Rob)

52%

Property (include Rob)

50%

Crimes Against Person

14%

Crimes Against Person

10%

Drugs

20%

Drugs

20%

Traffic

10%

Other

10%

Traffic
Other
TOTAL

3%
11%
100% (306)

TOTAL

100% (163)

The great majority of cases in both years were single count
rather than multiple count cases.

As indicated in Table VIII, how-

ever, there was a slight increase in settled multiple count cases in

Ii
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TABLE VII
SETTLED CHARGE CATEGORIES:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
Property (include Rob)

54%

Property (include Rob)

49%

Crimes Against Person

13%

Crimes Against Person

11%

Drugs

18%

Drugs

20%

Traffic

11%

Traffic

4%
11%

Other

100% (253)

TOTAL

9%

Other

100% (141)

TOTAL

TABLE VIII
TOTAL CASES BY TYPES OF MULTIPLE COUNTS:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
1976

1977

306

163

Percent multiple initial counts

26

25

Percent multiple initial felony counts

20

19

Percent multiple settled counts

6

13

Percent multiple settled felony counts

4

8

TOTAL CASES
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1977.

While the number of multiple count initial charges was small,

the number of multiple count settled charges was even less.

The

number of cases settled with more than one felony count was miniscule.
About a quarter of the cases (27 percent in 1976 and 25 percent in
1977) which resulted in conviction ended up with

~

felony counts.

Thus, a reduction in offense severity was notable as cases moved
from initial charge to settled charge.
The Nature of Closings
Nine categories of closing types were coded.

The labels given

the closing types, which are used in subsequent references,
symbolize the following.

PG refers to those cases in which the

defendant entered a straight guilty plea to the initial charge(s).
PG + Dis s·ymbolizes those cases in which the defendant plead guilty
to the initial charge but had a count(s) and/or other charges(s)
dismissed.

PGTL indicates those cases in which the defendant plead

guilty to a less serious charge (a lower class offense) than the
initial one.

PGTL + Dis refers to cases in which the defendant plead

guilty to a lesser charge and also had a count(s) and/or other
charge(s) dismissed.

CBJ means convicted at trial by jury; ABJ means

acquitted at trial by jury.

CBC refers to those cases in which the

defendant waived the right to trial by jury and was convicted by
the court (judge); ABC means acquitted by trial heard by the judge.
DIS refers to cases which were dismissed subsequent to formal arraignmente

The categories are mutually exclusive.

However, at times

the following narrative refers to all PGTLS (which includes PGTL

--~"-,;.;...----,-~~
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and PGTL + Dis), all PG bargains (which includes PGTL, PGTL + Dis and
PG + Dis), or all PG's (which includes PG, PGTL, PGTL + Dis and
PG + Dis).

Table IX gives the percentage distributions of closing

types in 1976 and the latter half of 1977.
TABLE IX
CLOSING TYPES: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT
1976

1977

PG

26%

23%

PG + Dis

12%

13%

PGTL

24%

29%

PGTL + Dis

9%

7%

CBJ

8%

9%

CBC

3%

7%

ABJ

2%

1%

ABC

1%

0

Dis

15%

12%

100%
(306)

100%
(163)

Type Closing

TOTAL

Variations in the distribution of closing types between 1976
and 1977 were slight.

There was a small decrease in the proportion

of PG closings and a small increase in the proportion of trial
closings.

Charge reduction closings (PGTL and PGTL + Dis) were

the most common type closing in both years.

Only a small percentage

of cases went to trial, and an extremely small number ended in
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acquittal.

It should be noted that the number of dismissals was

actually higher than here indicated (see Chapter VI) since Criminal
Court statistics include only dismissals after formal arraignment.
OVer half of all cases which did not end in dismissal were settled
with a bargained guilty plea.

It should also be noted that data on

two other types of bargains--agreements not to file on other known
charges and sentence agreements--were not available from this data
source.

However, data from the Public Defender files (see Chapter

V)

indicated that if these two types of bargains were included, thenumber of bargained closings would account for the great majority of
convictions.
The Nature of Offenders
The defendants were

~

representative of the general pop-

ulation; rather, they were characterized by high rates of undereducation, unemployment and underemployment, and recidivism.

Also,

young people and men were over-represented in the offender population.
Finally, the great majority were defended by public attorneys.
Reflecting national patterns, the overwhelming majority of
defendants were male (83 percent in 1976 and 88 percent in 1977).
Also in line with national statistics, defendants were relatively
young.

In 1976, the mean age of defendants was 29, and in 1977 it

was 28.

The mode statistics was even lower (20 in 1976 and 19 in

1977) •
Compared to the general county population, defendants were
considerably undereducated.

Thirty-eight percent in 1976 and 42

percent in 1977 had completed less than four years of high school.
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Seventeen percent in both years had some college, but only 1
percent in 1976 and 2 percent in 1977 were college graduates.
The statistics indicated that about half of the defendants
in both years were unemployed.

Although high, the unemployment

statistic only partially reflected the extent of employment
instability which characterized the offender population.

First,

employment status was often a self-report measure, and as such was
subject to bias.

Since attorneys interviewed expressed the belief

that a defendant with employment increased his or her chances of
receiving a light sentence (an opinion likely passed on to the
client), the bias may have been in favor of underreported unemployment.

Also, it is likely that anything that could qualify as

employment was reported as such, e.g., part-time yard maintenance or
off-and-on janitorial work.

Additionally, an unemployed defendant

who was not in jail custody may have been urged to find some employment in order to increase the chances of light sentencing.

An

attempt was made to take these points into account by coding
defendants who had been employed less than six months in a separate
category.

However, data on length of employment were not available

for all cases.

Also, the data on part-time and off-and-on employ-

ment were too sketchy to record with any confidence (although these
descriptions appeared frequently enough to suggest that there was
likely a substantial number of these kinds of employment).

However,

a profile of job instability was definitely indicated by the
statistics on defendants who had been employed for over six months,
as only 20 percent in 1976 and 26 percent in 1977 fell into this
category.
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An

attempt was also made to get some idea of the nature of

jobs held by those accused offenders who were employed.

Many

of

the case files only gave the name of the defendant's employer, and
thus it was not possible to ascertain the nature of the job in these
cases.

However, job descriptions were obtained for 72 defendants

from the 1976 sample (a complete description of these jobs is given
in Appendix H).

The great majority of these persons either had

labor or low-level service jobs.

Only three individuals held jobs

which could be classified as administrative types.

It should be

remembered that most defendants were relatively young, and therefore
it would not be expected that they would have a significant rate of
high-level employment.

Nevertheless, the complete picture indicated

by the data was one of employment instability.

The people who got

in trouble with the law tended to be unemployed, only partially
employed, or have employment which society characterizes as working
or lower class.
Prior record, like employment, was a problematic variable.
Some of the files from which the data were drawn included only the
sheet on which self-reported prior record was recorded.

Others

only included a form which called for prior felony convictions.
Arrests not resulting in convictions were not uniformly recorded,
and thus were not included in the prior record category.

Even

so, the great majority of defendants were recorded as repeaters.
Seventy percent had prior felony convictions in 1976, as did 72
percent in 1977.

When the only prior record information available

was for prior felony convictions, the researcher coded no prior
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felony convictions as a separate category.

This latter category is

really an unknown, since it included those with misdemeanor
convictions as well as those with no prior record of any kind.
However, there was a clear indication of no prior record of
convictions of any type for only a small percentage of individuals
(10 percent in 1976 and 14 percent in 1977).
Offenders were highly likely to be defended by a public
attorney.

In only 15 percent of the cases in 1976 and 20 percent

of the cases in 1977 was an attorney privately retained.

Almost

half of the cases (49 percent in 1976 and 41 percent in 1977) were
handled by public defenders, while the remainder were handled by
court-appointed attorneys from the private bar.

These findings

point to the low economic status of the offender population, for in
order to be assigned either a public defender or a court-appointed
attorney from the private bar, the defendant had to sign a statement
saying that he or she was indigent and unable to afford to retain an
attorney.
The Nature of Punishment
OVer half of the charged offenders (53 percent in both years)
spent their pre-trial time in jail custody.

Release on own

recognizance was granted in 31 percent of the cases in 1976 and
35 percent of the cases in 1977.

Bail release was obviously the

least common of the three possible pre-trial custody statuses.
While these gross distributions likely reflected reality, it should
be noted that for individual cases, the type of pre-trial custody
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recorde'd may have only represented a portion of pre-trial time, as
changes in custody status can occur during the course of case settlement.
The largest number of convictions resulted in a non-incarceration sentence in both years, although non-incarceration sentences
decreased from 54 percent in 1976 to 47 percent in 1977.

Of those

who were not incarcerated, 89 percent in 1976 and 86 percent in 1977
were placed on probation.

The remainder either received no punish-

ment at all or were punished through a fine, restitution, or participation in a special program.

The proportion of defendants who

received jail sentences increased from 23 percent in 1976 to 33
percent in 1977.

The percentage of defendants sent to the peniten-

tiary was about the same for both years (23 percent in 1976 and 20
percent in 1977).
Table X shows the distributions of convicted cases in which
the sentences included a fine, restitution, or participation in a
special program.

While the variations between the years were slight,

the use of special programs did increase in 1977.

It should be

noted that these conditions were usually not alternatives to
incarceration or probation, but rather, in almost all cases, were
accompanied by a jailor probation sentence.
Since all felony charges carry a potential penitentiary
placement, it is clear that sentencing was much less severe than
allowed for by law.

While charge reductions prior to conviction

accounted for some of the reduction in punishment severity, maximum
sentencing even on non-reduced felonies was under-utilized.

Of those
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TABLE X
TOTAL CONVICTIONS FOR WHICH SELECTED SENTENCE CONDITIONS
WERE ORDERED: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT*
1976

1977

253

142

Percent restitution

23

22

Percent fine

13

16

Percend drug or alcohol program

17

16

Percent mental health program

5

10

Percent community service

2

B

TOTAL CONVICTIONS

*These are not mutually exclusive conditions. Multiple sentence
conditions could be ordered for a single case.

who were sent to the penitentiary, however, the majority (66 percent
in 1976 and 72 percent in 1977) were given sentences of five years or
more.

Thus, if one was sent to the penitentiary, he or she was

likely to have received a long sentence.
Relationships Between the Nature of Offenses and Offenders
As an addition to the population profile presented thus far,
relationships between offense and offender characteristics are
presented in this section.

Relationships involving the type offense

variable refer to settled rather than initial charge unless otherwise specified.
The relationship between initial charge and multiple counts
was highly significant (at the .001 level in both years).

As

indicated in Table XI, Drugs and Crimes Against Person (along with
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TABLE XI
MULTIPLE INITIAL COUNTS FOR SELECTED OFFENSES:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977 ,
BY PERCENT
1976
Total #
Offenses

% Mu1t
Init cts

Total #
Offenses

% Mu1t
Init cts

Drugs

62

50

33

49

Crimes Against Person

45

40

16

43

Rob I

21

24

4

0

Traffic

9

22

17

47

Theft I

38

10

12

17

Burg

I

24

8

19

10

Forg I

15

7

17

12

Other Burg

23

4

7

14

other Rob

14

6

14

13

Other Property

27

10

8

0

Offense Type

f

1977

Traffic in 1977) were the offense categories most commonly charged
with multiple counts.

The findings on the relationship between

settled charge and multiple counts showed a similar patterns.
Property offenders were relatively unlikely to be charged with
multiple counts.

However, there was some indication that if the

initial charge was to a Class A property felony and with multiple
counts, the settled charge was likely to be for multiple counts.
For example, 24 percent of the Rob I charges in 1976 were multiple
count cases; of those charged and convicted of Rob I, 22 percent
still ended up with multiple settled counts.
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Offense types were differentially distributed on the basis
of the sex and age of offenders.

The relationship between sex and

type offense (significant at the .01 level of 1976 and the .001
level in 1977) indicated that females were most likely to commit
offenses which could be categorized as petty property crimes,
e.g., Forg I, Theft I, Other Rob and Other Property.
,

The relation-

ship between age and type offense was also significant at the .01

i

level in 1976 and the .001 level in 1977.

Crimes with particularly

high numbers of youthful offenders in both years were:

Burg I

(60 percent in 1976 and 67 percent in 1977 were 17 to 20 years old);
UUV (60 percent in 1976 and 75 percent in 1977 were 17 to 20 years
old); other Burg (35 percent in 1976 and 40 percent in 1977 were
17 to 20 years old).

These relationships between type offense and

sex and age of offender are in line with official national statistics.
Statistically significant relationships were not found between
the type offense variable and prior record, education or employment
of the defendant.

However, there were patterns worth noting which

were consistent for both years.

Of all offenses, the Rob, Burg

and Traffic categories had the highest proportions of offenders with
prior felony records.
felony records.

Drug offenders much less frequently had prior

The less serious property offenses (Other Rob,

Other Burg and Other Property) involved the highest proportions of
defendants with less than four years of high school.

Drug offenses

showed the lowest proportion of defendants with less than four years
of high school.
offenders.
l~kely

Unemployment was most frequent among petty property

Traffic and Crimes Against Person offenders were the most

to have been employed for over six months.
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The only relationship which was significant for both years
between type attorney and the offense/offender characteristics was
that between type attorney and employment status of the defendant
(significant at the .05 level in 1976 and the .001 level in 1977).
As shown in Table XII, the differences were more dramatic in 1977,

but the patterns were consistent for both years.

As would be

expected, those who retained attorneys were less likely to be unemployed than those who had public attorneys.

Of all offense types,

TABLE XII
UNEMPLOYED DEFENDANTS WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
1976

1977

Type Attorney

Total #
Defendants

% Defendants

Public defender

102

56

44

61

Court-appointed/
private bar

66

56

34

63

Privately retained

26

31

19

16

Unemployed

Total #
Defendants

% Defendants

Unemployed

Traffic cases were the most likely to be handled by retained
attorneys in both years (38 percent in 1976 and 43 percent in 1977
were handled by retained attorneys).

The offenses with the next highest

proportion of retained attorneys was Theft I for both years (35 percent
in 1976 and 29 percent in 1977).

In 1976, the relationship between

attorney and prior record of defendant was significant at the .01
level, with those defendants who retained attorneys much less likely
to have prior felony reocrds.

The fact that this relationship was
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not significant in 1977 was likely due in part to the rise in Traffic
offenses in 1977 (since Traffic offenders were likely to retain
attorneys and also likely to have prior felony reocrds).
Defendant Characteristics:

Inter-Relationships

A final piece of information entered into the population profile
is on the inter-relationships between defendant characteristics.

The

only relationship which was statistically significant for both years
was that between age and education.

Over half of the youngest (17

to 20) and oldest (over 30) defendants had not completed four years
of high school.

Patterns were similar in 1976 and 1977 in the relation-

ship between age and employment.

The 17 to 20 age group included a

high proportion of unemployed individuals; younger defendants had
infrequently been employed for more than six months.

As one moves up

the age scale, the proportion of defendants with prior felony
records increased steadily in both years.

Almost all defendants over

40 years old had prior felony records.
Of males, 50 percent were unemployed in 1976 and 51 percent in
1977.

Of females, 70 percent were unemployed in 1976 and 78 percent

were unemployed in 1977.

If females were financially supported by

an employed male, they were counted as employed; thus, the differences
in employment were not due to the housewife status of women.

Males

were much more likely than females to have a prior record in both
years.

However, a greater proportion of females than males in both

years reported having no prior felony record.

As explained earlier,

the no prior felony category was an ambiguous one; it could include
a number of women with prior misdemeanor records.
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Profile summary
The descriptive data from the 1976 and 1977 samples indicated
overall stable patterns in terms of the nature of offenses,
offenders and dispositions of felony cases processed through this
urban court system.

In this section, these consistent patterns are

summarized.
Property offenses accounted for about half of both initial and
settled charges.
types.

Drug offenses made up another fifth of the offense

The most serious offenses (Class A felonies) constituted a

minority of all initial charges and an even smaller minority of all
settled charges.

The great majority of cases began as single count

cases; very few cases ended up with more than one settled count, and
the number of cases settled with multiple felony counts was extremely
small.
The overwhelming majority of cases were settled by guilty pleas.
Guilty pleas with reductions and/or dismissals were more common than
straight guilty pleas as charged.

About half of the accused felons

spent their pre-settlement time in jail custody,

and approximately

half of the convicted offenders were incarcerated at sentencing.
Compared to the general population, accused felons were undereducated and underemployed.

The great majority were defended by

public attorneys, and attorneys from the Public Defender's Office
defended almost half of all accused felons.

The offenders were

predominantly male, tended to be young, and were highly likely to
have prior criminal records.
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Offenders accused of Traffic and Theft offenses were the most
likely of all offenders to privately retain attorneys.

Those who

retained attorneys were more likely than those who had public
attorneys to be employed and (with the exception of Traffic offenders)
less likley to have prior felony records.
Offenses in the Drugs, Crimes Against Person and Traffic
categories were the most likely to be charged with multiple counts.
Women were most likely to commit offenses which fall into the petty
property category.

Individuals in the 17 to 20 age group accounted

for the great majority of Burg I and UUV offenses.

Crimes Against

Person and Traffic offenses were categories with relatively high
numbers of over age 30 offenders.

The data indicated patterns

suggesting that prior felony records were most common in the Rob,
Burg and Traffic offender populations.

Undereducation and unemploy-

ment were most common for petty property offenders.
There were also indications of inter-relationships between
defendant characteristics.

The youngest and oldest defendants were

the most likely to be undereducated.

The youngest offenders were

the most likely to be unemployed and underemployed.

From young to

old, the proportion of offenders with prior felony records increased
steadily.

The women were more likely than the men to be unemployed,

but the men were more likely than the women to have prior felony
records.
What emerges, then, is a profile of felony offenders who bear
a number of negative labels upon entrance into the court system.
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Their most common offenses are drugs and property violations.

Most

are convicted through guilty pleas, and very few are acquitted in
any manner.

Only about half, however, go to jailor the penitentiary

upon conviction.

Having presented this population profile, the

discussion now moves to a description and analysis of relationships
which are specifically relevant for an assessment of the nature and
outcome of case disposition through negotiation.

The first two of the

remaining five sections in this chapter attend to relationships which
showed consistent patterns between 1976.

The final three sections

are concerned with comparisons of the 1976 and 1977 data.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TYPE CLOSING Ar~
OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS
Offense Type
The data on type closing and offense type indicated some
relationships which were consistent in both the 1976 and 1977
samples.

Offenses which were most likely to be closed with charge

reduction bargains fell into the Drugs, Assaults, Traffic, Other
Rob and Other Property categories.

Straight guilty plea closings

without reductions or dismissals were most common for the offense
categories of Rob I, Burg I, other Burg, Theft I and Forg I (all
of which were included in the non-reducible classification scheme
of the District Attorney's Office).

With the exception of Sex

Crimes, no Crimes Against Person were closed with a straight plea
of guilty as charged in either year.

There were no consistent patterns

between 1976 and 1977 in the proportions of offense types closed
either by PG + Dis or by trial.

In 1976, the highest proportion of
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PG + Dis closings were in the Homicide, Kidnap and Other Property
categories; in 1977, Theft I and Traffic offenses had the highest
proportions of PG + Dis closings.

The data showed little variation

in the type offense/closing by trial relationship in 1976 (although
Forg I and Other Property offenses had a noticeable lack of trial
closings).

In 1977, however, the non-reducible offenses had high

proportions of trial closings.
Offender Characteristics
Cross tabulations were carried out between type closing and
offender characteristic variables.

Ideally, these relationships

could best be analyzed by controlling for the type offense variable.
However, when offense types were broken down into as many categories
as they were, the small number of cases made this type of analysis
unfeasible.

On the other hand, lumping offenses into a few broad

categories covered up important differences.

The decision to retain

the more precise categories of offenses meant, therefore, that it
was impossible to make statements about the relative importance of
other variables on type closing independent of offense type.

Despite

this methodological impediment, the data did indicate the existence
of patterns which would appear to warrant future, more precise
testing.
The findings suggested that sex, age, prior record, employement
and education were not influential factors in terms of whether or
not a defendant was offered and accepted a bargain in exchange for a
guilty plea.
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In 1976, women accounted for 10 percent of PG closings and
30 percent of PGTL closings.

However, women were likely to be

charged with offenses which were likely to close by PGTL.

Of the

19 women in the 1977 sample, 8 closed by PG, and 6 closed by PGTL.
The larger proportion of female PG closings in 1977 was likely due to
the larger number of Forg I convictions for females in the 1977
sample.
Age did not appear to be an important factor regarding
straight versus bargained guilty pleas.
difference in the trial closings.

However, age did make a

The statistics were particularly

dramatic in 1977.

Only 13 percent of 17 to 20 age offenders went

to trial in 1977.

Offenders over the age of 30, on the other

hand, accounted for 53 percent of the trial closings in the same
year.

These statistics are even more meaningful when one takes into

account that offenses common to young people had a relatively high
proportion of trial closings in 1977, and offenses common to older
people had a relatively low proportion of trial closings in 1977.
Prior felony record did not appear to be related to type
closing independent of offense type.

In both years, of those

offenders with prior felony records, the highest proportion of
bargained closings was PG + Dis, followed in order by PGTL + Dis
and PGTL.

However, offenses which commonly closed by PGTL were also

those with relatively low numbers of offenders with prior felony
records.
No significant relationships or interesting patterns were
found between education and type closing or between employement and

-.:
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type closing with the exception of one interesting piece of information.
Of all closing types, trials had the lowest percentage of unemployed
for both years (38 percent in 1976 and 47 percent in 1977).
Multiple Counts
Significant relationships were found for both years between
number of initial counts and type closing.

OVer 90 percent of those

who PG and PGTL in both years were initially charged with only one
count.

In fact, 100 percent of PG in 1977 had only one count.

Of

trials, however, 76 percent in 1976 and 79 percent in 1977 had only
one initial count.

The fact that the offenses that were most

likely to have multiple initial counts (Drugs, Crimes Against
Person, Traffic) were

~

offenses with high trial rates suggests

that multiple counts may be an important variable in terms of the
defense'S decision as to whether or not to go to trial.

Table XIII

gives the percentages of bargained closings which had multiple
TABLE XIII
BARGAINED CASES CLOSED WITH MULTIPLE COUNTS AND NO FELONY COUNTS:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
1976
Type Bargain

Total #
Cases

1977

% Mult

% No Fe1

Counts

Counts

Total #
Cases

% Mu1t

% No Fe1

Counts

Counts

PGTL

73

1

70

47

0

62

PGTL + Dis

28

3

47

12

27

46

PG + Dis

37

3

0

21

14

a

87

settled felony counts and which had no settled felony counts.

A

particularly relevant piece of information was that the majority of
PGTL bargains ended up with no settled felony (but rather only
misdemeanor) counts.
Summary

The findings from the cross tabulations on type closing and
offense/offender variables indicated several patterns which were
consistent in the 1976 and 1977 samples.

Charge reduced guilty

plea closings were most common for Drugs, Assaults, Traffic, Other
Rob and Other Property offenses and least common for Rob I, Burg I,
Other Burg, Theft

I

and Forg

I

offenses.

Being charged with

multiple counts, being older and being employed showed a positive
relationship to disposition by trial.

However, none of the defendant

characteristic variables appeared to be independently 'related to
whether or not cases were closed by straight as opposed to bargained
guilty pieas.

Finally, the great majority of PGTL closings ended

up with no settled felony counts.
THE ISSUE OF PUNISHMENT

Two areas of punishment were considered in the collection and
analysis of data from the case files:
sentencing.

pre-disposition detention and

The researcher endeavored to uncover relationships

between punishment and offense/offender characteristics and to
examine the way in which punishment was related to type closing.
Again, in this section, the focus is on findings which were consistent in both years.
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Pre-Trial 'Detention and Offense/Offender Characteristics
The relationship between pre-trial custody status and type
offense was significant at the .001 level in 1976 but not significant
in 1977.

However, the patterns were similar for both years.

The

most serious property offenses--Burg I, Rob I--along with Escape
and ECPFA had the highest proportions of jail custodies in both
years (70 percent and over).

Over half of those convicted of

Crimes Against Person had also been in jail custody in both years.
Offenders who were least likely to be placed in jail custody
were Drug and Traffic offenders; over half of defendants in these
two categories were released on their own recogniznace.

While the

total number of bail releases was small in both years, Forg I and
Other Property offenders had higher proportions of bail releases
than any other offenses.
The only statistically significant relationship between
custody status and the defendant characteristic variables was
between custody status and prior record.

The findings (significant

at the .001 level in both years) were that of those placed in jail
custody, 84 percent in 1976 and 85 percent in 1977 had prior felony
records.

In contrast, of those released on recognizance, 53

percent in 1976 and 59 percent in 1977 had prior felony records.

Of

bail releases, 65 percent had prior felony records in 1976 as did
50 percent in 1977.
Males were more likely than females to be placed in jail
custody in both years (56 percent in 1976 and 53 percent in 1977
as opposed to 38 percent in 1976 and 37 percent in 1977).

However,
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because females were commonly charged with crimes which were less
likely than others to be accompanied by pre-disposition custody,
it appears that sex may indeed be an influential variable in predisposition custody.

Similarly, although no differences were

found in the relationship between age and pre-disposition custody,
in view of the finding that youthful offenders commonly committed
offenses ''''ith a high likelihood of jail custody, the no-differences
relationship becomes meaningfuL

If age were not an influential

factor in pre-disposition custody, one would expect to find an
inverse relationship between age of offenders and jail custody.
No patterns were indicated in the relationships between custody
status and education or employment.
The relationship between attorney type and pre-disposition
custody status was significant at the .01 level in both years.
As shown in Table XIV, those who retained attorneys were much less

TABLE XIV
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS' CLIENTS HELD IN PRE-TRIAL
CUSTODY: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEt1BER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT

1976

1977

Type Attorney

Total It
Clients

Court-appointedj
private bar

99

61

58

67

144

47

65

55

36

22

30

23

Public defender
Privately retained

%

Pre-Trial
Custody

Total It
Clients

%

Pre-Trial
Custody
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likely to receive jail custody.

This finding may be accounted for

in great part by the category of Traffic offenders, who were highly
likely to retain their own attorneys but not ·likely to receive jail
custody.

In both years, a larger percentage of defendants with

court-appointed attorneys from the private bar than those with
public defenders were placed in pre-trial jail custody.

This

relationship appeared to be independent of offense type.
Sentencing and Offense/Offender Characteristics
As would be expected, the most serious crimes of violence
(Homicide, Kidnap) as well as Rob I, Escape and ECPFA had the
highest proportions of incarceration sentences in both years.
Incarceration was highly unlikely for those convicted of Other
Property and Other Drug offenses in both years.

Sentencing on

Burg I, Theft I and Forg I convictions showed considerable variations
in 1976 and 1977.

These variations are discussed in the section on

1976/1977 comparisons.
Since the relationships between sentencing and defendant
characteristics were not examined controlling for offense type, their
interpretations are only suggestive.

However, the consistent

findings strongly indicated that sex, age, prior record, employment
and education were influential variables in terms of sentencing.
Seventy-one percent of females were not incarcerated in 1976,
and 62 percent were not incarcerated in 1977.

In comparison, 51

percent of males were not incarcerated in 1976, and 45 percent were
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incarcerated in 1977.

However, the fact that females were over-

whelrningly convicted of petty property offenses (which had relatively

I

low incarceration rates) suggests that sex may have been influential
in terms of sentence severity.

I;

"

No significant differences were found in the relationship
between age and sentence.

However, this does not mean that age

was an unimportant variable in sentence severity, for young people
were most likely to be convicted of crimes for which incarceration
sentences were common.

Thus, if age were not an influential

variable, one would expect to find a high proportion of young
people receiving incarceration sentences.

The findings do suggest,

then, that being young may work in favor of sentencing leniency.
The relationship between sentence and prior record was
significant for both years, and in both years the patterns were
consistent.

Table XV depicts this relationship.

Those defendants

TABLE XV
DEFENDANT PRIOR RECORD BY SENTENCE: 1976 AND JULY
THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT

Fel
Record

1976
No Fel
Record

No
Record

Fel
Record

Pen

29%

6%

9%

26%

0

0

Jail

28%

13%

14%

35%

30%

27%

No Incarc

43%

81%

77%

39%

70%

73%

100%
(163)

100%
(47)

100%
(22)

100%
(81)

100%
(20)

100%
(15 )

Sentence

TOTAL

1977
No Fel
Record

No
Record
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with prior felony records were much more likely than those with no
prior felony records to receive incarceration sentences.
Table XVI presents the distributions of persons in the various
education categories along with incarceration sentences.

As can be

seen, those offenders with less than four years of high school had the
TABLE XVI
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS BY INCARCERATION SENTENCES:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
1977

1976

Educational Level

.,

% Incarceration
Total #
'.Sentence
Defendants

% Incarceration
Total #
Defendants
Sentence

Less four years
high school

78

55

43

53

Four years
high school

90

36

40

49

College

36

35

19

31

", ~.

highest proportions of incarceration sentences for both years.

Yet,

offenders with less than four years of high school were most likely
to be convicted of petty property crimes--offenses which overall had
a relatively low proportion of incarceration sentences.

Thus, the

findings do suggest that the education variable may be influential
in terms of sentence severity.
The data on employment and sentence suggested the same
possibility as did those on education and sentence.

Of unemployed

defendants, 46 percent were incarcerated in 1976 and 44 percent were
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incarcerated in 1977, even though unemployed defendants had high
proportions of convictions for petty property crimes.
The data were also examined regarding the relationship
between offense type and sentencing conditions other than incarceration.

Of those offenses in which fines were ordered as a

sentencing condition, in both years almost half were Drug offenses.
Traffic offenses accounted for the second highest proportion of
fines in both years (13 percent in 1976 and 16 percent in 1977).
Restitution was most commonly ordered for Assault in both years
(over half of Assault convictions received restitution orders).
Taken as a single category, the less serious property offenses
(Theft I, Other Property, Forg I) received restitution order in
about one third of the cases.

Participation in drug or alcohol

programs was most commonly ordered for Traffic Homicides and Traffic
offenses in general.

Only a small minority of Drug offenders (13

percent in 1976 and 14 percent in 1977) were ordered at sentencing
to participate in a drug or alcohol program.

The number of offenders

ordered to participate in a mental health program was extremely
small in both years.

However, in both years, sex offenders were

more likely than any other offender types to receive an order to
participate in a mental health program as a condition of their
sentence.

The number of community service orders was also extremely

small but did not appear to be related to offense type.
Variations in Sentencing
In this county a rotation system was used in which one judge
sat on the bench of Chief Criminal Court for several months hearing
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all guilty pleas and sentencing the overwhelming majority of
defendants who had plead guilty.

The result of this system was that

a small number of Circuit Court judges closed the great majority of
felony cases in any given year.

Data were collected on the four

judges in each year who settled the largest number of cases.

No

noticeable differences appeared between judges by offense type or
between judges by closing type.

Some differences did appear between

judges and sentence which could not, thus, be accounted for by
type offense or type closing.
Tables XVII and XVIII show the percentages of various
sentences ordered by respective judges.

Judges have been labeled

anonymously as A, B, C and D (these are different individuals
in each year).

In 1976, Judge C gave a much higher proportion of

incarceration sentences than any other judge.
relatively high proportion of fines.

He also ordered a

Judge A, who handed out the

lowest proportion of incarceration sentences, gave the highest
proportion of drug/alcohol, mental health, and community service
orders.
In 1977, Judges A and C gave higher numbers of incarceration
sentences than did the other two judges.

Here, the judge who gave

the highest proportion of incarceration sentences also ordered
the highest percenuage of drug/alcohol, mental health, and
community service participations.

Judge C, who also gave a

larger number of incarceration sentences, gave no drug/alcohol,
mental health or community service orders; yet he ordered the
highest percentage of restitution of all four judges.
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TABLE XVII
SELECTED SENTENCING ORDERS GIVEN BY SELECTED JUDGES:
1976, BY PERCENT*
Selected Sentencing Orders
%

Judge

i,'

Total
# Cases

% Incar-

%

% Resti-

% Drug/

% Mental

ceration

Fine

tution

Alcohol

Health

Community
Service

A

42

33

14

25

27

15

10

B

79

39

5

17

16

3

3

C

35

63

25

14

9

6

6

D

49

39

10

22

14

4

4

*The selected sentencing orders are not mutually exclusive categories;
multiple orders could be given for one case, e.g., incarceration,
fine and participation in drug program. Thus, the percentages of
total cases resulting in selected sentencing orders (computed across
rows) total to OVe~ 100 percent.

TABLE XVIII

;~

SELECTED SENTENCING ORDERS GIVEN BY SELECTED JUDGES:
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT*
Selected Sentencing Orders
%
% Incar-

%

% Resti-

% Drug/

% Mental

Judge

Total
# Cases

Community
Service

ceration

Fine

tution

Alcohol

Health

A

28

68

19

26

23

16

10

B

25

32

21

21

18

5

21

C

18

61

6

35

0

0

a

D

19

42

6

9

6

6

6

*The selected sentencing orders are not mutually exclusive categories;
multiple orders could be given for one case, e.g., incarceration,
fine and participation in drug program. Thus, the percentages of
total cases resulting in selected sentencing orders (computed across
rows) total to over 100 percent.
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The patterns between judge and sentencing lead to no clear
interpretations.

What the statistics did show was that there were

clearly variations in sentencing patterns of different judges which
were not related to variations in type offense or type closing.
Bargains and Punishment
Pre-Disposition Punishment.

The relationship between pre-trial

custody status and type closing was significant at the .01 level in
1976 and at the .05 level in 1977.

Table XIX presents the percentages

of type closings with jail custody.

Noticeable were the high

percentages of PG + Dis closings with jail custody, again suggesting
that the multiple count variable (regardless of whether or not
multiple counts were dismissed) may be accompanied by harsh punishment.
In contrast, PGTL had a low percentage of jail custodies in both
years.

Although the offenses which were likely to be closed by

PGTL were the same offenses which were likely to be granted pretrial release, the PGTL percentages of pre-trial release were higher
than the Drug and Traffic percentages of pre-trial release.

Again

while inconclusive, the findings do suggest a possible positive
relationship between pre-trial release and PGTL independent of
offense type.
Sentence Punishment.

The relationship between sentence and

type closing is depicted in Table

xx.

As indicated, those who were

convicted at trial had by far the greatest proportion of penitentiary
sentences for both years.

Those who PGTL were almost never sent to

the penitentiary and were highly unlikely to be incarcerated at all.
',',
I'j-

n
~I

I

The findings suggest that PG + Dis was not an advantageous bargain.
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TABLE XIX
TYPE CLOSING BY PRE-TRIAL CUSTODY STATUS:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
Type Closing

PG

PGTL

PGTL
+ Dis

Recognizance

28%

54%

38%

Bail

15%

13%

Jail

57%

PG +
Dis

CBC/
CBJ

ABC/
ABJ

Dis

18%

19%

0

24%

10%

12%

25%

38%

17%

33%

52%

71%

56%

63%

59%

100%
(75 )

100%
(67)

100%
(29 )

100%
(34)

100%
(32 )

100%
(8)

100%
(41)

Recognizance

28%

50%

50%

24%

17%

33%

37%

Bail

14%

22%

0

10%

4%

0

11%

Jail

58%

28%

50%

67%

78%

67%

53%

100%
(36 )

100%
(46)

100%
(10)

100%
(21)

100%
(23)

100%
(3)

100%
(19)

1976

Custod:l Status

I

~

TOTAL

~

I
~
~

l'i

I

1977

Custod:l Status

l-
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TABLE XX
TYPE CLOSING BY SENTENCE: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT

1976

PG +
Dis

1977

TYEe Closing
PGTL +
PGTL
Dis

CBC/
CBJ

TYEe Closing
PGTL +
PGTL
Dis

CBC/
CBJ

Sentence

PG

Penitentiary

28%

33%

20%

0

53%

28%

29%

9%

2%

48%

Jail

25%

28%

23%

21%

18%

34%

29%

36%

32%

33%

No Incarceration

48%

39%

57%

79%

29%

38%

41%

55%

66%

19%

100%
(80 )

100%
(36 )

100%
(30 )

100%
(73)

100%
(34)

100%
(29 )

100%
(17)

100%

100%

(11 )

(44 )

100%
(21 )

TOTAL

PG

PG +
Dis

1.0
OJ
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Similarly, PGTL + Dis was more disadvantageous than PGTL in terms of
sentencing.

It appears that those charged with multiple counts do

not gain much in terms of sentence leniency by having counts dismissed.
In order to get a better idea of the importance of type
closing regarding sentence, this relationship was analyzed controlling for four offense types.

Again, the small number of cases

in several categories made it unwise to form any unequivocal
conclusions, but the data did indicate patterns.

Table XXI gives

the frequency distributions of type closing by sentence for initial
charges of Burg I, Theft I, Forg I and CAID.
Although the proportion of PG to the initial charge of Burg I
was about the same in 1976 as in 1977, those who did PG to Burg I
in 1977 were more likely not to be incarcerated than those in 1976.
In both years, all defendants initially charged with Burg I who
either were convicted by PG + Dis or by trial received penitentiary
sentences.

Of those who were initially charged with Burg I but

closed with PGTL or PGTL + Dis, the tendency was toward nonincarceration.

Thus, for initial charges of Burg I, pleading guilty

to a lesser offense did appear to be an advantageous bargain in terms
of sentencing.

On the other hand, PG was more advantageous than PG

+ Dis (again indicating the negative influence of multiple count
charges).

Of all four offenses discussed here, only Burg I had trials

in which defendants were convicted of lesser offenses.

Actually,

those initially charged with Burg I who were convicted at trial
appeared to have a good chance of being found guilty of a lesser
offense and a non-incarceration sentence.

~'-:"I,.........".~ .
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TABLE XXI

r
tt

TYPE CLOSING BY SENTENCE ON SELECTED OFFENSES:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977

1976

1977

Sentence

Sentence

j'
I

Pen
~.

k

r

Jail

t
~

t
•f~
1

!:

"

No Jail

Pen

Jail

No Jail

4

0
0
1

0
3

BURG I
Txpe Closing
PGTL
PG + Dis
PG
Trial/reduced
offense
Trial/same
offense

1

1
2
5

0
0
4

G
2

0
2
1

0

0

2

0

1

1

1

0

0

3

0

0

0
1
2

0
2
4

8
1
10

0
2
2

0
2
3

0
0
1

0

1

1

0

0

1

0
0
3

4

1

3
0
3

15
8
3
0

0
0
1
0

1
3
1
1

9
5
2
2

1

1

2

0

0

1

0
1
0

1
1
0

3
0
6

0
0
2

0
0
2

2
2
2

0

0

0

0

1

0

THEFT I
Type Closing
PGTL
PG + Dis
PG
Trial/same
offense
CAID
Type Closing
PGTL
PGTL + Dis
PG + Dis
PG
Trial/same
offense
FORG I
Type Closing
I

i

I,
I

!

PGTL
PG + Dis
PG
Trial/same
offense
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The decrease in the number of initial Theft I charges which
resulted in non-incarceration was due in part to the absence of
PGTL in 1977.
,
I·

However, of those who PG to an initial charge of

Theft I in 1976, 63 percent were not incarcerated in 1976, as

I

f,
i

compared to only 17 percent in 1977.

Similarly, harsher sentences

I

~

~

f

were received by those who PG + Dis in 1977 than in 1976.
In 1976, regardless of whether an initial charge of Forg I was
closed by PG or PGTL, defendants were not likely to be incarcerated.
Harsher sentencing was indicated for those who PG to an initial
charge of Forg I in 1977.

Although the number of Forg I PGTLs was

small in 1977, PGTL did appear to be a good bargain in this year in
terms of sentencing.
In both years, the overwhelming majority of those initially
charged with CAID who PGTL were not incarcerated.

PGTL + Dis was

a slightly less advantageous bargain, and PG + Dis even less
advantageous.

Those who PG to an initial charge of CAID were

sentenced less harshly in 1977 than in 1976.

S~ary

The findings on relationships between closing types and
punishment indicated some patterns relevant to the study which were
consistent in 1976 and 1977.

Overall, pleading guilty to a lesser

.

charge appeared to be related to leniency regarding both pre- and
post-disposition incarceration.

The great majority of offenders who

PGTL were not incarcerated upon conviction.

Pleading guilty to a

reduced charge with counts and/or charges dismissed was the next most
advantageous closing in terms of sentencing.

A straight guilty
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plea as charged was slightly more advantageous than a guilty plea
as charged with dismissal of counts and/or charges in 1976, but
the former was slightly less advantageous than the latter in

1977~

Conviction by trial resulted in the harshest sentencing of all
closing types.

Approximately half of offenders convicted by trial

were sentenced to the penitentiary, and only about a quarter of
these offenders were not incarcerated at sentencing.
PLEADING TO A LESSER OFFENSE

Contrary to other studies in which it has been suggested
that bargains often result in pleas to charges which are not
necessarily or situationally included in the original charge
(Sudnow, 1965), the data from this study indicated that 69 percent
of the 1976 cases and 74 percent of the 1977 cases involving
reduced charges were to the initial offense at a lower level.
Table XXII gives the distributions of different types of plea
reductions.

Although the overall percentages of those who plead

guilty to a lesser charge were almost the same for both years, the.
nature of reductions underwent certain changes between 1976 and
1977.

The most noticeable change was in the increased percentage

of offenses in which a guilty plea was entered to the same charge,
but at a misdemeanor rather than a felony status.

Even omitting

,,

i
r
I

Traffic offenses from these statistics, the increase of bargains to
a misdemeanor of the same charge went from 7 percent to 27 percent.

I'

(

These statistics did not take into account those cases in which
either immediate or deferred felony status was granted by the judge
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TABLE XXII
TYPES OF PLEA REDUCTIONS: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT
1976

1977

Different offense

31%

26%

Attempted (same offense)

39%

26%

Reduced level (same offense)

21%

10%

9%

38%

Type Reduction

Misdemeanor status (same offense)

100% (103)

TOTAL

100% (58)

at the time of sentencing (rather than at the time of entering a plea).
If these cases were counted, the number of same-charge felony to misdemeanor reductions would be even higher.
Tables XXIII and XXIV show the exact nature of the reduction
of all reduced caseS in both years.

In 1976, Drug offenses and

Crimes Against Person accounted for 69 percent of the total offenses
,

resulting in a lesser plea to a different offense.

In 1977, these

~.

same two categories of offenses accounted for 80 percent of the
different-offense reduced pleas.
In the above discussion, reduction to misdemeanor status
referred to those cases in which the charge and level were the same,
but only the felony status was dropped, e.g., from CAID as a felony
to CAID as a misdemeanor.

In this paragraph, statistics refer to any

reduction to a misdemeanor (whether it be to a different offense,
reduced level, etc.).

Of all reduced guilty pleas, 58 percent in

1976 and 69 percent in 1977 resulted in a settled misdemeanor charge.

·. ".
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TABLE XXIII

I"

I·

INITIAL CHARGE/SETTLED CHARGE REDUCED PLEAS:
1976

Initial Charge/Settled Charge

Initial Charge/Settled Charge
CAID/Att CAID
CAID/CDP
Att CAID/Other Drugs
CAID/Other Drugs
CAID/Mis1emeanor

16
9
1
1
4

Att Murder/Assault II
Mansltr I/Mansltr II
Mansltr I/Crim Neg Homicide

1
1
1

Att Assault I/Menacing
Asslt II/Att Asslt' II
Asslt II/Asslt III
Asslt II/Menacing
Asslt II/Resist Arrest
Att Asslt II/Harrassment

1
6
6
1
1
1

Kidnap I/Rob II
Kidnap II/Att UUV

1
1

Rape I/Sex Abuse I
Att Rape I/Sex Abuse I
Sod I/Sex Abuse I
Sex Abuse I/Sex Abuse II

1
1
1
1

Rob
Rob
Rob
Rob
Rob

1
3

I/Rob II
II/Rob III
II/Theft I
III/Att Rob III
III/Misdemeanor

DWS/Other Traffic
Other Traffic/Misdemeanor

2
1

1

1
2

Burg I/Burg II
Burg I/Att Burg I
Burg I/Crim Trespass I
Burg I/Theft I
Att Burg I/Crim Trespass I
Att Burg I/Burg II
Burg II/Att Burg II
Burg II/Theft II
Theft I/Theft II
Theft I/Att Theft I
Theft I/Misdemeanor

2

1
1
1
1
1
3
1
5
2

1

UUV/Att uuv
Other Prop/Att Other Prop
Arson I/Arson II
Arson I/Reckless Burning

5
2

Forg I/Att Forg I
Forg I/Att UOPA
Forg I/Misdemeanor

2
1

1

Escape I/Escape II
Escape II/Att Escape II
ECPFA/Weapons

1
1
1

Prostitution/Att
Prostitution

1

1
1
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TABLE XXIV
INITIAL CHARGE/SETTLED CHARGE REDUCED PLEAS:
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977
r

I"

L
;

t
"
~.

il

I
I
1)

Initial Charge/Settled Charge

Initial Charge/Settled Charge

CAID/Att CAID
CAID/CDP
CAID/Other Drugs
Other Drugs/Att Other Drugs
Other Drugs/Misdemeanor

5
5

Rob II/Theft II
Rob III/Theft II
Rob III/Misdemeanor

2

Burg I/Burg II

2

Att Murder/Assault II
Mansltr/Crim Neg Homicide
Crim Neg Homicide/Misdemnr

1
1
1

Forg I/Misdemeanor

2

1
1
7

1
1

Assault II/Assault III
Assault II/Att Assault II

1
1

UUV/Att UUV
Arson I/Arson II
Other Prop/Att Other Prop
Other Prop/Misdemeanor

Kidnap II/Att Coercion

2

Traffic/Misdemeanor

9

Sod I/Sod III
Sod I/Sex Abuse II
Sex Abuse I/Sex Abuse II

1

Escape II/Misdemeanor

1

2

4

1
2
3

1

At first glance, this may seem as though defendants were getting better
bargains in 1977 than in 1976.

However, this was actually not the

situation, since more of the bargained cases were on original
charges of Class C as opposed to Class A or B felonies in 1977 than
in 1976 (43 percent compared to 32 percent).

Additionally, the

data indicated that in terms of sentencing, guilty pleas to lesser
charges resulted in a higher proportion of incarceration sentences
in 1977 than in 1976.
In both years, then, the overwhelming majority of charge
reduction please were to lesser offenses which were necessarily
included in the initial charge.

In fact, the great majority were to

the initial offense at a less serious level.

Almost all the
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reductions to different offenses were to crimes which were
reasonably related (or situationally included, to use Sudnow's
term) to the initial charge.

CASE DISPOSITION WITHOUT TRIAL
AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION

The case disposition process in the county under study was
extremely efficient in terms of time elapsed from initial charge
to final settlement of cases.

In 1976, 62 percent of cases were

settled within 60 days, and only a very few took over 90 days to
settle.

Of particular interest, however, was the fact that in the

latter half of 1977, 81 percent of cases were settled within 60
days.

A new state law called the Speedy Trial Act, which states

that barring unusual circumstances, cases must be settled within

GO days from time of arrest or else dismissed, went into effect
in 1977, and it appears that this Act has been effective.

Con-

comitant1y, there was a decrease in the percentage of cases with
setovers or continuances during the settlement process.

In 1976,

35 percent of the cases had one or more setovers, compared to
26 percent in 1977.

There was also a decrease in the percentage

of cases which had more than one setover.

Of those cases which

had setovers, 45 percent had more than one in 1976, but only 30
percent had more than one in 1977.
Total disposition time was not significantly related to type
closing in 1976, but a significant relationship (at the .001 level)
between these two variables was found in 1977.

One finding was

--IL-,_. ,." . .
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clear from the data for both years:

trials were the least efficient

of all closing types in terms of total disposition time.
indicated in Table

As

xxv, no trials were completed within 30 days·,

and 39 percent of the trials took over 60 days to complete (in
1976, 55 percent of trials took more than 60 days to settle).

The

TABLE XXV
TYPE CLOSING BY TOTAL DISPOSITION TIME:
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
TyEe Closing
Total Time

PG

PG +
Dis

1 - 30 days

35%

14%

18%

31 - 60 days

49%

81%

Over 60 days

26%
100%
(37)

TOTAL

PGTL +
Dis

PGTL

Trials

Dis

9%

0

28%

64%

76%

61%

50%

5%

18%

15%

39%

22%

100%
(21)

100%
(11)

100%
(46)

100%
(28)

100%
(18)

only clear finding from the 1977 data on time differences between
straight guilty plea and bargained guilty plea closing was that the
former had a much higher percentage than the latter of cases closed
within 30 days.

However, straight guilty pleas had a higher pro-

portion of over-60-day closings than did the bargained pleas.

Thus,

an assessment of the relationship of bargained vs. non-bargained
guilty pleas to efficient production is problematic.

The absence

of any patterns in this relationship in the 1976 sample further
clouded this issue.

However, the findings were conclusive that any

.
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kind of disposition without trial was more efficient than disposition
by trial.

Finally, it is of interest that even those defendants

whose cases were ultimately dismissed had a high likelihood of
spending over 30 days in the court system.
The findings on the relationship between total disposition
time and the D.A. unit which handled the case were in line with
other data.

Unit C, which handled serious felonies (Burg, Rob,

Weapons and Negligent Homicide cases) and settled 62 percent of
their cases with straight guilty pleas, had a relatively high
proportion (39 percent) of cases settled within 30 days.

Unit D,

which handled primarily Crimes Against Person cases and had a high
proportion of bargained closings, settled only 6 percent of their
cases within 30 days.

The Career Criminal Unit, which settled 60

percent of its cases by trial, had the highest proportion of over60-day trials (30 percent) of any of the D.A. units.
In summary, then, case disposition in this county, in
comparison with national trends, was time-efficient.

An

efficiency

component had been built into the structure by administrative and
legislative mandate.

However, there were variations in efficiency

which were related to the way in which cases were closed.

Guilty

plea dispositions were more efficient than trial dispositions.
Finally, there was no clear evidence that bargaining for a guilty
plea was less time-efficient than getting a straight guilty plea.
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CHANGES IN DISPOSITION PATTERNS:
1976 AND 1977 COMPARISONS
A noticeably stable picture of offenses and offender popu-

I,

lations processed through the felony court system was indicated by

lf

the data from the 1976 and 1977 samples.

!

~.
~

Additionally, there was

very little variation in the overall closing type proportions
between the two years.

However, differences did appear between the

two years in certain relationships regarding offense types, closing
types and punishments.

These differences are particularly relevant

in view of the fact that plea bargaining policies of the District
Attorney's Office underwent certain changes between 1976 and the
last half of 1977.

The list of non-reducible offenses was expanded,

and the curb-p1ea-bargaining position was generally solidified.
A hard-line approach was taken toward the treatment of the guilty
offender.
Shifts in the Relationships Between Offense and Closing Types:
Stability in the Overall Picture
Although the data indicated only slight variations in the
overall proportions of type closings between 1976 and 1977, when
type closings were examined within offense categories, noticeable
differences did appear between the two years.

Tables XXVI and

XXVII present the statistical breakdowns of closing types for
different initial charges for both years, and Tables XXVIII and
XXVIX shows the breakdowns of closing types for different settled
charges for both years.
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TABLE XXVI
INITIAL CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING:
1976, BY PERCENT
Type Closing

PG

PGTL/
PGTL
+ Dis

PG +
Dis

Trials

Dis

Total

Homicides

0

38%

25%

13%

25%

100% ( 8)

Assaults

0

80%

0

20%

0

100% (20 )

Kidnaps

0

40%

20%

40%

0

100% ( 5)

Initial Charge

Rob I

48%

5%

10%

29%

10%

100% (21 )

Other Rob

14%

50%

14%

2196

0

100% (14)

Sex Crimes

17%

33%

8%

17%

25%

100% (12)

Burg I

46%

21%

8%

17%

8%

100% (24)

Other Burg

35%

26%

13%

17%

9%

100% (23)

Theft I

42%

21%

11%

13~6

13%

100% (38)

UUV

32%

23%

23%

0

23%

100% (22 )

Forg I

40%

27%

13%

0

20 96

100% (15)

Other Property

40%

40%

20%

0

0

100% ( 5)

CAID

7%

51%

10%

7%

25%

100% (59)

Other Drug

0

33%

0

33%

33%

100%

3)

Traffic

44%

33%

0

22%

0

100%

9)

Escape/ECPFA

46%

23%

8%

15%

8%

100% (13)
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TABLE XXVII
INITIAL CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING:
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
Type Closing

PG

PGTL/
PGTL
+ Dis

0

64%

0

36%

0

100% (11)

25%

0

0

50%

25%

100% ( 4)

Other Rob

0

50%

13%

13%

25%

100% ( 8)

Sex Crimes

0

80%

0

20%

0

100% ( 5)

Burg I

47%

11%

11%

32%

0

100% (19)

Other Burg

43%

0

14%

29%

14%

100% ( 7)

Theft I

58%

0

33%

29%

0

100% (12 )

Forg I

53%

12%

18%

6%

12%

100% (17)

Other Property

7%

64%

0

14%

14%

100% (14)

CAID/Other Drug

9%

58%

15%

3%

15%

100% (33)

Traffic

6%

53%

24%

6%

12%

100% (17)

14%

14%

14%

29%

29%

100% ( 7)

Initial Charge
Homicides/
Assaults/
Kidnap
Rob I

Escape/ECPFA

PG +
Dis

Trials

Dis

Total

,
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TABLE XXVIII
SETTLED CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING:
1976, BY PERCENT
rt'.
~

Tl12e

Closin~

PG

PGTL/
PGTL
+ Dis

PG +
Dis

CBC/CBJ

Homicides/
Kidnaps

0

40%

40%

20%

100% ( 5)

Assaults

0

76%

6%

18%

100% (17 )

Rob I

59%

0

12%

29%

100% (17)

Other Rob

14%

50%

14%

21%

100% (14)

Sex Crimes

20%

40%

20%

20%

100% (10)

I

Burg I

29%

0

14%:

7%

100% (14)

Other Burg

36%

32%

9%

23%

100% (22 )

I

Theft I

70%

9%

13%

9%

100% (23)

UUV

35%

30%

35%

0

100% (20)

Forg

55%

27%

18%

0

100% (11)

Other Property

13%

81%

6%

0

100% (16)

CAID

24%

18%

35%

24%

100% (17)

i
~

~

Settled Charge

Total

~

I

I

I

I
lI

E
i
I

i

i,

Att CAID

0

. 100%

0

0

100% (16)

Other Drug

0

92%

0

8%

100% (13)

Traffic

44%

33%

0

22%

100% ( 9)

Escape/ECPFA

55%

18%

9%

18%

100% (11)
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TABLE XXVIX
SETTLED CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING:
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT

Type Closing

Settled Charge

PG

PGTL/
PGTL
+ Dis

o

70%

20%

PG +
Dis

CBC/CBJ

Total

o

30%

100% (l0)

20%

20%

40%

100% ( 5)

o

67%

17%

17%

100% ( 6)

Burg I

73%

0

9%

18%

100% (11)

Other Burg

30%

20%

10%

40%

100% (10)

Theft I

50%

0

29%

21%

100% (14)

Forg

60%

13%

20%

7%

100% (15)

7%

80%

o

13%

100% (l5)

20%

47%

27%

o

92%

B%

60%

27%

o

33%

Homicides/
Kidnaps/
Assaults
All Rob
Sex Crimes

Other Property
CAID
Other Drug
Traffic
Escape/ECPFA

33%

100% (l5)

o

100% (l3)
100% (l5)

33%

100% ( 3)
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There was a slight increase in the proportions of PG closings
for initial charges of Rob I, Burg I, Other Burg, Theft I and
Forg I.

The proportions of these same initial-charge offenses which

went to trial showed substantial increases between 1976 and the
latter half of 1977.

For bargained closings, these offenses showed

decreases in PGTL but increases in PG + Dis.

All of the above

offenses are (or in the case of Other Burg include) crimes on which
the non-reducible policy was strengthened as of June, 1977.

It is

clear that these policies have been accompanied by an increase in
trials for non-reducible crimes.

However, as if in compensation for

this increase, the proportions of trials decreased for initial
charges of Other Rob, Other Property, Drug and Traffic offenses.
The number of PGTLs for these latter offenses, while relatively
high for both years, showed increases in 1977.
The findings, then, supported theoretically-based arguments
set forth in this study and in previous research.

First, it

appears that restricting one kind of bargain leads to an increase
in other kinds of bargains.

Similarly, restricting bargains for

certain offenses leads to an increase in bargains for other offenses.
Finally, restricting bargaining on certain offenses leads to an
increase in trials for these offenses (not only was there an
increase in trials for the non-reducible offenses, but also 60
percent of the non-negotiable Career Criminal cases were closed by
trial in 1977).

The result is that smooth movement of cases

through the criminal justice system is insured, thus fulfilling
the court's need for efficient production.
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Shifts in Relationships Between Offenses, Closings and Punishment:
Overall Increases in the Likelihood of Incarceration
Proportionately more convicted offenders were incarcerated in
1977 than in 1976.

Overall, 54 percent of offenders were not in-

carcerated in 1976; this percentage dropped to 47 percent in 1977.
This drop was accompanied by a parallel increase in the proportion
of offenders sentenced to jail; penitentiary sentences remained
stable over the two years.
Approximately the same proportions of PG + Dis and PGTL + Dis
closings resulted in sentences of incarceration in both years.
However, there were increases in the proportions of PG and trial
convictions (10 percent in both categories) incarcerated in 1977.
The most dramatic shift was in the PGTL category; 21 percent
resulted in incarceration in 1976, but 34 percent resulted in
incarceration in 1977.
As depicted in Tables

XXX and XXXI, there were shifts in

punishment severity for different offense types.

The most dramatic

drop in incarceration sentences was for those convicted of CAID; 53
percent were incarcerated in 1976 while only 20 percent were
incarcerated in 1977.

There also appeared to be a decrease in

punishment severity for convicted burglars.

While a relatively high

proportion of those convicted of Burg I in both years received
penitentiary sentences, there was an increase in the proportion of
those convicted of Burg I not receiving incarceration sentences.
A considerable increase in the proportion of Other Burg convictions
which resulted in non-incarceration was indicated by the data.
These findings could be due in part to the fact that Burg trials

,"

~.
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TABLE XXX

,t

~

.

SETTLED CHARGE BY SENTENCE:
1976, BY PERCENT

r,

Sentence
set tIed Charge

Penitentiary

Jail

Homicide/
Kidnaps

40%

40%

20%

100% ( 5)

Assaults

12%

29%

59%

100% (17)

Rob I

71%

0

29%

100% (17)

t

Other Rob

36%

7%

57%

100% (14)

I

Sex Crimes

30%

30%

40%

100% (10)

Burg I

57%

29%

14%

100% (14)

Other Burg

45%

16%

36%

100% (22 )

i

Theft I

17%

22%

61%

100% (23)

,rt

UUV

5%

25%

70%

100% (20 )

Forg

9%

18%

73%

100% (11)

Other Property

0

19%

81%

100% (16)

29%

24%

47%

100% (17)

Other Drug

0

28%

72%

100% (29 )

Traffic

0

11%

89%

100% ( 9)

36%

45%

18%

100% (ll)

~

,
I

No Incarceration

Total

!

!

CAID

Escape/ECPFA
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TABLE XXXI
SETTLED CHARGE BY SENTENCE:
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER
OF 1977, BY PERCENT
)',

i

',I

~

i

Sentence
,.

Penitentiary

Jail

il

Settled Charge

1

Homicide/
Kidnap/
Assault

25%

63%

13%

100%

8)

All Rob

40%

20%

40%

100%

5)

Sex Crimes

50%

17%

33%

100% ( 6)

Burg I

43%

14%

43%

100% ( 7)

Other Burg

17%

17%

67%

100% ( 6)

Theft I

31%

54%

15%

100% (13)

Forg

18%

27%

55%

100% (11)

Other Property

15%

15%

70%

100% (13)

CAID

7%

13%

80%

100% (15)

Other Drug

0

33%

67%

100% (12 )

Traffic

0

57%

43%

100% (14)

33%

67%

a

100% ( 3)

~

!g
f

No Incarceration

Total

I
t

I
I,

Escape/ECPFA

118

(which increased in 1977) appeared to have a relatively good
chance of resulting in non-incarceration sentences.
On the other hand, incarceration sentences for those convicted

F
\'.

(:

of Theft I increased substantially in 1977.

Although not as

dramatically as for Theft I, incarceration sentences also increased
for those convicted of Forg I.

The findings also indicated an

increase in the likelihood of incarceration for the less serious
property offenses not in the D.A.'s non-reducible cateogry.

Thus,

while incarceration increased overall from 1976 to 1977, increases
in incarceration for certain offenses were offset by decreases for
other offenses, again maintaining a balance necessary to the
stability of the criminal justice system.
Sentence severity also increased in 1977 for those defendants
who had been granted pre-trial release.

Whereas in 1976, only 19

percent of those individuals who had been released on their own
recognizance were incarcerated upon sentencing, 38 percent of the
recog releases were incarcerated at sentencing in 1977.

A similar

pattern emerged for those granted bail pre-trail release; incarceration sentences were given to 31 percent of bail releases in
,

1976, but to 58 percent of them in 1977.

Thus, while pre-trial

I
,

ceration versus no incarceration) in both years, pre-trial release

!

was much less likely to be accompanied by post-conviction release

I,
~,

in 1977 than in 1976.

,.,If-

custody status was a good predictor of sentence severity (incar-

i.

il
"

The importance of the multiple count variable in terms of
dispositional outcomes has been previously documented.

The 1976-1977
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comparisons yielded another piece of information in support of
the contention that it is multiple initial counts as opposed to
multiple settled counts that work toward punishment severity.
While there was an increase in 1977 in the proportion of PGTL +
Dis and PG + Dis closings with multiple settled counts, there was
virtually no change in the proprotions of these closing types which
resulted in incarceration sentences.

In other words, regardless of

whether an initial multiple count charge was settled with multiple
or single counts, the likelihood of incarceration was the same.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The findings on the nature of offenses, offenders and
dispositions processed in felony court were examined for 1976
and the latter half of 1977 in this chapter.

The data indicated

a stable picture of the offenders and offenses processed through
the system in both years.

However, there were differences in

dispositional outcomes which accompanied policy changes on
bargaining.

In the next chapter, data from the case files of

the Public Defender's Office are examined for their relevancy to
the research topic of case disposition without trial.

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF DISPOSITIONAL OUTCOMES:
SUMMARY AND SELECTED STATISTICS ON
CASES HANDLED BY THE OFFICE OF
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER

INTRODUCTION

From data in the records of the Office of the Public
Defender in this county, the researcher endeavored to add to the
body of information about the nature of cases settled in felony
court in the system under study.

The summary statistics on

dispositional outcomes of all felony cases handled by the Public
Defender's Office served as an independent source of information
similar to that collected from the Criminal Court random samples.
Additionally, these population statistics could be analyzed in
terms of their consistency with the sample statistics collected
from the Criminal Court case files.

For this latter purpose of

comparison, summary statistics from the Public Defender records are
presented for the same time periods covered in the Criminal Court
research (all of 1976 and the latter half of 1977).
In addition to the summary statistics, two offenses were
selected for a more in-depth examination.

Files on Burg I and

Forg I cases closed by the Public Defender's Office in the last
six months of 1977 provided data relevant to the research topic.

Ul

DISPOSITION OUTCOMES OF FELONY CASES HANDLED BY PUBLIC DEFENDERS:
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Statistics on the closings of the total 'population of felony
cases handled by the Public Defender's Office in all of 1976 and
from July to December of 1977 are given in Table XXXII.

These data

confirmed the findings from the Criminal Court data that the great
majority of cases were closed by guilty plea dispositions and that
the number of acquittals at trial was extremely small.

However,

there were some differences between these statistics and those from
the Criminal Court samples.
The most noticeable difference was in the percentages of
dismissals.

The proportion of dismissals reported in the Public

Defender records was nearly double that found in the Criminal
Court records.

Variations in record-keeping practices appear to

account for this difference.

Whereas about half of the Public

Defender dismissals came about at the preliminary hearing, only
dismissals after the preliminary hearing were recorded in the
Criminal Court statistics.

The way in which the dismissal category

was handled also affected the conviction rates.

If dismissals were

excluded, the conviction rate was much higher than if dismissals
were included in the non-conviction statistics.

The importance of

taking into account these methodological variations in an analysis
of the data is obvious.
Another difference between these data and those from Criminal
Court was in the lower percentage of pleas to lesser offenses
recorded in the Public Defender statistics.

It is likely that the
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TABLE XXXII
FELONY CASES CLOSED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977
1976

1977

Total closed

1,972

812

Total adjudicated

1,325

444

Percent pleas
Percent trials
Percent dismissals

58%
10%
32%

60%
14%
25%

Percent guilty
Percent not guilty/dismissed

66%
34%

72%
28%

Probation/extradition cases

405

258

Change of type attorney cases

172

73

68

37

907

331

Bench warrant cases
Total pleas and trials
Percent plea to charge
Percent plea to lesser
Percent trials

49%
36%
15%

52%
29%
19%

Percent guilty
Percent not guilty

96%
4%

96$
4%

fact that certain offenses, e.g., Traffic, which had high proportions
of PGTLS, also had relatively high proportions of privately-retained
attorneys accounted for some of this difference.
The data on type closing of the various non-reducible offenses
were consistent with the data from Criminal Court.

with the

exception of CAID (only some CAID charges are included in the nonreducible category), very few of these offenses were closed by PGTL.
On the other hand, Burg I, Rob I, Rob II and Theft I had relatively
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high proportions of closings by trial in 1977.

The frequency

distribution of closing types for the non-reducible offenses is
depicted in Table XXXIII.
TABLE XXXIII
CLOSING TYPES FOR NON-REDUCIBLE OFFENSES:
CASES HANDLED BY THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S
OFFICE FROM JULY THROUGH DECEMBER
OF 1977
Type Closing
Percent Trial of
Pleas and Trials

Dis

PG

PGTL

Trial

Burg I

1

19

1

12

38%

Burg II

9

15

2

4

19%

Escape II

1

9

o

1

10%

12

33

o

5

13%

Rob I

o

9

o

5

36%

Rob I I

5

2

3

2

29%

Supp Contraband

1

7

o

1

12%

Theft I

22

22

3

9

26%

CAID

24

19

45

5

7%

ECPFA

1

0

o

1

TOTAL

76

135

54

45

Type Offense

Forg I

The findings on incarceration sentences were also generally
consistent with those from Criminal Court.

As can be seen in Table

XXXIV, the proportion of total incarceration sentences increased
between 1976 and the latter half of 1977.

The percentages of offenses
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TABLE XXXIV
TOTAL CONVICTIONS RESULTING IN PENITENTIARY, JAIL AND
NON-INCARCERATION SENTENCES: PUBLIC DEFENDER
FELONY CASES IN 1976 AND JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT
Sentence

1976

1977

Penitentiary

21%

24%

Jail

21%

24%

No Incarceration

58%

52%

TOTAL

100% (872)

100% (318)

\'lhich resulted in incarceration sentences (Table XXXV) showed the
same patterns as in the Criminal Court data with the exception of
Theft I.

There were two factors which may have in part accounted
TABLE XXXV
INCARCERATION SENTENCES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES:
PUBLIC DEFENDER CASES FROM JULY THROUGH
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT
Offense

Percent Incarceration

CAID

26%

Theft I

33%

Forg I

46%

Burg I

66%

Burg

52%

II

UUV

46%

Assault II

64%

Rob I

86%

Rape I

50%

Rob II

67%
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for this difference regarding Theft I.

First, closings of Theft I

cases handled by the Public Defender were characterized by an
inordinately high proportion of dismissals.

Second, Theft I

offenders had a high proportion of privately-retained attorneys.
Both factors suggest the possibility that public defenders had a
higher success rate (in terms of getting a non-incarceration
sentence) with Theft I cases than did other types of attorneys.
BURGLARY I AND FORGERY I PUBLIC DEFENDER CASES
Data were collected from all of the available files of Burg I
and Forg I cases closed by the Public Defender's Office from July
through December of 1977.

In addition to providing some new in forma-

tion, these findings generally supported the findings from the Criminal
Court data.

The list of variables on which data were collected is

presented in Table XXXVI.
TABLE XXXVI
VARIABLES ON WHICH DATA WERE COLLECTED ON
PUBLIC DEFENDER BURG I AND FORG I CASES
l.
2.
3.

i
t::
1,0

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Number initial counts
Number initial felony counts
Most serious settled charge
Number settled counts
Number settled felony counts
Type Closing
Judge
Sentence recommendation by
prosecutor
Sentence

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

Sex of defendant
Age of defendant
Prior record of defendant
Education of defendant
Employment of defendant
Race of defendant
Defendant drug/alcohol
problem
Offense in dwelling
(Burg I only)
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Burglary I
The closing type frequencies for Burg I cases closed by the
Public Defender's Office in the last half of 1977 are given in Table
XXXVII.

As can be seen, the trial percentage was relatively high;

TABLE XXXVII
TYPE CLOSING: PUBLIC DEFENDER BURG I CASES FROM
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT
Percent

Type Closing
PG

31

PG + Dis

13

PG + Not File

17

PGTL

4

CBC/CBJ

26

ABC/ABJ

4

Dis

4

TOTAL

100 (23)

Burg I cases were as likely to be closed by trial as by a straight
guilty plea.

In contrast, pleading guilty to a lesser offense was

highly unlikely for Burg I offenders (the one offender in this
category plead guilty to Burg II).
were not uncommon.

However, other kinds of bargains

Of the five cases with initial multiple counts,

three were closed with PG + Dis.

In this data set, a new type of

bargain was coded as a separate category.

This category, labeled

PG + Not File refers to a closing in which the defendant plead
guilty to the initial charge in return for an agreement by the
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prosecutor not to file on other known charges.

The statistics

suggested that this was a fairly common bargain for Burg I.

Of

all guilty plea convictions, then, some kind of bargain occurred in
64 percent of the cases.
A bargain agreement may also take the form of a sentence
recommendation.

Procedure in this court system required that

prosecutors fill out a written form in which they are specifically
to state their sentence recommendation.

The data indicated that

sentence recommendation was a powerful commodity held by the
prosecutor, as the relationship between the recommendation and the
actual sentence was significant at the .05 level.

Prosecutors made

an outright recommendation of incarceration in 43 percent of the
cases; for another 35 percent, prosecutors stated that they would
make a sentence recommendation subsequent to conviction and/or the
completion of the pre-sentence investigation.

They recommended no

incarceration in 22 percent of the cases.

Actual sentencing tended

to be either quite severe or quite light.

Fifty-three precent of

the convicted were sentenced to the penitentiary (and of those 90
percent were sentenced to five years or more), and 11 percent were
sentenced to jail.
sentence.

Thirty-seven percent received a non-incarceration

Thus, when prosecutors withheld a recommendation until

after conviction, there was a greater chance that the actual sentence
would be for incarceration than for non-incarceration.
Specific evidence of the positive relationship between sentence
recommendation and actual sentence includes the following.

Of those

cases for which a penitentiary sentence was recommended, all wer('

j.-
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sentenced to the penitentiary.

Misdemeanor status was not recommended

for any case, nor was it ever granted at sentencing.

There was one

recommendation for a concurrent sentence which was granted at
sentencing.

There were no recommendations for consecutive sentences,

and none were given at sentencing.

Neither fines nor community

service were recommended, and no such orders were given.

Of four

recommendations for participation in a drug or alcohol program,
three were sentenced to participate in such a program.

Restitution,

however, was recommended in eleven cases but only ordered at
sentencing in six cases.
In terms of sentencing, PG bargains were "no bargain" compared
to straight PG closings.

Of all PG bargains, 50 percent resulted in

penitentiary sentences, and 33 percent resulted in non-incarceration
sentences.

In contrast, only 29 percent of PG closings resulted in

penitentiary sentences, and 57 percent were not incarcerated at
sentencing.

However, the harshest sentencing was received by those

convicted at trial; 83 percent of the Burg I offenders convicted at
trial were sentenced to the penitentiary.
Further support was also found for the previously-discussed
finding that certain defendant characteristics were related to
sentence severity.

Of those defendants who received incarceration

sentences, 92 percent had prior felony records, whereas of those who
received non-incarceration sentences, only 71 percent had prior felony
records.

Similarly, employment status appeared to be influential in

sentencing.

Of those who were incarcerated, 73 percent were unemployed,

and of those who were not incarcerated, only 43 percent were unemployed.

--------_

..
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Another important factor in bargaining and sentencing decisions
in Burg cases was whether or not the burglary took place in a
:;

dwelling.

Non-dwelling burglaries appeared to be the most

I
,"

for dwelling burglaries; 71 percent of the PG closings were for

t

dwelling burglaries, but only 38 percent of the PG bargain closings

~.

"bargainable."

Eighty-three percent of the trial convictions were

were for dwelling burglaries.
an advantage at sentencing.

Overall, non-dwelling burglaries had
Only 43 percent of non-dwelling

burglars (compared to 75 percent of dwelling burglars) received
incarceration sentences.

However, again the data indicated that PG

bargain closings were not advantageous in terms of sentencing.
While bargained closings included a relatively high proportion of
non-dwelling burglaries, they also had a relatively high proportion
of incarceration sentences.

Thus, it seems that the advantage

gained by committing a non-dwelling burglary is offset by pleading
guilty with a dismissal or not file agreement as opposed to
pleading guilty without such a bargain.

Here it should be recalled

that only one of the PG bargains was a charge reduction bargain.

All

others were pleas to the original charge with an agreement to drop
other filed or known charges or counts.

In line with the Criminal

Court data, the Public Defender data on Burg I cases strongly
suggested that the filing or knowledge of multiple counts or charges
worked against the defendant at sentencing regardless of whether or
not counts or charges were dropped in exchange for a guilty plea.
Of course, it is possible that sentencing would have been even
harsher if these extra counts or charges had not been dropped.
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Nevertheless, compared to straight PG closings (almost all of which
were single count cases), PG + Dis and PG + Not File had a sentencing
disadvantage.
The people charged with (and for the most part convicted of)
Burg I wore a number of negative labels.

Compared to the general

population, they showed a high proportion of undereducation, unemployment or underemployment, prior criminal records, and drug or
alcohol problems.

Fifty-eight percent had less than four years of

high school, and none had any college education.

Fifty-four percent

of the defendants were unemployed; 36 percent had only tenuous employment (had been employed less than six months and/or were employed
either part-time or intermittently.
employment.

Only 11 percent showed stable

Prior felony records were reported for 77 percent of the

charged felons.

Finally, the files indicated that 52 percent of the

accused offenders had a drug or alcohol problem; for another 30
percent there was no information on whether or not such a problem
existed, and in only 18 percent of the cases was it stated in the
file that there was no indication of a drug or alcohol problem.
Additionally, the Burg I offenders defended by public
defenders were predominantly male, young and white.

Fifty-nine

percent were between 17 and 20 years old, ana almost all (91 percent)
were 27 or younger.

Males comprised 94 percent of the group, and

84 percent were white.

However, blacks were over-represented

compared to their representation in the county population (13 percent
of the defendants were black, whereas blacks account for only 4
percent of the total county population).
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Forgery I
Forg I cases handled by the public defender system in the
latter half of 1977 were most likely to be settled by a bargained
guilty plea conviction.

While there was only one charge reduction

plea (the defendant plead guilty to Att Theft II and had a second
count dismissed), pleas to the initial charge accompanied by some
agreement to dismiss or not file other counts or charges were
extremely common.

Of all convictions, 58 percent were settled by

bargained guilty pleas, and 32 percent were settled by straight
guilty pleas.

Table XXXVIII gives the frequency distribution of

closing types for the Forg I cases.

Nine of the ten cases with

initial multiple counts ended in conviction on only one count.
Thus, initial multiple count cases were highly likely to receive a
dismissal

offe~

in exchange for a guilty plea.
TABLE XXXVIII

TYPE CLOSING: PUBLIC DEFENDER FORG I CASES
FROM JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977,
BY PERCENT
Type Closing
PG
PG + Dis

Percent
26
8

PG + Not File

23

PG + Not File + Dis

13

PGTL + Dis

2

CBC/CBJ

8

ABC

2

Dis

18

TOTAL

100 (39)
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The majority of Forg I convictions (61 percent) resulted in
non-incarceration sentences.

Likewise, a sentence recommendation of

non-incarceration was given in 61 percent of the cases.

A positive

relationship (significant at the .01 level) was found between
recommendations of incarceration/non-incarceration and actual
sentences of incarceration/non-incarceration.
Only three types of incarceration recommendations were made:
(1) no incarceration and probation; (2) no position or no opposition

I

to non-incarceration; (3) withhold until after conviction and/or pre-

,

trial investigation.

Il .

Of those cases in which there was a recommenda-

tion of non-incarceration, non-incarceration was given in 90 percent
of the cases.

Of cases which received one of the two other types of

recommendations, 42 percent were sentenced to the penitentiary;

I

42 percent were sentenced to jail, and only 17 percent were not
incarcerated upon sentencing.

Thus, when the prosecution took no

position or withheld a position, the chances were high that the
defendant would be incarcerated.

In fact, of those cases in which

the recommendation was withheld until after conviction and pre-trial
investigation, all received incarceration sentences.
Actual sentencing was a little harsher than the recommendations
regarding misdemeanor status.

Although all 14 recommendations for

immediate misdemeanor treatment were granted, only 1 of the 7
recommendations for deferred misdemeanor treatment was granted.
Fourteen of the 15 recommendations for restitution were ordered by
the judge.

.~."
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PG

bargains appeared to be "better deals" for Forg I

offenders than for Burg I offenders in terms of sentencing.

I

Seventy-two percent of defendants who plead guilty with a bargain
compared to 50 percent of defendants who plead guilty as charged
were not incarcerated upon sentencing.

The number of trials was

small, but sentencing was the harshest for those defendants who
were convicted at trial.
Defendant characteristic variables were also influential in
terms of sentencing.

Those who received incarceration sentences

were more likely to have prior felony records, to have less than
four years of high school education, and to be unemployed.
of noticeable importance.

Race was

Whereas 70 percent of white defendants

were not incarcerated upon conviction, only 38 percent of black
de:endants were not incarcerated at sentencing.

Sex was also of

considerable importance in the sentencing statistics for the Forg I
offenders; 80 percent of females compared to 44 percent of males
were not incarcerated upon conviction.
As

was the case for Burg I, Forg I offenders had a number of

strikes against them from the outset.

Eighty-four percent

had prior felony records; 44 percent had completed less than four
years of high school.

Unemployment was high (77 percent), and only

5 percent showed stable employemnt.

Also, 22 percent were black

(again a considerably higher proportion than the 4 percent of
blacks found in the county population).

Thus, the findings

suggested that individuals charged with Forg I entered the system
with a number of disadvantageous characteristics, and that these same
characteristics worked against defendants as they moved through the
system.

134

The Forg I defendants tended to be older than the Burg I
defendants.

Only 33 percent of the former were 20 or younger.

Also, the Forg I offenders were more likely to be female than were
other types of offenders.

Almost half (43 percent) of these public

defender cases involved female offenders.
CONCLUDING

RE~1ARKS

The findings from the Public Defender records supported many
of the findings from the Criminal Court data.

The proportions of

cases settled with the different closing types were similar, as
were the proportions of incarceration and non-incarceration sentences.
Both sources indicated a relatively high proportion of trial
closings for Burg I, Rob I and Theft I in the latter half of 1977.
Burg I and Forg I offenders were characterized similarly in both
data sets.
New information was also offered.

Another type of bargain,

i.e., pleading guilty with an agreement not to file on other known
charges, was found to be common for both Burg I and Forg I cases
(although more common for the latter than the former).

It is possible

that the agreement-not-to-fi1e bargain is more advantageous than
the agreement-to-dismiss bargain, since PG bargains were more
advantageous in terms of incarceration sentences for Forg I than
for Burg I offenders.

Also, a positive relationship was found

between sentence recommendation and actual sentence for both Burg I
and Forg I.

Finally, the data on race (not available from the

Criminal Court records) indicated that blacks were proportionately
more likely than whites to be incarcerated at sentencing.
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The present and preceding chapters have yielded a detailed
picture of the nature and outcome of felony cases processed through
the court system in this county.

In the next chapter, the focus is

on the atittudes and opinions of key actors in the disposition
process regarding both the substance and the process of case
disposition without trial.

The data source was the interviews

with prosecutors, public defenders and judges working in the court
system under study.
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CHAPTER VI
ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS OF KEY COURT ACTORS:
THE INTERVIEWS
INTRODUCTION
An integral part of the total picture of the case disposition
process within the court organization is the attitudes and opinions
of participating key actors.

As noted earlier, attitudes and

behaviors regarding the workings of a system may be inconsistent.
However, the reality of the total system can only be fully understood by including both attitudes and actions as component parts of
the same system.

The way in which system members perceive the

system is likely to affect and be affected by the way in which they
play their respective system roles.

In similar dialectical fashion,

attitudes and role behaviors are related to the overall operation
of the system.
Because the interviewees, i.e., prosecutors, public defenders
and judges, play major roles in the case disposition process, their
attitudes and opinions are of primary importance.
~

.

Analysis of the

interview data was directed toward an assessment of (1) attitudes and
opinions as independent as well as component parts of the system; (2)
relationships between attitudes and actions; (3) relationships between
and within the responses of the three different groups of key court
actors.
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The interviews yielded two data sets.

The source of the

first set was a questionnaire which called for written closed-end
li.

t:,

.'

responses.

The second source was a set of questions calling for

t'·

i. .

l

i:

I

verbal open-ended responses.
Appendix D.

The questionnaire form is found in

In this chapter, the findings from the questionnaire

are discussed first, followed by a discussion of the findings from
the open-ended part of the interview.
FINDINGS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
Consideration Given Various Factors in the Handling of Cases
The first question was a multi-part one in which the respondents were asked to rate on a five-point scale the amount of consideration given to 24 separate factors by the Public Defender's
Office and the District Attorney's Office when handling a given
case.

The response categories moved from very much consideration

(coded as five) to no consideration (coded as one).

The question

read:

!
iI.
f

I

In deciding how to handle a given case, how much
consideration do you think the following factors are
given by
a)
b)

the Public Defender's Office;
the District Attorney's Office?

r

For analytical purposes, the 24 factors or variables have been
placed in one of 6 categories as shown in Table XXXIX.
The findings from the responses to this first question are
discussed in narrative form in this chapter.

For a statistical

picture of these data, see Appendix J, in which the means, modes,
ranges and standard deviations are presented.
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TABLE XXXIX
CATEGORIES AND INCLUSIVE VARIABLES ON WHICH ANALYSIS
OF DATA FROM QUESTION NUMBER ONE WAS BASED

Nature of Case

Strength of Prosecutor's Case
Seriousness of Offense
Typicality of Offense

Nature of Defendant

Prior Record
General Character
Attitude

Criminal Justice Goals

Due Process
Actual Guilt
Crime Control
Victim Needs
Defendant's Wishes

Functional Court Needs

Avoidance of Court Overload
Conservation of Staff Resources
Speedy Case Settlement
Maintenance of Good Relations

Within-System Input

Report of Arresting Officer
Tendencies of Juries
Tendencies of Judges
Relationship with Opposing Attorney
Office Policy
Career Advancement Concerns

Outside-System Input

community Attitudes
Political Concerns
Special Interest Groups

Nature of Case.

Strength of prosecutor's case was the only

variable on which there was high within and between group agreement
that it was of extreme importance to both Offices.

There was also

high within and between group agreement that seriousness of offense
was given very much consideration by the D.A.'s Office.

While judges

and public defenders also agreed that this variable was given a great
deal of consideration by the P.D.'s Office, prosecutors felt that it
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was only of medium importance to the P.D.'s Office.

All groups did

give seriousness of offense a higher rating in terms of its imp ortance to the D.A.'s Office than to the P.D.'s Office.

Relative to

! :

i".

other factors, strength and seriousness of case appeared to be
perceived as very important in case disposition decisions.

Here

the opinions of key court actors were consistent with plea bargaining
policy as well as observations of case disposition in action.
Typicality of offense turned out to be a problematic variable.
The majority of respondents asked for further explanation of the
meaning of this variable.

Even after it was explained, three

prosecutors and four judges said that they did not know how to
respond to this question and therefore chose not to respond at all.
The explanation given by the researcher was that typicality of the
offense referred to whether or not the patterns of a particular
,.

,.

f
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case, e.g., characteristics of the defendant, the manner in which
the offense was committed, the place in which the offense took place,
were typical or fit an overall pattern generally seen for that type
offense (see Chapter I for a description of Sudnow's conceptualization
of normal or typical crimes).

The interviewer's impression was that

the great majority of respondents were not able to grasp clearly the
meaning of this notion, and thus any interpretation of the ratings is
questionable.

The ratings themselves offered very little information;

means fell at the middle of the scale, and the response ranges were
high.

It is possible that the concept of "typical offenses" (or to

use Sudnow' s label, "normal crimes") did exist in reality but that the
researcher was simply unable to communicate the meaning of this concept
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to the respondents.

However, it is also quite possible that Sudnow's

widely-cited claims that case disposition decisions are made based on
the typicality of the offense do not reflect the reality of case
disposition in this court system.

This latter possibility was

supported by the observational data, which were notable in their
lack of reference to the concept of "typical" or "normal" crimes.
Nature of Defendant.

All groups agreed that prior record

was given medium consideration by the P.D.'s Office and somewhat more
consideration by the D.A.'s Office.

Interestingly, the group means

indicated that prosecutors and public defenders thought that prior
record was given more consideration by their own Offices than did
the other groups.
The data indicated that judges did not think either general
character or attitude of the defendant was given much consideration
by either Office.

Prosecutors believed that general character of

the defendant was given very little consideration by their Office.
Other than that, prosecutors and public defenders gave these two
variables medium ratings in terms of its importance to both Offices.
All groups gave higher ratings on general character and attitude
of the defendant to the P.D.'s Office than to the D.A.'s Office.
The nature of the defendant (in terms of prior record, general
character and attitude) was generally seen to be only of medium
importance in deciding how to handle a given case (although prior
record was perceived as of above average importance to the D.A.'s
Office).

Public defenders and prosecutors did attach slightly more

importance to character and attitude of the defendant than did judges.
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Several public defenders commented that while the nature of the
defendant was not particularly important in terms of type closing,
it was important in terms of sentencing decisions.

These findings

were consistent with the findings from the Criminal Court case file
data, indicating that the perceptions of key court actors reflected
reality.
Criminal Justice Goals.

Judges believed that due process was

given a great deal of consideration by both Offices.

Public

defenders and prosecutors also believed that due process was given
a great deal of consideration by the P.D.'s Office, but both groups
agreed that it was of somewhat lesser importance to the D.A.'s
Office.

Prosecutors, however, gave due process a higher rating

for their own Office than did public defenders.

In subsequent

comments by attorneys on both sides, it was indicated that while
due process' was a criminal justice goal for all, in fact it was
public defenders who had the major responsibility for insuring due
process.
While idealistically the actual guilt of the defendant should
be a very important factor in case disposition decisions, the data
suggested some ambiguity over this variable.

For all groups, there

was fair within-group agreement regarding the amount of consideration
given to actual guilt by both Offices.
able between-group disagreement.

There was, however, consider-

The data reflected a belief on the

part of judges that the ideal was in fact reality, i.e., actual guilt
was given a great deal of consideration by both Offices.

Public

defenders and prosecutors, on the other hand, believed that actual
guilt was only of medium importance to the P.D.'s Office.

~
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Prosecutors
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thought that actual guilt was given a great deal of consideration
by their own Office.

Public defenders, however, gave this variable

a higher rating for their Office than for the D.A.'s Office.

Looking

at other data, it appeared that two factors were influential
regarding these opinions on the importance of actual guilt.

First,

the great majority of accused offenders were believed to be actually
guilty of something by attorneys and judges.

This presumption of

guilt must certainly lessen the amount of consideration given this
variable in the case disposition process.

Second, public defenders

reported that a major goal for them was to defend a client to the
best of their ability regardless of actual guilt.

On the other

hand, if a client maintained a position of total innocence (not
guilty of the charge or of a related charge), trial was deemed by
public defenders to be essential.

Generally, however, the defense

goal appeared to take precedence over the determination of guilt
goal--one of several indications that the adversary system prevailed
in this particular court system.
Another ideal goal of the criminal justice system is crime
control.

It was generally felt that crime control was important

to the D.A.'s Office but not so important to the P.D.'s Office.

Of

all groups, prosecutors gave crime control the highest rating in
terms of its importance to their Office.

On the other hand, public

defenders thought that crime control was more important to their
Office than did the prosecutors or judges.
Like crime control, all groups believed that victim needs
were not given much consideration by the P.D.'s Office.

Prosecutors
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maintained that victim needs were of great importance to their
Office.

However, public defenders and judges were inclined to

think that victim needs were of only medium importance to the D.A.'s
Office.
Finally, as would be expected, all groups believed that the
P.D.'s Office gave a great deal of consideration to the defendant's
wishes regarding the way in which his or her case be handled.
There was high within-group agreement among public defenders about
the importance of this variable to their own Office, but considerable
within-group disagreement between judges and prosecutors as to the
amount of consideration the P.D.'s Office gave to defendant's wishes.
All groups agreed that defendant's wishes were not very important
to the D.A.'s Office.

However, prosecutors expressed the belief that

it was more important to their own Office than did public defenders
or judges.
The findings on the importance of criminal justice goals
in the case disposition process, then, indicated that overall,
public defenders and prosecutors believed that criminal justice
goals were given more consideration by their own Office (either
more consideration than by the other Office or more consideration
than the other respondent groups thought).

Judges were the most

inclined to believe in the reality of the importance of the ideal
goal of due process and the consideration given actual guilt.
Functional Court Needs.

All groups were of the opinion that

court overload was not given much consideration by either Office.
However, public defenders and judges gave court overload a higher
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rating for the D.A.'s Office than for the P.D.'s Office, whereas
prosecutors saw it as equally unimportant to both Offices.
Judges believed that conserving staff resources was of medium
importance to both Offices, but public defenders and prosecutors
reported that it was not very important to either Office.

The

public defender group gave court overload the lowest rating for
their own Office, and the prosecutor group rated it the lowest for
their Office.
Judges thought that speedy case settlement was of some
importance to the P.D.'s Office but of greater importance to the
D.A.'s Office.

Public defenders felt it was of some importance to

the D.A.'s Office but of very little importance to their own Office.
Prosecutors did not think that speedy case settlement was given
much consideration by either Office.
A similar pattern was found in the ratings on the need to
maintain good relations with others in the court system.

Judges were

of the opinion that this factor was given some consideration by both
Offices.

Public defenders also rated it of medium importance to the

D.A.'s Office, but of little importance to their own Office.
Prosecutors responded that it was of little importance to either
Office.
The patterns for this category of variables were quite consistent.
Judges tended to think that these functional court needs were given
greater consideration by the attorneys than did the attorneys.

There

I·:

was overall agreement that these variables were more important to
the D.A.'s Office than to the P.D.'s Office.

However, prosecutors'

ratings showed only slight variations for the two Offices.

None
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of

th(~

respondent groups viewed functional court needs as playing

a particularly important role in case disposition decisions.
Two points should be noted.

First, there was considerable

within-group disagreement among judges regarding the importance
of court overload, conservation of staff resources and speedy case
settlement to either Office.

Thus, individual judges perceived

the role o'f functional court needs quite di fferently •

Second,

comments by attorneys indicated a belief that these variables need
not be given much consideration by them because the court structure
provided for these needs, e.g., resources were administratively
distributed; case settlement was mandated.to take place within 60
days.

The attorneys openly recognized the importance of functional

court needs, but maintained that they were not influential in their
decisions as to how to handle a given case.
Within-System Input.

All groups believed that the report

of the arresting officer was of slightly above average importance
to the P.D.'s Office.

Public defenders and judges felt that it was

of somewhat greater importance to the D.A.'s Office.

Prosecutors,

however, gave it only a slightly above average rating for their own
Office.

This is a finding of some interest since prosecutors are

generally expected by other court actors to x'ely heavily on police
reports.
Public defenders and judges thought that tendencies of juries
were given a great deal of consideration by both Offices, whereas
prosecutors felt that it was given medium consideration by both
Offices.

All, however, felt that tendencies of juries were more

important to the P.o. 's than the D.A. 's Office.
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Public defenders and judges believed that tendencies of
judges were given over average consideration by both Offices
(public defenders reported that tendencies of judges were extremely
important to them).

While prosecutors rated tendencies of judges

slightly above average for the P.D.'s Office, they gave it a low
rating for their own Office.
Again public defenders and judges were in agreement over the
amount of consideration given to the relationship between the two
opposing attorneys handling a case, both groups giving it a slightly
below average rating for both Offices.

Prosecutors, however,

believed that this variable was of little importance to either Office.
The patterns for these four variables were also quite consistent.

Overall, public defenders and judges were inclined to

think that these within-system input factors were given more
consideration in case disposition decisions than did prosecutors.
All groups felt that report of the arresting officer was more
important to the D.A.'s than the P.D.'s Office, and all thought
that tendencies of juries and judges were of greater importance to
the P.D.'s than the D.A.'s Office.
The consideration given office policy by the D.A.'s Office
was rated high by all groups (means were 4.6 from the public
defender ratings, 4.4 from the judge ratings, and 4.1 from the
prosecutor ratings).

Public defenders were in strong agreement

that office policy (their own, not that of the D.A.) was of no
importance to them in terms of decisions on how to handle a given
case.

Prosecutors believed that office policy was not very important

to the P.D.'s Office, but judges rated it high in importance
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(mean was 4.0) to the P.D.'s Office.

Again it should be noted that

within-group disagreement was high among prosecutors and judges
regarding the amount of consideration given this variable by the
P.D. 's Office.
The factor of career advancement concerns rated very low
in terms of its importance to the P.D.'s Office in making case
disposition decisions.

Prosecutors also gave this variable a very

low rating in terms of its importance to their own Office.

Public

defenders, however, thought that career advancement was given above
average consideration (mean was 3.4) by the D.A.'s Office.

Judges

also thought that it was of some importance to the D.A.'s Office
(mean was 2.9).

Both office policy and career advancement, then,

were seen by public defenders and judges as being of greater
importance to the D.A.'s Office than by the prosecutors themselves.
Outside-System Input.

All groups agreed that community

attitudes were not given much consideration by the P.D.'s Office
(of all groups, prosecutors gave the P.D.'s Office the lowest rating
on community attitudes).

However, all groups felt that community

attitudes were given above average consideration by the D.A.'s
Office (of all groups, prosecutors gave community attitudes the
lowest rating for their own Office).
The patterns were similar regarding the importance of
political concerns.

All groups agreed that political concerns

were given almost no consideration by the P.D.'s Office.

Public

defenders gave political concerns a high rating for the D.A.'s Office,
and judges gave this variable an above average rating for the D.A.'s
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However, prosecutors believed that political concerns were of little
consideration in their decisions about how to handle a case.
Special interest group demands indicated similar patterns.
All groups agreed that demands of special interest groups were of
very little importance to the P.D.'s Office.

Public defenders and

judges thought that this factor was given above average consideration
by the D.A.'s Office (the public defender group gave it the highest
rating for the D.A.'s Office).

Prosecutors, however, viewed

special interest group demands as being of very little importance to
them (actually, they thought it was slightly less important to them
than to the P.D.'s Office).
The data on this category of variables were clear and consistent.
Everybody agreed that none of these variables was given much consideration by the P.D.'s Office.

Public defenders thought that they

were of considerable importance to the D.A.'s Office, but the
prosecutors thought they were of little importance to their own
Office.

Judges fell somewhere in the middle of these two extremes

regarding the importance of these factors to the D.A.'s Office.
Summary:

Question Number One

In the opinion of the respondents, strength of case and
seriousness of offense were indtsputedly the most important variables
to both Offices in terms of decisions as to how to handle a given
case.

The nature of defendants was seen as of lesser importance

than the nature of the case.

Judges were inclined to view due

process, actual guilt and functional court needs as being of greater
importance than did public defenders or prosecutors.

Judges and

public defenders tended to think that within-system inputs were
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given greater consideration than did prosecutors.

All groups agreed

that outside-system inputs were of little importance to the P.D.'s
Office, but only prosecutors felt that they were of little concern
to their own Office.

Each group of attorneys tended to play up the

importance of criminal justice goals to their respective Offices,
and to play down the importance of functional court needs and outsidesystem inputs to their own Offices.
Getting Something in Exchange for a Guilty Plea
Public defenders were asked to respond to the second question,
which read:
If your client decides to plead guilty, how important
is it to you that he/she receive some benefit in
exchange for a guilty plea?
As

for all the questions, a five-point rating scale was used; the

possible responses were:

very important (coded as five); important

(four); somewhat important (three); not very important (two); not
at all important (one).
The responses strongly indicated that a benefit in

exch~1ge

for

a guilty plea was considered by the public defenders to be quite
important.

This finding supported the theoretical assumption that

an exchange or negotiation process is functional for meeting
participants' needs only if there is a real exchange, in which all
parties believe they have received some tangible benefit.
Knowledge of the Routinized Process:

Anticipating Bargains

The third question, asked of public defenders and prosecutors,
':;

had two parts:
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After having studied a case assigned to you, how
often do you feel that you can reasonably anticipate
a)
b)

whether or not the case will be plea negotiated;
what kind of a bargain will be made?

The five possible responses to both parts of the question were:
always (coded as five); usually (four); sometimes (three); not
usually (two); never (one).
The responses indicated that bargaining was routinized in
this court system.

OVerall, attorneys believed that they could

usually tell from the outset whether or not a case would be plea
negotiated and what kind of a bargain would result.

As groups,

public defenders expressed greater certainty than did prosecutors.
None of the public defenders or prosecutors gave a "not usually"
or "never" response to either part of the question.

All public

defenders and 10 of the 14 prosecutors responded that they could
usually tell whether or not a given case would be plea negotiated
I
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after they had looked it over.

The attorneys were only slightly

less sure of what kind of a bargain would be made.

Thirteen of

the 15 public defenders responded that they usually could anticipate
what kind of a bargain would be made, and 9 of the 14 prosecutors
also said that they could usually anticipate the bargain.

Although

no one gave an "always" responses to either part of this question,
the predominance of the "usually" response was a strong indication
of the existence of a routinized classification scheme which was
understood by the key actors.
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Satisfaction with Disposition Outcomes
Again, only public defenders and prosecutors were asked to
respond to the fourth question:
How often would you say you are satisfied with the
disposition outcome of cases you handle?
The same response categories were offered as for the preceding
question.
The majority of both groups of attorneys responded that they
were usually satisfied with the disposition outcome.

However, only

60 percent of the public defenders compared to 86 percent of the
prosecutors reported that they were usually satisfied.

This

difference was consistent with other int,erview data, in which public
defenders lamented their weaker position in the disposition process.
Nevertheless, although no one reported that they were always
satisfied, satisfaction with outcomes was more common than uncommon.
There were no "never satisfied" responses, and only one "not usually
satisfied" response.
Presumption of Guilt
The next two questions, asked of public defenders, prosecutors
and judges, attended to the presumption of guilt issue:
Approximately how many accused felons do you think are
actually guilty, either of the formal charge or of some
related charge?
Approximately how many accused felons assigned to the
Public Defender'S Office du you think are actually guilty,
either of the formal charge or of some related charge?
The possible responses to these two questions (again coded from a
high of five to a low of one for statistical purposes) were:

over
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80 percent; 80 percent to 60 percent; 60 percent to 40 percent;
40 percent to 20 percent; less than 20 percent.
The findings confirmed previous research which has suggested
that key actors in the disposition process assume that charged
offenders are guilty of something prior to a legal finding of guilt
or innocence.

No differences were found regarding accused felons

in general as opposed to accused felons defended by the public
defender system.
All judges and prosecutors were of the opinion that over 80
percent of all accused felons (as well as those assigned to the
P.D. 's Office)

~lere

actually guilty, either of the formal charge or

of some related charge.

While 12 public defenders believed that over

80 percent of all accused felons as well as their own clients were
actually guilty of something, the remaining 3 felt that only from 60
percent to 40 percent of all those charged were guilty.

Thus, a

minority of the public defenders were not so likely to presume guilt.
Also, from comments made while responding to this question, it
appeared that if the question had been limited to "guilty as charged,"
the ratings of public defenders would have been considerably lower.
The Number of Guilty Plea CC'.ses Involving Bargains
Using the same percentage categories as for the preceding
question, public defenders, prosecutors and judges were asked for
their opinion regarding thp. percentage of guilty plea cases which
were accompanied by some kind of bargain:
Of cases which are settled by guilty pleas, how many do
you think involve some kind of bargain, however minimal?
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All public defenders and judges believed that the majority
of guilty plea dispositions involved some kind of bargain.

Sixty-

seven percent of the public defenders responded that over 80
percent involved some kind of bargain, and the remaining 33
percent marked the 80 percent to 60 percent category.

While only 38

percent of the judges thought that over 80 percent involved bargains,
the other 62 percent felt that the percentage was in the 80 percent
to 60 percent category.

The estimates of public defenders and

judges were consistent with the findings from the Criminal Court
data.
The responses of prosecutors showed greater variation on
this question than did those of public defenders and judges.

On

the one hand, 50 percent of the prosecutors interviewed were of
the opinion that over 80 percent of guilty plea cases involved
some kind of bargain.
category.

Five marked the 80 percent to 60 percent

Yet one checked the 60 percent to 40 percent category,

and another marked the 40 percent to 20 percent category.

Some

of the differences between the three groups (and within the
prosecutor group) could have been due to differences in definitions
of "bargains."

However, taking into account other interview

responses, it seems likely that some of the differences are real,
i.e., public defenders were the most inclined of the three groups
to view guilty plea cases as accompanied by some kind of bargain.
Power Imbalance in the Exchange Process
In an attempt to uncover opinions regarding the balance of
power in the exchange process, all three groups of interviewees
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were questioned about their agreement/disagreement with the
following statement:
The district attorney has the "upper hand" in
the plea negotiation process.
The possible responses were:

strongly agree, agree, neutral,

disagree, strongly disagree (again coded from strongly agree [five].
to strongly disagree [one]).
This question was purposely stated in very general terms in
order to get at an overall feeling that respondents might have about
the balance of power in the negotiation process.

As a result of

this rather ambiguous phrasing, the researcher had anticipated
some requests for explanations of the meaning of this statement.
None, however, was forthcoming.

Respondents were able to give an

opinion with no apparent discomfort or hesitation (although it
should be recalled that 9 of the 14 prosecutors filled out the
questionnaire
,;
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in my presence, rendering an assessment of

their feelings about the question impossible).
Public defenders, as might be expected, showed the strongest
agreement with this statement (mean was 4.2).

None of the public

defenders disagreed or strongly disagreed, and only one gave a
"neutral" response.

As a group, however, prosecutors also indicated

agreement with this statement (mean was 4.1).
express disagreement.

One prosecutor did

Judges, on the other hand, were less inclined

to perceive of a power imbalance (mean was 3.3).

Only one judge

reported that he strongly agreed, and three judges said that they
disagreed.

From the conversational interview responses, it was

apparent that judges tended to view plea negotiation in this court
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system as an opportunity for attorneys and the defendant to discuss
objectively the facts of a case in an attempt to make mutual and
rational decisions regarding resolution.

Within this context, power

was not seen as a major factor.
Concluding Remarks
The questionnaire data provided a great deal of insight into
the attitudes and opinions of the interviewees, all of whom play key
roles in the case disposition process.

Generally, these attitudinal

data were consistent with the behavioral data collected from
records and observation, indicating an understanding on the part
of the key actors of the reality of the disposition process.

There

were between-group differences regarding the amount of consideration
given certain factors by the P.D.'s and D.A.'s Offices, implying that
perspectives do vary in accordance with one's status and role within
the system.

However, the responses showed that all groups shared

beliefs that most accused felons were guilty of something and that
the majority of guilty pleas were accompanied by some kind of bargain.
Public defenders and prosecutors also agreed that bargains could
usually be anticipated at the outset and that the negotiation process
was prosecutor-dominated.
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RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Introduction
The interviewees were asked to give open-ended responses to
nine questions in terms of their own beliefs about plea bargaining
and their respective roles in the case disposition process.

In this
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section, the findings are discussed for each question separately.
However, as is the case with the questionnaire data, these openended responses are also presented in the final chapter as part of
the overall picture of case disposition in one urban court system.
While all of the public defenders in this county and 11 of the
13 judges in the county felony court were interviewed, it should be
recalled that only 5 (a small minority) of the county prosecutors
responded to this verbal part of the interview.

The bias which

could result from this under-representation of the prosecutor group
was compounded by the fact that the interviewed prosecutors were
selected by the D.A.'s Office and were all in positions at the upper
level of the hierarchical structure of the Office.

Thus, the

prosecutor staff was not only under-represented but also nonrepresentative.

On the other hand, the argument could be made

that the responses of high-level prosecutors reflect most closely
the attitudes and opinions which in turn reflect the operations
of the D.A.'s Office.

In the hierarchical structure of the D.A.'s

Office, policies (which are generally carried out in actual
operations) are set by top-level staff.

With these considerations

in mind, let uS now turn to a discussion of the conversational
responses.
Question Number One:

In Your Opinion, What is Plea Bargaining?

The responses of the three groups to this question indicated
a fair amount of definitional agreement.

A description often given

initially by individuals in all groups was of plea bargaining as a
negotiation between prosecution and defense whereby cases were
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resolved through a guilty plea rather than a trial.

Another

common thread was that plea bargaining involved some sort of
concession on the part of the prosecution in exchange for a guilty
plea.

Finally, there was general agreement that plea bargaining

could take many different forms, e.g., charge reduction, dismissal
of or not filing other counts or charges, sentence recommendations.
Two prosecutors, however, pointed out that from the perspective of
their office, plea bargains referred to charge reduction bargains.
Public defenders expressed the belief that for prosecutors, plea
bargains were charge reduction bargains.
Each group did tend to emphasize different aspects of plea
bargaining.

Judges were inclined to point out that plea bargaining

was better labeled plea negotiation conference.

Six judges

explicitly stated that in this state, plea negotiation was a process
structured by the courts for the purpose of allowing prosecution and
defense to discuss the facts of the case and to work toward a
mutual agreement as to the proper resolution of the case.

The

definition of one judge was illustrative:
The examination of the issues concerning the commission
of a particular crime and the circumstances of the person
charged with the crime--that's an examination conducted
by the prosecution and the defense attorney and the
defendant. Their determination, that is their agreement,
as to what would be a proper disposition of the particular
charge.
Whereas the mutual examination of issues was emphasized by the
judges as a group, implications of strategical game plans for
bargaining were absent.

From one judge:
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In the criminal justice system now [in this state],
for example, we have open discovery. Everything
essentially that the state has is an open file to the
defendant. In other words, they're trying to take out
the games involved • • •
Although public defenders agreed with judges that plea
bargaining in this court system was presently a formally structured
process, they were less inclined to view it as a fair exchange.
Eleven of the 15 public defenders interviewed emphasized that plea
bargaining should be a negotiation process in which benefits were
exchanged and concessions granted by both sides.

The attorneys, as

adversaries, were to try to get the best deal for their client.

From

;
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the perspective of one public defender:
. . • you have a basic charge that your client
is charged with and you negotiate with the D.A. to
achieve some kind of end result that's favorable to
your client.
Under the present formalized system, however, it was felt that the
bargaining position of the defense attorney had been severely
reduced, resulting in an off-balance exchange:
Plea bargaining is largely where we--the defendant
and his attorney--hope that the state is going to
offer us something. What the state can bargain in
this county is so carefully described by rules in the
D.A.'s Office that they in most cases have very little
flexibility. And so there are few things that you can
offer as an inducement that would be sufficient to break
the rules.
This belief may in part explain why public defenders also emphasized
in their definitions that plea bargaining included any benefit, however
minimal, that the defense attorney was able to get for his or her
client:
[Plea bargaining is] ga1n1ng anything of value in
return for entering a plea • • •

,
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As might be expected, prosecutors emphasized in their

definitions of plea bargaining the fact that it included
concessions by the state:
An agreement between prosecutor and defense which
calls for some limitation on the part of the state
other than those required by statute.
The prosecutor has given up something he or she
wouldn't have to.
An incentive offered by the D.A. to encourage a plea.
In their responses to this first question, different emphases
were noticeable between the three respondent groups.

These emphases

reflected their respective roles in the court system.

Judges viewed

plea bargaining as ideally a neutral, objective and cooperative
process with the goal of arriving at a just decision.

Public defenders

saw it, again in ideal terms, as an adversary exchange in which both
sides had some bargaining power.

Prosecutors placed their emphasis

on their belief that bargaining meant the state suffered somn cost.
Question Number Two: What Features of a Case Would Make it Most
Likely that the Prosecutor Would be Willing to Plea Negotiate?
Judges, prosecutors and public defenders were all most likely
to cite strength of case as the most important factor in a
prosecutor's willingness to plea negotiate.

This finding was

consistent with the responses on the questionnaire form.
Following the strength of case factor, economy was most often
referred to by the judges.
illustrative:

The comments of two judges were
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• • • prostitution, drugs, marijuana offenses
and things like that, you just haven't got the time.
It isn't worth it. So you plea negotiate.
Even though the state has iron-clad cases, if they
get 12 burglary cases against the same defendant,
ordinarily, just for the purposes of economy, they're
not going to try the same person 12 times.
This emphasis by the judges on functional needs was also seen in
their responses on the questionnaire form.
Prosecutors noted that bargaining decisions were guided by
their Office policy.

However, of all three groups, public

defenders were the most vocal regarding the importance of D.A.'s
Office policy.

Rather than viewing it as a guiding factor, public

defenders described it as a limiting factor in the prosecutors'
ability to plea negotiate.

However, the defense attorneys also

suggested that policy could enhance the chances of plea negotiation
when prosecutors had a weak case.

This was due to their belief

that the D.A,'s Office had an overriding concern with getting
convictions.

One public defender stated:

Also, they certainly do evaluate cases in terms of
can they win. I think from my perception it's accurate
to say that the D.A.'s Office is much more concerned about
winning and losing, for whatever purpose • • • I believe
they're much more supervised there than we are; people
are watched, and statistics are kept on wins and losses.
I think we're also concerned with wins and losses; however,
we don't expect to win. The cases that I have that are
good to go to trial with, they give me offers that are
just incredible.
A related factor mentioned by several public defenders and one
judge was that policy not to negotiate on certain kinds of cases
had to be enforced in order for the D.A.'s Office to keep federal
monies which had been given for the purpose of the reduction of plea
bargaining.

The judge stated:
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You wouldn't negotiate out your career criminal
cases where you are rewarded monetarily for not
negotiating.
Question Number Three: What Features of a Case Would Make It Most
Likely that the Defense Attorney would be Inclined to Think the
Defendant Should Plead Guilty?
Only judges and public defenders were asked to respond to
this question.

The majority (7 of the 11) judges interviewed said

that guilt of the defendant was the most important factor.

One

judge actually stated that there were no other factors than actual
guilt which should be considered in plea decisions.

Another judge

believed that plea decisions should be the result of the objective
assessment of the facts of the case by all parties at the pre-trial
conference.

The responses of these judges indicated that they were

talking about "what should be" rather than "what was."

However, even

with further probing, these judges held to their initial responses
and were reluctant to attend to the interviewer's queries about
differences between the ideal and the actual.

The three remaining

judges emphasized strength of case factors as influential in plea
decisions on the part of the defense.
Public defenders also said that the guilt of the defendant was
an important factor in plea decisions.

However, they tended to

elaborate on this factor in the following way.

Guilt of the

defendant, in the majority view, was important in that the defense
attorney could not allow a client to plead guilty if he or she was
not able to say that he or she was guilty.

On the other hand, an

admission of guilt by the defendant did not necessarily lead public
defenders to a belief that pleading guilty was the only or best choice.

-_.1--_... ______ .
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Twelve of the 15 public defenders said that a primary concern for
them regarding plea decisions was that their client get the most
favorable outcome possible.

The following statements of three

public defenders reflect this point of view.
The only circumstance in which I don't think it's
appropriate for a client to plead guilty is when in
fact they can't say that they are in fact guilty.
My role is simply to get people through the criminal
justice system as expeditiously as possible for them
with the least impact possible upon their lives, the least
adverse effect possible. Generally, plea negotiation
results in that.
A condition is that he acknowledge that he'S guilty.
But it's not a factor in deciding whether to go that
route. I don't care how guilty they are, or how
contrite or non-contrite they are; if I think that I
can beat the case, the thing to do is to beat the case.
But on the other hand, if I can't beat the case and I know
it, I still have to try the case if my client says that he's
not guilty.
As defense attorneys, we want to limit the exposure of
the defendant to the authority of the state as much as
possible.
Again, what came through clearly was a commitment on the part of the
public defenders to their professional roles as advocates for the
accused.
Public defenders generally agreed that the defendant was the
one who had to make the plea decision, and that their job was only to
present to their client the facts of the case along with a description
I;,,

of the possible options and outcomes.

One public defender did admit

that it was not always easy for the defendant to make a plea decision
without some advice from the attorney:
To be truthful about that, the defendant often is not in
a position to make the legal evaluations that are necessary
to make decisions, and relies heavily on his lawyer's advice
as to what the odds are of winning or losing, and in that
sense it is false I think to say that the defendant is
making an unfettered decision.
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Question Number Four: What Features Make a Case Most Problematic
or Difficult in Terms of Deciding How to Charge/Plea?
Prosecutors were asked about problematic features in terms of
charge decisions, and public defenders were asked about problematic
features in terms of plea decisions.
Three of the five prosecutors interviewed said that the charge
decision was not problematic in that the laws were quite straightforward in defining offenses.
although "problematic"

wa~

Another prosecutor responded that,

probably too strong a word, careful

consideration was required in order to make sure that the facts
of the case did fit the statute.

The fifth prosecutor admitted to

a problematic or difficult situation which occurred "when the
credibility of witnesses is difficult to ascertain or you can't
get enough information."

All of these responses relied on a

legalistic framework for making charge decisions.
Two of the prosecutors who said that the charge decision was
not problematic did say that sometimes murder was problematic since
it could be difficult to prove the defendant's mental state.

One

stated:
Murder can be difficult because you have to prove
what's in a guy's head. That's probably why we plea
bargain murder.
Problematic features nentioned by defenders, although expressed
in slightly different ways, all had to do with the ultimate outcome
for the defendant.

All but one public defender referred to cases

in which either there were possible defenses or the guilt of the
defendant was unclear, but in which the likelihood of conviction
and severe punishment were high if they went to trial.

Expressing
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a concern for the least possible exposure for their client, the
defense attorneys said that it was difficult to turn down "good
offers" in such cases.
There are cases obviously where there is a great deal
of pressure to enter a guilty plea. For example, if an
individual is charged with murder which bears a mandatory
life sentence, and they're offered some attractive
charge with basically a guarantee of probation, that's
a difficult plea to turn down, and we agonize over those
a great deal.
Seven public defenders specifically stated that unpredictability
of outcome was a problematic feature, adding that plea bargaining
injected some certainty into the disposition outcome.
Four public defenders said that plea decisions were
particularly difficult when there was uncertainty about the mental
or emotional state of the defendant.

One of these commented:

Maybe I think they're mentally ill, but it's nothing
that I can demonstrate in court that would make them
not responsible.
Another pointed out that a defendant's state of mind was sometimes
such that the individual was unsure about what actually happened.
Again, the overall concern was over the consequences for the
defendant of entering a guilty plea as opposed to going to trial;
that is, are the risks of going to trial too great for the defendant,
even though a guilty plea may not be strictly appropriate?
Question Number Five: Are There Certain Kinds of Cases for Which
Charge Reductions are Fairly Standard? If So, Could You Give Some
Examples?
Although judges and prosecutors were especially inclined to
object to the term "standard" (stating that no reductions were
standard), all groups most commonly gave as examples of common
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reductions certain offense types.

Drug offenses (particularly

marijuana possession) were most often cited as examples of reduction
cases.

Sex crimes, non-premediated murders and assaults were the

other classes of offenses most frequently cited by the respondents.
Here, the beliefs of the key actors were consistent with reality, as
it was these classes of offenses which were most likely to be
settled with bargained, reduced-charge pleas.

The respondents

expressed the belief (again in line with reality) that cases were
usually reduced to attempts or lower levels of the initial offense.
Further probing with the purpose of getting respondents to
talk about case features (other than general offense types) which
enhanced the likelihood of charge reduction yielded s'ome information.
For instance, two prosecutors said that homicides resulting from
traffic violations were commonly reduced from Manslaughter to
Criminally Negligent Homicide.

Another prosecutor said that sex

cases in which the victim was unwilling or reluctant to testify
were commonly reduced.
There was agreement among public defenders that reducible
Homicide and Assault cases usually were non-premeditated and often
involved domestic quarrels or arguments between non-strangers.

In

the case of Assaults, it was pointed out, complainant and defendant
might not be easily distinguished:
In an assault case, there's often something that's
happened between two individuals which provoked one of
the individuals to strike the other, and it's usually the
guy who gets hurt most who ends up running down to the
courthouse and filing a complaint • • •

166

Several public defenders talked about the importance of
getting cases reduced to misdemeanors or at least to Class C
felonies, both allowing in some instances for eventual expungement:
Of course, we're always trying hard, especially on a
first offender, for reductions to a Class C felony for
purposes of expungement.
Another remarked that if it was not possible to get a reduction to a
Class C felony or a misdemeanor, it was better to plead to an attempt
(which reduces the offense one level) than to a lesser degree, e. g • ,
Assault I to Assault II, because an attempt looked better on the
defendant's record.
Public defenders agreed that charge reductions were less
common than they had been prior to new policies instituted by the
D.A.'s Office.

Generally, however, they agreed that for non-

reducible offenses, bargains to dismiss, not file, or give favorable
sentence recommendations were common.
A complaint often expressed by public defenders was that the
uniform and rigid charge reduction policies adhered to by the D.A.'s
Office worked against the first offender but in favor of the more
long-term criminal.

Other kinds of bargains, uniformly applied, had

the same effect.
It is in fact true that in most Burg I in a dwelling and
Rob I they have quit charge reduction. However, what they
have done instead is--they have continued to offer people
the chance to plead guilty to one charge in exchange for an
agreement not to bring other charges. Of course that has
the effect of taking the truly professional criminal--the
one who has committed many crimes, and giving them one
Class A felony; however, it takes the 18 year old who has
committed his first offense, and he gets the same conviction
as the more hardened criminal.
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Another complaint of the defense attorneys was that the placement
of

~,

individual in the Career Criminal unit (where all offenses

are non-negotiable) was arbitrary, and depended in great part on
whether or not the state had a strong case:
I get appointed on cases every day that the client
clearly qualifies as a career criminal--it's a felony,
and it was committed while he was on probation or parole,
where he has a significant prior record, has been to the
pen before--all their criteria--but you look at the case,
and it stinks, either in terms of the facts or there's
just a glaring search and seizure problem, a clear psychiatric
defense, or something like that where--you know, they won't
touch them. I suspect they're concerned because their
funding depends on their statistics, and if they come back
getting a lot of not guiltys, or it it's thrown out because
of a motion to suppress, or there are psychiatric defenses,
it's going to hurt their statistics.
Indeed, one public defender filed a motion intent upon proving that
the Career Criminal Unit was unconstitutional in that it violated
the individual's due process rights.

The motion was not upheld,

however, and the Career Criminal unit remains active.
Eight of the 11 judges responded to the question about routine
charge reductions with essentially "don't know" answers.

The

following statements were illustrative:
That's a hard question. I'm not sure that I can
answer that very well. I don't know enough of their
statistics.
Well, I don't know.
an answer to that.

I'm really not prepared to give

You'd have to look at the handbook with guidelines and
the framework as to when they will do a plea reduction.
My understanding is that they won't bargain on major
crimes now. But I've seen it done.
I do not believe there are any kinds of cases for
which pleas to reduced charges are standard, nor do I think
there should be.
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In spite of these initial responses, further probing yielded examples
1'.·

of commonly reduced offense types from all but two judges.

The

examples were the same as those given by prosecutors and public
defenders, i.e., drugs, certain homicides and assaults, and sex
crimes.
Five judges made references to the fact that agreements to
dismiss or not file appeared to be common bargains at present.
eve~

How-

none of the judges talked about sentence bargaining, although

one judge did comment on his own role in sentence reduction:
I reduce many cases--pure and simple shoplifts in which
the shoplifter would try to run or something like that,
they're charged with robbery, and although technically the
facts might fit the statutory definition of robbery, it
was still just a shoplift. In that situation, in that
type of case, even though the conviction was for robbery,
I don't reduce the charge--I reduce the penalty; I
consider it as a misdemeanor instead of a felony.
The interviewer's impression of the judges' responses to
this question, as to others, was that they were reluctant to give
opinions about anything that was going on in the system in which
they were not formally involved or for which they did not have
statistics.

Another impression was that they were inclined to

respond to questions in terms of how the system was formally
structured and how it was to function ideally.

Some judges seemed

to think that what was wanted from the interview was a description
of the court system similar to what one might get in a political
science or law course.

One judge, for example, asked why it was

necessary to talk to so many judges, expressing the belif that
one could get all the information from talking to just one judge.
Another frequent comment was that one should talk to someone from
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the D.A.'s or P.D.'s Office in order to get information about those
Offices.

On the other hand, when the question was clearly an

opinion question, e.g., what do you think are the main advantages
and disadvantages of plea bargaining, the judges were more willing
to give their opinions.
>. •

Question Number Six: What Do You See as Your Primary Responsibilities
or Goals in Your Role as Prosecutor/Public Defender/Judge?
The responses of all three groups included references to the
primary task or goal of handling cases as well as possible.

As would

be expected, the meaning of handling a case well varied in accordance

with their respective roles.

For judges, the general theme had

to do with seeing that a fair trial was conducted from the standpoint
of both the state and the defendant.

For the prosecutors, handling

a case well referred to convicting the guilty and thus protecting
the community from crime.

Public defenders were concerned with

giving their clients the best possible legal representation and
with reducing their exposure to the system.
As advocates for the state, prosecutors believed that it
was their duty to prepare their cases well and get convictions:
Charge right.

Prepare right.

Present correctly and win.

Convict all the guilty people you can find.
They also spoke of their role in crime control:
To try to help solve the crime problem--either by
putting people in jailor scaring them about going
to jail, or maybe just warehousing.
Orderly process of holding people responsible
for their anti-social acts; this serves rehabilitation
and deterrence.
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All public defenders interviewed stressed first and foremost
their responsibility to provide good legal defense for their clients
and to see that their clients got the best disposition possible--the
best disposition being defined as that which resulted in the least
severe exposure or punishment.

Three public defenders made an

interesting point when they said that their responsibilities were
sometimes incompatible.

On the one hand, they felt obliged to see

that due process and other legal rights were upheld; on the other
hand, they were committed to seeing that the individual client
suffered the least severe consequences from the disposition.

The

incompatability surfaced when an attorney felt that a legal issue
should be tested but that such a test might result in a less favorable disposition for the client should the attorney lose the case.
Additionally, testing the legal issue could mean a longer period
of pre-disposition incarceration (or at the least a longer period
of exposure to the system) for the defendant.
Six public defenders specifically stated that a major
responsibility was to see that the system worked properly and
honestly.

One of these expressed the belief that although they

"
(public defenders)
did not have any overwhelming impact on the

outcome of the case, the fact that they were there as advocates for
the defendants kept the system in line.
Service to the client was seen by public defenders as
including more than providing them with solid, proper defenses.
All of the defense attorneys referred to their duty to make sure
that their clients were totally informed about their case, their

---iIJ.;.----.-.-..
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rights, and the options available.

Five of the respondents talked

at length about their social role in relation to their clients:
Beyond that [legal representation] I think we're also
involved with dealing with human beings--our
clients, our clients' families, even victims. And we try
to help people out. I'm very much concerned about the
particular life problems that my client might have, above
and beyond and apart from the particular crime that he may
or may not have committed.
But going beyond the legal issues, I think we playa
big social role to the client--probably a social worker role,
because a lot of what we're doing is taking somebody who's
off the track and trying to get them back on the track,
going into the reasons as to why they're involved in
criminal activity and trying to prevent them from re-involving
themselvel'l.

iI
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I think we do more than that [legal representation]; we
handle the people too. I think we really contribute to
keeping crime down in this community because of the good
relationships that we try to foster with our clients.
In their responses, judges referred to their responsibility
of making sure that cases were resolved fairly from the standpoint
of all involved.

Six judges emphasized their responsibility to

insure a "fair trial."

Three judges, however, noted the fact

that since many cases did not go to trial, their main job was to
insure fair guilty pleas and accompanying negotiations.

As one

of these judges stated:
I prefer to think of the judge's primary role as just
presiding over the means of resolving the controversy,
which in the criminal justice system, as in the civil
system, means mostly by negotiation, because only a
small part of either kind of case is ever tried.
Another of these three judges, again noting the great number of
guilty pleas, said that a primary responsibility was to make sure
that guilty pleas were valid and to see that once it had been
decided that a case should go to trial, it was not negotiated at
the trial level.
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Several judges cited administrative tasks as an important part
of their role, and seven judges talked about sentencing duties.
Finally, two judges discussed the enormity of the job in relation
to the time available.

One of these said:

Unfortunately, under this present system, my main
function is just to turn the business over. I'm not
allowed the luxury of giving as much thought or time
or effort to a particular case as I would prefer to give.
Question Number Seven: What Makes You Feel Satisfied with the
Disposition Outcome of a Case You Have Handled?
Only prosecutors and public defenders were asked about
satisfactions with cases they handled.

Again, concomitant with

their respective roles, prosecutors said they felt best about
getting convictions, whereas public defenders felt most satisfied
when they could get their clients off with as little exposure to the
system as possible.
Four of the five prosecutors said that they felt satisfied
when they got a conviction.

One of these said "when the defendant

is convicted of the crime that represents what he actually did."
Another mentioned "conviction on particularly heinous crimes."

Two

prosecutors said they felt good when dangerous offenders were
incarcerated.

The fifth prosecutor gave a more general response,

saying that he was satisfied when "I've done the best I can."

[
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The responses of the prosecutors indicated that there was a
distinction between deserving and underserving offenders.

Two

prosecutors commented that they got satisfaction from helping

f

r

deserving offenders get into alternative programs, although one

,.'i:f'

remarked that usually there was little feedback from this:

I,
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At times people just get caught up in the system,
and they show remorse. When you can divert these
people, it's also satisfying.
Usually there's no follow-up on what happens say
to a youthful first-time offender whom you've helped
get into some rehabilitative program.
Eleven of the 15 public defenders said that a not guilty
verdict was extremely satisfying.

Of these 11, 8 responded with

this answer practically before the question could be asked.

In

a particularly candid response, one public defender said:
There's nothing that even compares to the feeling of a
not guilty verdict from the jury. There's just no
emotion in the job that compares with it. And it's truly
an ego-satisfying one in the sense of exhuberance you
get from it; the sense of elation is, at least speaking
for myself, totally unrelated to whether the man is innocent
or guilty. It is purely a matter of them against me, and
I won.
In addition to a not guilty verdict, public defenders stated
that dismissals, fair sentences, and keeping people out of jail/
penitentiary were all very satisfying.

Ten of the defense attorneys

specifically mentioned that they felt very good when they could
have some affect on their client's life, e.g., helping solve a
problem, get into a rehabilitative program, stay out of the system
in the future.

Seven public defenders talked about the satisfaction

from having a creative sentencing alternative accepted by the judge.
,,
f

In all of these responses, however, public defenders indicated

l

that many of these things rarely happened, and that when they did,

!

they were happily surprised.

I

Some comments illustrate:

f,
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The most satisfying thing of course is the acquittal
or dismissal of a factually, legally innocent client.
Not a terribly frequent occurrence, but that's the
most satisfying.
Actually I think the most honest answer is the few
occasions when three years after the case was over, the
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defendant came back by and waS doing fine, and
had really made some changes. That doesn't happen
too often; if that was all you had to sustain you,
you'd be in trouble.
Getting positive feedback from the clients--that's
satisfying, although that's not a major part of the
satisfaction of the job. You can't expect a lot of
gratitude from the clients.
Winning is nice, but it happens very seldom, so that's
not much of a source of gratification.

I

I think the thing that's most rewarding for me is
feeling that somebody who is not a hardened criminal
gets a break a person deserves. Now whether that's by
going to trial and getting a not guilty verdict--even
though he may be guilty--or whether it's by entering a
plea and having the good fortune of having the judge
understand the point of view which you're presenting
about that person--having the judge go along with that
against all odds, and having this person come out of it
with a second chance
Perhaps due to the perceived infrequency of some of the most
rewarding occurrences, public defenders were also inclined to
state that it was very satisfying just to know that they had done

,!
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as good a job as possible in representing their client, and that
others (e.g., clients, attorneys, judges) gave them recognition for
a job well done:
When my clients feel good about how I've handled
their case. When I know I did something well and
that other people see it.
Knowing that I've done all that I can do and that
at least the client has been represented as well as he
can expect to be represented.
When you come up with something really creative,
and the judge sees that
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Question Number Eight: How Would You Characterize the Relationship
of the District Attorney's Office with the Public Defender's Office?

i

i

All three groups of respondents were asked how they would
characterize the relationship between the D.A.'s

and P.D.'s Offices.

After their initial response, the interviewer probed by asking
whether or not they thought there was cooperation between the
two Offices.

A further probe attempted to ascertain whether or

not the respondents thought that the prosecutors and public
defenders had divergent belief systems or world views which went
beyond what was inherent in the adversary system.
Generally, all three groups expressed the belief that
relationships between attorneys in the two Offices were good, and
that although there were at times conflicts between some individual

I
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attorneys, for the most part they got along quite well at the staff
level.

It was pointed out by many that although there was cooperation

in the working relationship, cooperation was limited by the nature
of the adversary roles of the attorneys.

The responses to the

question about belief systems were mixed, with some interviewees
believing that they were similar and others believing that they
were dissimilar.
Prosecutors characterized the relationship between the two
Offices with such phrases as "congenial," "good rapport," and "overall quite good."

One prosecutor said that the relationship was

"good in that we can communicate and healthy in that we're not the
best of friends," suggesting that a certain distance should be
maintained due to their divergent responsibilities within the criminal
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justice system.

Prosecutors' comments about cooperation were

similarly qualified.

One said, for example, that there was cooperation

in that "we share what we're required to share," but that the
adversary system was inherently not a cooperative one.

Another

prosecutor said that there was cooperation in the sense that both
sides worked toward making the system run properly and effectively.
Public defenders agreed with prosecutors that overall the
relationship was good, using phrases similar to those of the
prosecutors, e.g., cordial, respectful, generally pretty good.

How-

ever, 12 of the 15 defense attorneys stressed that it was difficult
to generalize and that relationships varied with different
attorneys.

Here, as in other responses, public defenders were

more inclined than prosecutors or judges to take an individualistic
rather than a systemic approach.
They have so many people, and they run the gamut
of personalities and abilities, that it gets complicated
to generalize.
There's respect for individuals on both sides, but it's
selective.
It's really a matter of individual relationships as a
felony attorney.
There is cooperation between individual attorneys.
Eleven public defenders expressed the belief that there were strains
in the relationship due to certain policies of the D.A.'s Office
which severely limited the freedom of staff attorneys to make
their own decisions.
There's less to cooperate about because of the
directives from the top it seems to me, and that is
part of what the strains are.
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Deputies have very little independence, exercise very
little judgment on their own, because they're not
allowed to. And frequently then you find that you're
dealing with some guideline, or some office policy that
there's really no way for us to attack.
Particularly frustrating to public defenders were the policies which
(',
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disallowed or severely limited plea negotiation.

Specifically

singled out by three public defenders was the Career Criminal unit:
There's some strain between attorneys in our office and
attorneys in the Career Criminal Unit, and it's not because
some of the attorneys in our office don't like those attorneys;
it's because it's very hard to deal with the way they're
handling cases. They have to follow their rules.
That [working with the Career Criminal Unit) is just like
beating your head against the wall. I mean they cannot
negotiate the charge; they cannot give any sentence recommendation prior to sentencing; so it's just a difficult
situation
Like prosecutors, public defenders were inclined to qualify
their responses to the question about cooperation:
There's not a great deal of cooperation because we do
represent differing points of view. Within that fr~~e
work we cooperate to the extent that we don't cause each
other unnecessary trouble, and we attempt to make the
system work.
We work together on an ongoing basis, and I think more
than cooperation I would be inclined to describe it as
familiarity. You know the kinds of things this person is
likely to do or think.
Three public defenders expressed the belief that because it was an
adversary system, it was not a good idea for the two sides to become
too cordial.

However, these same respondents also felt that it was

necessary for them to have a good working relationship with the
deputies in order to benefit their clients.
I think there should always be a barrier between the
defense and the prosecution. I think it's dangerous-and you see this in small counties--for the D.A.'s and
the defense attorneys to be all buddy-buddy. I think that
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takes away part of your fighting spirit. I try to be
very pleasant to all of them, even at great strain,
because I think that's part of the job.
It's extremely cordial, and at times I think perhaps
too cordial • • • Obviously we work together constantly,
and it's necessary to benefit my client that I have a
relatively good working relationship with the D.A.s and
the courts because you get more play out of the system.
Judges also expressed the belief that the relationship between
the two Offices was good, while reiterating that nevertheless they
remained adversaries.

The following comments illustrate:

A lot of compatability without compromise.
I think they get along very well, although they
maintain an adversary position. To the extent that there
can be cooperation in an adversary procedure, yes.
Cooperative arms length relationship; thoroughly
professional and in the public interest.
Seems to operate with a minimum of friction. I'm
not sure the word is cooperation because they represent
different parties and have different responsibilities.
Excellent; they have great respect for each other, at
least this is demonstrated in court. Cooperation in the
sense of complying with the law as far as adhering to
their respon,sibili ties, but never at any time diminishing
or ignoring their responsibilities to their respective
clients. You know, it is an adversary system.
Judges, then, strongly maintained that the relationship between the
opposing attorneys conformed to the ideal adversary relationship.
Only one judge even sopke of a possible problem of too much
cooperation:

I
I

Sometimes there's been criticism because of this, through
the idea that you have two large offices constantly doing
business together and that the individual case or client
could suffer.
Also, one judge specifically mentioned friction over the Career
Criminal Unit:
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I'm sure there is strong feeling between them as to
this idea of the Career Criminal Unit, that is, the D.A.'s
flat denial to negotiate on any of certain cases; there's
sharp disagreement in that area. other than that I don't
see them at odd points very often.
Seven judges remarked in their responses to this question that both
Offices had very competent, able staffs, and that the legal representation was of the highest quality.
Six public defenders said they did not think there were really
any major differences in world views between prosecutors and defense
attorneys beyond that inherent in their adversary roles, although
three of these six said that there were individual exceptions:
I think that our attitudes are very similar with the
exception of some D.A.'s who say that they could never
defend someone.
I think there are shared beliefs in general. I think
there are some prosecutors and some defense attorneys who
have widely divergent views, but there are also some
defense attorneys who have widely divergent views.
Eight public defenders said that there were noticeable differences
in the belief systems or world views of the prosecutors and defense
attorneys, although five of these eight believed that the differences
came about as a result of their respective job experiences:
You do get a mind set that fits in with what you're
doing, and this is necessary to do it well.
I think it's a question of experience, and how the
experience shapes your view of cases.
The comments of two public defenders suggested that public defenders
saw themselves as fighting for the underdog (both of these respondents
said that they could never be prosecutors):
I think maybe it's kind of the underdog mentality that we
have here. You know, it's hard to be a public defender in
that you never have the marbles in your pocket; you're
,
'I
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always fighting an uphill battle and filing motions
which you know you have a 2% chance of winning • • •
I enjoy having the state on the other side of wherever
I am because there is a certain anarchistic romance to
that • . • My ego satisfaction would not be as great
if I were on the side of all the odds.
Among those public defenders who believed that there were basic
differences in world views, the comments held to a similar theme:
I think a prosecutor is more inclined to be law and
order oriented, and a defense attorney is more liberal in
terms of getting at what are the causes that caused this
person to commit crime.
People in our office at least start out dedicated to
the idea of trying to do something to help out people
who really had a bad shake from the beginning; D.A.s
see themselves as protecting society from criminals.
I think there is a feeling that the public defender
has a more sympathetic, human point of view.
None of the prosecutors felt that there were widely divergent
belief systems beyond what was inherent in the adversary system:
Generally there are shared beliefs and goals. Most
of the public defenders would make good prosecutors.
There's a shared belief about criminal justice although
we come at it from different sides. Both view crime as
something negative; both believe that the criminal justice
system ought to be administered by the rules.
One prosecutor did say that prosecutors, like judges, may tend to
become more conservative over time as a result of their job experience.
Another said that the nature of the public defender's job was such
that a pro-client orientation was paramount, leaving little time for
a concern with overall criminal justice goals.
Judges agreed with prosecutors that generally the only
difference in belief systems was that which was inherent in the
adversary system:
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In general, no; both are committed to the same legal
system. In a specific case, of course, because they
are adversaries, they do take a contrary position, a
contrary point of view on the specific case.
No, I don't think it's very dramatic. There are
some differences in orientation, but most could switch
from one office to the other and be just as effective.
Question Number Nine: What Do You See as the Main Advantages and
Disadvantages of plea Bargaining?
All respondents were asked what they saw as the main advantages
and disadvantages of plea bargaining.

Probing further, the inter-

viewer also asked them who they thought were the major beneficiaries
of plea bargaining.

Although there were some within-group differences,

the most notable differences in opinions were between the three groups
or respondents.

Prosecutors were inclined to think that there were

few advantages to plea bargaining, but were able to state a number
of disadvantages.

I

Public defenders, on the other hand, felt that

plea bargaining was a positive and essential part of the criminal
justice system, citing the individualization of justice as a major
advantage.

Judges generally stated that plea bargaining was an

inevitable part of the present criminal justice system and that the
major advantage was the reduction of court overload.
Although none of the prosecutors felt that there were any
major advantages of plea bargaining, two did say that it was useful
when there was a case in which a victim didn't want to have to
testify at trial.

Another said that in a case in which the defendant

was guilty but would be difficult to convict because of loopholes in
the case , it was probably "better to get him fOl:' something than
nothing. "

A fourth said:
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If there is an advantage, I guess its expediency-unclogging of the courts. But I don't think there
are any real advantages. I guess it does give us a
lot of leverage to get a conviction.
The fifth prosecutor said that plea bargaining didn't really make
any difference one way or the other, either in terms of court needs
or in terms of the eventual outcome of the case.

This prosecutor

refrained from giving an opinion about the advantages or disadvantages
of plea bargaining, simply stating that it was a long-time tradition
which had become routinized.

The four prosecutors who did express

an opinion said that a major disadvantage was that plea bargaining
led to dispositions which didn't really reflect reality--didn't
reflect what kind of a person the defendant really was or what he
or she really had done.

Two said that with plea bargaining the

defendant learned to manipulate the system and that thus the
integrity of the system was reduced.

One said that it was a waste

of time, that more time was spent on negotiating than on preparing
for a trial.
case.

Another said that the state gave up too much of its

A final negative comment was that the victims usually didn't

understand and were unhappy about it.
All public defenders expressed the belief that plea bargaining
was a positive part of the system in that it individualized justice
and gave defendants a chance of having their exposure to the criminal
justice system reduced.

Four public defenders did say that sometimes

the benefits for defendants were illusory in that they ended up with
the same sentence that they would have without the bargain.

However,

it was emphasized that a reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor did
have the advantage of allowing for record expungement even if the
sentence was the same.
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Public defenders often referred to justice goals when citing
the advantages of plea bargaining:
it would be impossible to see that justice was
done if cases couldn't be individualized, if modifications couldn't be made in the law, which requires
equality regardless of circumstances, situations.
I think oftentimes a more just and certain result
occurs with the benefit of plea negotiation than
would otherwise occur without it. I can almost liken
it to any kind of arbitration in a labor union dispute
or a contract dispute; you have attorneys representing
the interests of whoever's involved. You negotiate, and
out of that comes the best result.
The system is fine in general, but it provides very
broad justice. And when it gets down to the individual,
it can provide some very definite injustices. And that's
where plea negotiation, along with the charging discretion
of the D.A. and the judges' sentencing discretion--all of
these help to humanize the system.
Twelve public defenders mentioned as an advantage that plea bargaining
served functional needs in that it conserved resources and allowed
for an efficient processing of a large number of cases.

Four of the

defense attorneys pointed out that speedy disposition was not merely
an advantage for the courts but that it was also a fairness to
defendants.
There was also consistency in the responses of the public
defenders concerning the disadvantages of plea bargaining.

Dis-

advantages were primarily seen in terms of injustices to the defendants
that could result from a poorly or improperly administered negotiation
system.

Among injustices to defendants, seven public defenders said

that plea bargaining could put undue pressure on defendants to plead
guilty in exchange for the certainty of a reasonable disposition,
even though the individual might not be guilty of the charge and/or
might have a good chance of getting an acquittal or dismissal.

-_11--.---.. . . . .
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It strikes me that the worst thing about negotiating
is that people end up pleading to things that they
didn't do and/or they plead to things that couldn't
be proven •
• • • the real possibility that when a person's
charged with a very serious crime, and he is not guilty,
but there's a lot of evidence against him, circumstantial
or whatever, there's strong pressure to enter a guilty
plea to a lesser charge when the D.A. offers a plea
bargain.
Two noted that the plea negotiation option in this sytem was
discretionary in that certain types of offenders who were charged
with certain types of offenses were not given this option.

Again

the Career Criminal Unit was used as a primary example of such
unfair discretion.

Another two remarked that plea bargaining

did violate due process rights by circumventing the trial process.
However, most of the public defenders expressed the belief that
going to trial was a difficult and trying experience for the
defendant, and that it carried with it higher risks than did
disposition through negotiation.

One public defender pointed out

that an admission of guilt and an expression of remorse with the
entry of a guilty plea were valuable in obtaining a lighter sentence
from the judge:
If the purpose of sentencing is rehabilitation, and
you have a defendant that won't even admit that he's guilty,
and he compounds that by getting on the stand and lying about
his guilt, then you're more likely to treat him more
severely than a person who comes and says, "I've made a
mistake; I'm pleading guilty. Please deal with me leniently."
Three defense attomeys said that a potential disadvantage of
plea bargaining was that it could lead to a situation in which defense
attorneys tended to anticipate and accept routinized bargains without
carefully considering possible defenses for individual cases:
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I think that I have perceived, especially if you have
a case which you know will fall into a typical plea
negotiation pattern, it will make you less apt to really
search the case, and prepare the case, do the legal
research., _ and so discover possible defenses.
• • • a potential danger is that the needs of the
court system take priority and that cases would not be
seen on their individual basis.
All but one of the judges talked about the advantages of
plea bargaining in terms of court and criminal justice system needs.
For example:
• • • without it, the system would be in turmoil;
it allows us to streamline the system.
It's practical; there are not enough resources to
try all cases.
cutting down on the number of cases that go
to trial. The whole criminal justice system is overcrowded.
Without it, the costs would simply be staggering.
I think it's absolutely essential in order to dispose
of cases.
The one dissenting judge said that "there was a mistaken belief
that the system would be bankrupted without plea bargaining."

The

elimination of plea bargaining, in the opinion of this judge, would
increase the integrity of the system without increasing court overload because prosecutors would be forced to consider carefully the
charging decision and guilty offenders would thus be likely to plead
to the charge.

One judge supported the contention of one of the

public defenders by saying:
If a person is guilty, an acknowledgement of guilt
is an essential precondition to any kind of rehabilitation. Insofar as rehabilitation is one of the goals
of the criminal justice syste, it is to that extent
facilitated by plea negotiation.

186

The responses of the judges to the question about disadvantages of plea bargaining varied.

Three said that it was mis-

understood by the public, who often saw it as a way in which criminal
justice goals were compromised.

Four stated that a negative aspect

was that the reality of the crime was not accurately reflected as a
result of plea bargaining.

Two believed that a potential danger

was that defendants could be pressured into pleading guilty, and
three mentioned the possibility of prosecutorial overcharging in
anticipation of bargaining.

Finally, two said that because of a

bargain, offenders might be given lighter sentences than they
deserve.
Of the 11 judges interviewed, 5 did not either strongly
support or oppose the plea bargaining process, but rather claimed
that it was essential to meet functional needs.

Three did not

approve of plea bargaining, and three thought that properly
administered, plea bargaining was a positive component of the
criminal justice system.
It can be fundamentally fair if it's structured and
under the supervision of the court.
Plea negotiation carefully controlled, using recognized
standards published by the prosecutor's office and
available to defense counsel and closely supervised
by the court is, in my judgment, a legitimate, effective
and necessary component of the criminal justice system.
without such controls, it would pose a serious hazard to
the integrity of the system.
There must be standard, open procedures. I'm very
much in favor of it; properly administered, it
benefits all.
And on the other side:
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I don't like it; I'm uncomfortable with it. We
should try people on what we think they're guilty
of. Society and the whole judicial system
suffer because of the acceptance of it.

l.

I don't believe in it • • • You either stand
trial or the case is dismissed. Individuals
ought to be tried for what they're indicted for.
While judges agreed that the plea negotiation process should
be structured and supervised by the court, no judge expressed the
belief that judges ought to take part in the actual plea negotiation
process.

Three specifically stated (although they were not asked

this question) that judges should definitely not play a role in the
actual negotiation.
Responses to the question of who were the major beneficiaries
of plea bargaining indicated that the way in which major beneficiaries
were perceived was related to a general acceptance or rejection of
plea bargaining as a positive process.

Prosecutors emphasized that

the defendant was either the major or sole beneficiary of plea
bargaining (although one said that whether or not the defendant
actually benefited depended on individual cases).
expressed the opinion that no one benefited.

One prosecutor

Public defenders

consistently stated that everybody benefited from plea bargaining,
i.e., the court system, the attorneys, the public and the defendant.
Those judges in favor of plea negotiation were inclined to believe
that it benefited all, and those opposed that it benefited the
defendant or no one.

The judges who were neutral in their assess-

ment of plea bargaining emphasized the public as a major beneficiary
due to the cost benefits for the taxpayer.
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CONCLUDING REf.1ARKS
Data from the interviews indicated that there was overall
agreement among key court actors regarding the reality of the case
disposition process in this urban court system.

Additionally, their

responses about factors given the most consideration in disposition
decisions, about what kinds of offenses were typically bargained,
and about the power of the prosecutor in the bargaining exchange
were consistent with the objective data.

Each group of attorneys,

however, perceived their own Offices in a more favorable light in
terms of working toward ideal goals.

Judges showed some tendency

to idealize the system's operations in general.
The data resulting from the conversational part of the interview offered clear evidence of the between-group variations in
attitudes toward the plea bargaining process and exchange.

These

differences undeniably reflect the system status of prosecutors,
public defenders and judges in the court system.
Judges, the group farthest removed from the actual plea
negotiation process, viewed this process as a well-structured, open
f,

examination and discussion of the facts of a case.

[:

talk about the existence of game plans, strategy calculations, trade-

•f:

They did not

I
"

offs, etc. in their descriptions of plea bargaining.

They

expressed the opinion that, ideal or not, plea negotiation was
necessary to meet functional needs.

They believed that the relation-

ship between the P.D.'s and D.A.'s Offices was professional and
cordial, but cooperative only within the limits of the adversary
system.
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Prosecutors, on the other hand, held negative attitudes
toward plea bargaining in general.

They believed that plea

bargaining distorted the reality of the crime (or the criminal),
presenting a less negative picture than was actually the case.
Like judges, they did not refer to the existence of game plans,
strategy calculations or trade-offs.

Also like judges, they

expressed the opinion that the relationship between the two sets of
attorneys was professional and friendly, but cooperative only to the
extent that the rules of the adversary system allowed.
Public defenders strongly advocated case disposition through
a negotiation process in which individual adversary attorneys were
responsible for making decisions about individual cases.

They

believed that plea negotiation benefited all, and could think of few
disadvantages in an open, above-board plea bargaining process in
which all parties were committed to obtaining justice on an
individualized basis.

They believed, however, that the present

policies of the D.A.'s Office left little room for individual
decision-making and therefore curbed the individualization of
justice.

Although prosecutors were confined by a strict set of

rules regarding plea negotiation, plea bargaining, in the view of
public defenders, still included an element of game-playing.

An

example often given by the defense attorneys was that good deals were
offered on capes which differed from non-reducible cases on only
one variable, i.e., strength of case.

Concerned about not getting

a conviction, the prosecutor offered good deals on those very cases
which the public defender felt stood a good chance at trial.

Since

public defenders felt that they had little to offer the state in

190

the bargaining process, their need to calculate, anticipate, and
weighicosts and benefits to their client was continual.

Public

defenders indicated that at the staff level, the relationships between
the two sets of attorneys was generally good.

They, too, noted that

cooperation was of a professional nature and that the adversary
orientation was maintained.

strains were most apparent when the

public defenders worked on cases which were totally non-negotiable
within D.A. policy.
The interviews, then, fulfilled the research endeavor to
include the perceptions of key court actors regarding the case
disposition process in the system in which they worked.

The next

chapter presents the findings from observations of the case
disposition process in action.

The two activities for which a

standard set of observations were recorded were the pre-trial
conference (in which plea bargaining took place) and the Chief
criminal Court hearings (in which guilty pleas were entered,
accepted and sentenced).

CHAPTER VII
FELONY CASE DISPOSITION IN ACTION:
OBSERVATIONS OF THE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The findings from the final data source--observations of case
process--are presented in this chapter.

An

observational methodology

is obviously extremely useful in uncovering the behavioral reality
of the case disposition process.

Additionally, it yields information

on the attitudes of the individuals participating in the process.
It also allows for an assessment of the setting in which the activity
takes place.

Finally, by combining the observations of all these

components--behaviors, attitudes and setting--the researcher is
better able to form a picture of the whole.
Two of the several activities in the case disposition process
were selected for standardized observations.

The first was the pre-

trial conference, which was the formal setting for plea bargaining.
This conference did appear to be the setting in which most of the
plea bargaining actually (not just ideally) took place.
relevance to the research topic is paramount.

Thus, its

The second was the

plea and sentence hearings in Chief Criminal Court--the setting in
which the great majority of felony cases were adjudicated.

Since all

guilty pleas were entered and accepted or rejected in Chief Criminal
Court, the relevance of this activity is also obvious.
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THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
with the agreement of the participating attorneys and the
defendant, the researcher was able to observe five pre-trial
conferences from beginning to end.

The conferences took place in

one of two locations in the Courthouse.

Two rooms separated from

one another by a divider and located adjacent to the courtroom of
the Chief Criminal Judge (the only entrance to these rooms was
through the courtroom) were designated as the pre-trial conference
rooms.

However, since there were more scheduled conferences than

could be handled by these spaces, a number of conferences took place
in private offices in the D.A. Office complex.

One of the observed

conferences was in the former designated rooms, and four took place
in the D.A. Offices. The shortest of the observed conferences took
ten minutes, the longest thirty minutes.

Following is a summary of

the conversations carried on during the conferences.
Conference 1
Initial charge:

I

UUV/DWS/Failure Yield Right-of-Way.

Conversation summary.
Prosecutor explained what would take place in conference.
Prosecutor presented his case.
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and
investigative reports.
Prosecutor talked about strength of his case.
Prosecutor questioned defendant about prior record.
Defendant responded about prior record.
Prosecutor talked about strength of his case.
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Prosecutor asked defendant if he had questions about the
purpose of the conference. Defendant responded that
he had no questions.
Public defenders asked defendant if there were witnesses.
Defendant answered that there were no witnesses.
public defender explained what would take place in conference.
public defender talked about strength of case.
Prosecutor asked defendant if he had opinion as to sentence.
Defendant answered he did not.
Prosecutor asked defendant if he committed the crime.
Defendant answered he was guilty of ULV.
Public defender asked defendant about prior record.
Defendant responded about prior record.
Prosecutor asked defendant for information about himself.
Defendant responded.
Prosecutor offered to dismiss the DWS count, but said
he was hesitant to dismiss the Failure to Yield count.
Prosecutor asked defendant about employment situation.
Defendant responded.
Public defender, prosecutor and defendant discussed the
nature of the offense.
Public defender asked prosecutor if he would dismiss the
Failure to Yield count if there were no civil problem.
Defendant said he would be willing to pay damages and that
he didn't want to have to go to jail.
Prosecutor said he would dismiss Failure to Yield count if
the victim would agree to this.
Prosecutor set time limit on the plea offer.
Prosecutor said sentence recommendation would be made after
the pre-sentence investigation.
Public defender asked prosecutor if state would recommend
misdemeanor treatment.
Prosecutor said that state would oppose immediate misdemeanor
treatment.
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Public defender told prosecutor deferred misdemeanor
recommendation was no bargain since this would
probably occur anyway.
Prosecutor again asked defendant if he had any questions.
Defendant responded he did not.
Public defender again questioned the prosecutor about
sentence recommendation.
Prosecutor and public defender discussed restitution for
the victim.
All participants in Conference 1 contributed to the discussion.
The prosecutor spoke slightly more often (22 comments) than did the
public defender (18 comments) or the defendant (15 comments).
prosecutor, however, directed the conversation.

The

He opened the

conference by explaining what was to take place, and he opened
each new topic of conversation.

Both prosecutor and public defender

made statements to and asked questions of the defendant, who as a
result was not excluded from the conversation.
place in the

i).J\..

This conference took

Offices and lasted for fi fteen minutes.

Conference 2
Initial :::harge:

r.1anslaughter II.

Conversation Summary.
Prosecutor explained what would take place in conference.
Prosecutor presp.nted his case.
Prosecutor questioned defendant about her alcohol status
at the time when the crime took place. Defendant responded
with uncertainty.
Public defender gave information about nature of the offense.
Prosecutor asked defendant about prior record.
responded that she had no prior record.

Defendant

Prosecutor again questioned defendant about her alcohol status
at the time of the crime. Defendant again responded with
unce.rtainty.
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Prosecutor talked about strength of his case.
Prosecutor and public defender discussed strength of case.
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and
investigative reports.
Public defender gave prosecutor information about
defendant's family.
Defendant gave prosecutor information about her family.
Prosecutor offered to reduce charge from Manslaughter II
to Criminally Negligent Homicide.
Prosecutor said state would recommend confinement, but
would not oppose work release.
Prosecutor and public defender explained state's offer
to the defendant.
Prosecutor asked defendant for more information about the
offense. Defendant gave information.
Public defender asked prosecutor about strength of his
case. Prosecutor responded.
Prosecutor asked defendant if she had any questions.
Defendant said she did not have questions.
Prosecutor and public defender again discussed strength
of case.
Defendant commented about strength of case.
Public defender asked for further information about state's
offer. Prosecutor repeated earlier statements regarding
the offer.
Defendant asked about retrieving her car and its contents.
Prosecutor, public defender and defendant discussen such
retrieval.
Prosecutor asked defendant if she had other questions.
Defendant responded that she had no other questions.
In Conference 2, the prosecutor was the most prolific speaker,
making 24 comments as opposed to 14 comments by the public defender
and only 7 comments by the defendant.

Much of this conversation
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focused on the strength of the case.

Other than asking about the

retrieval of her car, the defendant's only comments were responses
to questions directed to her.
directed the conversation.

Again, the prosecutor opened and

This conference took place in the

designated pre-trial conference room and lasted ten minutes.
Conference 3
Initial Charge:

Burglary II.

Conversation Summary.
Public defender explained what would take place in conference.
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and
investigative reports.
Public defender made comment about strength of case.
public defender made comment about nature of offense.
Prosecutor asked defendant about nature of offense.
gave information about nature of offense.

Defendant

prosecutor questioned defendant about his residential status.
Defendant gave information about residential status.
public defender gave opinion that initial charge did not
fit offense. public defender and prosecutor discussed
this issue.
Prosecutor offered sentence recommendation of immediate
misdemeanor treatment.
Prosecutor set time limit (48 hours) for acceptance of the
offer.
Prosecutor commented on strength of his case.
public defender questioned strength of prosecutor's case.
Prosecutor reiterated his belief that case was strong.
Prosecutor and public defender discussed time limit on
offer.
Prosecutor and public defender again discussed strength
of case.
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Prosecutor asked defendant about prior record.
responded about prior record.

Defendant

Prosecutor and public defender discussed legal issues of
case.
Public defender raised issue of testing the legal issues
without harming defendant.
Prosecutor and public defender discussed legal issues of
case.
Conference 3 seemed to be directed more by the public
defender than the prosecutor even though the number of comments
was about the same (31 for the prosecutor and 29 for the public
defender).

The public defender went into this conference feeling

that this was one of the few cases for which he had good bargaining
leverage.

He was convinced that a legal issue (the nature of the

offense did not coincide with the legal description of the charge)
weakened the state's case.

Indeed, most of the conference centered

around a discussion of this legal issue.
asked for or offered many comments.

The defendant was neither

This conference took place in the

D.A. Offices and was the longest of the five observed conferences
(30 minutes).
Conference 4
Initial Charge:

Burglary I.

Conversation Summary.
Prosecutor explained what would take place in conference.
Prosecutor presented his case, expressing the opinion that
the defendant was lucky the charge was Burg rather than Rob.
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and
investigative reports.
Prosecutor asked defendant about prjor record. Defendant
and public defender responded about prior record.
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Prosecutor asked defendant about employment and education
statuses. Defendant responded about his employment and
education statuses.
Prosecutor asked defendant about his relationship with
co-defendant. Defendant responded about this relationship.
Defendant expressed remorse for crime, intention not to
repeat.
Prosecutor advised defendant of his right to trial.
Prosecutor commented that his decision not to charge
Rob was a good deal.
Prosecutor said state would recommend one year in jail
with work release and would also ask for restitution.
Prosecutor and defendant discussed victim's needs and
restitution.
Defendant's mother commented on unfairness of disparate
offers for defendant and co-defendant.
Public defender gave legal explanation of disparate
offers.
Defendant and defendant's mother again commented on
unfairness of severity with which defendant was to be
treated.
public defender and prosecutor gave further descriptions
of court processes.
Prosecutor commented that sentence recommendation
was light in view of potential severity for the offense.
Prosecutor advised defendant of his right to trial.
Defendant expressed opinion that his chances at trial
were slim.
Prosecutor spoke to defendant about "evils" of crime,
consequences of participating in crime, and criminal justice
goals.
Prosecutor said sentence recommendation might be better
if pre-sentence report turned out to be favorable.
Defendant's mother asked for explanation of pre-sentence
report. public defender gave such explanation.
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Defendant gave explanations of why he participated in
the crime.
Prosecutor set time limit for acceptance of the offer.
Public defender commented on more favorable offer given
co-defendant.
Conference 4 had a fourth participant, i.e., the defendant's
mother.

She provided considerable support for the defendant,

possibly accounting in part for the earnest participation of the
defendant in this conference.

While the prosecutor opened and

directed the conversation in the first part of the conference, the
defendant and his mother directed the conversation in the latter
half of the conference.

The prosecutor was still the most prolific

speaker, making 28 comments as opposed to 13 comments by the defendant
and 10 comments by the public defender.

This conference took place

in the D.A. Offices and lasted 15 minutes.
Conference 5
Initial Charge:

Theft I (nine counts)/UUV

Conversation Summary.
Public defender explained what would take place in
conference.
Prosecutor asked defendant if he had questions about
conference. Defendant responded he had no questions.
Public defender asked prosecutor why defendant was
arrested when agreement had been made that defendant would
turn himself in. Prosecutor and public defender discussed
this situation, with prosecutor saying that the police had
taken charge.
Public defender gave defendant explanation of the arrest.
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and investigative reports.
'.~'
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Prosecutor questioned defendant about prior record.
Defendant responded with ambiguity. Prosecutor, public
defender and defendant tried to clarify prior record
situation.
Prosecutor and public defender again referred to police
reports.
Prosecutor expressed hope that case could be settled
during the conference.
Prosecutor said state willing to drop all but one count
of Theft I in exchange for guilty plea to Theft I.
Prosecutor pointed out that a great deal of money was
involved in the theft.
Prosecutor expressed opinion that charges would not
merge. Public defender expressed opinion that there was
a good chance they would merge.
Prosecutor commented on strength of state's case.
Prosecutor questioned defendant about employment status.
Defendant responded about employment status.
Public defender raised the possibility of an illegal
search issue. Prosecutor expressed opinion that this was
not viable issue.
Prosecutor asked how offer of PG to one count of Theft I
sounded.
Public defender pointed out that defendant had no prior
record for last six years. Defendant confirmed this point.
Prosecutor pointed out possibility of severe punishment
if offer was not accepted. Public defender commented
that defendant was concerned about this possibility.
Prosecutor commented on particular judge who would
sentence.
Public defender asked about restitution recommendation,
saying that defendant was not totally responsible for
restitution (a co-defendant was involved).
Prosecutor expressed opinion about sentencing judge's
strict view of individual responsibility.
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Prosecutor commented that state didn't have evidence to
ask for total restitution of all reported missing, but
that further evidence could appear making state less
willing to negotiate if case had to be re-indicted.
Prosecutor reiterated offer, adding state would not
object to five years probation and restitution.
Prosecutor set short time limit on offer, again pointing
to possibility of re-indictment if offer were not
accepted.
Prosecutor again asked what they thought of offer.
Public defender said he would have to discuss it with
defendant.
Public defender said offer sounded reasonable if judge
would actually give probation se~tence.
Prosecutor commented that if case were settled immediately,
sentencing would be by less severe judge (who was about to
end his turn as Chief Criminal Judge).
Public defender asked prosecutor how co-defendant's
case was being handled. Prosecutor said they were waiting
to see what took place there. Defendant commented about
co-defendant.
As in the other conferences, the prosecutor made the most
comments (40) in Conference 5, followed by the public defender
(17 comments) and then by the defendant (7 comments).
prosecutor directed the course of the conversation.

Again, the
The public

defender, however, did point to several possible weaknesses in
the state's case.

The defendant's comments were responses to

direct questions.

In this conference, anticipation of sentence was

a prime topic of conversation.

In particular, the sentencing

judge appeared to be used as a leverage to encourage acceptance of
the plea offer (it appeared that the judge who was about to leave
the position of Chief Criminal Judge was considered a less severe
sentencer than the judge who was about to assume the role of Chief
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In addition, the prosecutor used the possibility

of re-indictment as a reason why the defense should accept the
present offer.

This conference took place in the D.A. Offices and

lasted 25 minutes.
Concluding Remarks
Although it was recognized that the very small number of
observed conferences made it unwise to offer unequivocal conclusions
about the pre-trial conference in general in this jurisdiction, there
was no reason to suspect that the conferences observed were not
typical of the confet:ences in general.

What these observations

did suggest was that the pre-trial conference was

(l)

routinized in

terms of procedure; (2) an open exchange of the facts of the case;
(3) an exchange of strategic moves with each side trying to get the
best bargain possible; (4) prosecutor-dominated.

The routinized

procedure began with an explanation to the defendant of the conference
and was usually followed by the prosecutor presenting his or her
case against the defendant.

At some point in the first part of the

conference, the prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and
investigative reports.

Also at various points, the prosecutor

directed questions to the defendant regarding the nature of the
offense and the nature of the defendant.
questioned about their prior record.

All defendants were

The prosecutor then explained

what offers the state would make in exchange for a guilty plea.
all cases observed, an assumption of guilt was standard.

In

Defendants

were told that nothing they said in the pre-trial conference could
be used against them at any other point in the disposition process.
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While an admission of guilt was thus a protected piece of information,
it would seem to give the prosecutor additional leverage.

None of

the defendants in the observed cases denied that they had been
involved in the criminal incident in some way.

The question, then,

centered around what would be done with the accused offender, with
the public defender arguing for the least severe punishment possible.
Many of the comments of the public defenders were either (a)
questions to the prosecutor regarding strength of case or the plea
offer or (b) explanations and clarifications to the defendant.

The

public defender, however, was not completely without bargaining
leverage.

In most cases, he or she was able to point to weaknesses

in the state's case.

In Conference 3, where the public defender felt

that he had a strong legal issue in his client's favor, the public
defender played an aggressive role in the conference and was more
inclined to direct the course of the conversation than in the other
conferences.

While the defendant was not excluded from the conversa-

tion, his or her input was minor in comparison to that of the
attorneys.
The researcher was struck throughout the observations by the
business-like but almost jovial attitude of the attorneys as the
atmosphere for the conference was set.

The attorneys initially

greeted one another; the defendant was then introduced to the
prosecutor if they had not met before, and the defendant was
referred to as Mr. or Mrs. -------

Pleasantries were likely to be

exchanged, and notes of humor were injected by the attorneys.
conference was explained as though it were to be a business

The
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transaction in which the three people were going to take care of
a routine pending matter.
in the background.

The severity of the situation remained

Such an atmosphere might be introduced by the

attorneys in order to attempt to put the defendant at ease.

But the

defendants did not seem to be at ease and were certainly not "lighthearted."

Many appeared to be confused as to what demeanor they

should take.

They were in the presence of authority figures who had

a great deal of power in determining their fate, and yet they were
being treated initially as one of three individuals who were going
to sit down and mutually decide a matter to the satisfaction of all.
As the conference proceeded, however, it became clear that this was
not really the situation.

The definitive statements of the prosecutor

as the conference progressed, indicated that the defendant's fate
was not going to be mutually necided to the satisfaction of all.

HEARINGS IN CHIEF CRIMINAL COURT

For the judge sitting on the bench in Chief Criminal Court
the work day is best described as continually busy.

Beginning at

9:30 each morning, the judge must make decisions throughout the day
which may drastically affect the lives of a number of individuals.
Although the number of cases on the daily docket varied, two or
three dozen cases were usually heard each day.
docket was so large, time was of the essence.
presented and concluded within five minutes.

Since the daily
Most cases were
No observed cases were

in front of the bench for more than fifteen minutes, and some were
settled in two or three minutes.

The judge in Chief Criminal Court
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was not hearing trials.

Rather he was hearing guilty pleas, and

making judgments on a variety of other kinds of hearings (e.g.,
parole or probation revocation, bailor recognizance requests,
change of attorney requests, motions for setovers).
Since the majority of cases were settled by guilty pleas,
Chief Criminal Judge had the major responsibility for accepting
these pleas and sentencing the defendant.

Over a two month period,

the researcher sat in the spectator section of Chief Criminal Court
and recorded observations of this part of the court process.
Twenty-five cases were recorded in detail (the entire conversation
was written down as it took place).

While most of the observed cases

were either the hearing or sentencing of guilty pleas, a few
arraignments and other hearings were also observed.
Defendants who had decided to plead guilty filled out a
petition to enter a guilty plea which had to be accepted by the
judge of Chief Criminal Court.

The first business of the judge

hearing the guilty plea was to ask the defendant if he or she had
read and understood the petition.

The judge might or might not

question the defendant further about an understanding of the meaning
of pleading guilty, e.g., that the right to trial had been waived,
that an admissison of guilt had been made.

The judge then accepted

or rejected the guilty plea (in only one observed case did the judge
;

i·

i

I.
I,

I:

reject the guilty plea).

If the defendant was pleading guilty to a

misdemeanor, he or she could either waive postponement of sentence
and be sentenced on the spot or ask for a separate sentencing date.
In all observed cases, the defendant asked to be sentenced immediately.
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The judge then informed the defendant of his or her right to appeal
the sentence and the right to have a court-appointed attorney for such
an appeal should he or she be indigent.

If the defendant was

pleading guilty to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation was
required by law prior to sentencing.

Such an investigation was

taking, at the time of the research, from four to six weeks.
Following are some typical examples of the daily business in
Chief Criminal Court.
Case 1
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was initially
charged with CAID but had agreed to plead guilty to
Att CAID.
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the
plea and granted immediate misdemeanor treatment.
The defense attorney (a public defender) told the judge
that the defendant was very young (had just turned 18),
and that although he didn't have a job at present, he
was seriously looking for employment. The actual
offense, reported the attorney, involved the existence
of a marijuana plant in the defendant's garden. The
plant was not being cultivated.
The prosecutor told the judge that the defendant had
an extensive juvenile record, but that he had no record
of drug offenses.
The judge asked the defendant why he didn't go back
to school.
The defendant responded that he had been thinking of
going to the local community college.

;,

The judge said that he thought that this would be a
good idea, telling the defendant that "you're going
to have to learn to do something sometime. You have
to be able to support yourself."
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The defendant waived sentence postponement and was
sentenced to three years on probation.
The hearing.was completed in four minutes.
Case 2
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was
initially charged with one count of Assault II and
one count of Criminal Mischief II but had agreed to
plead guilty to one count of Assault IV.
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading
guilty and advised him of his rights. The judge
accepted the plea.
The defense attorney (a public defender) told the
judge that the defendant was 23 years old, that he was
presently employed, and that he had no prior record.
The attorney also told the judge that the crime was a
result of a lovers' quarrel and that the defendant and
the complainant were living together at the time of
the crime. Since arrested, the defendant had been kept
by court order from the shared residence and thus had
been without his personal possessions.
The judge asked the defendant if he had anything to
say.
The defendant responded that it was a lovers' quarrel,
and that he had hit the complainant with his hand-not with a weapon as the complainant had reported.
The defendant pointed out that the complainant showed
no evidence of any injury inflicted with a weapon.
The judge said to the defendant:
If that's the way you love someone, I'd sure
hate to have you mad at me. Let me give you
some advice; never fight with a woman. If
you win, you're a bully. If she whips you,
you're a bum.
The judge paused, then continued with:
~
I'
I"

You had an argument with the person you
love so you belted her (comment followed by
the judge's disapproving head shake).
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The defendant waived sentence postponement and was
sentenced to two years on probation.
The hearing was closed in six minutes.
case 3
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was
initially charged with Forg I and had agreed to plead
no contest to Forg I.
The judge questioned the defendant about his understanding of the no contest plea and advised him of
his rights. The judge accepted the plea.
The judge asked the prosecutor for the state's
position on sentencing.
The prosecutor responded that the state recommended
immediate misdemeanor treatment, probation and
restitution.
The judge told the defense attorney (a public
defender) that he was prepared to accept the state's
recommendation and thus the attorney need not say
anything on his client's behalf.
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was
sentenced to two years on probation and restitution of
the amount received through the forgery ($55).
The judge asked the defendant if he had the money to
pay the restitution.
The defendant responded that he had just been laid
off his job and that he had to go and see about
getting his job back.
The judge asked the defendant how much he made on
this job. The respondent responded. After considering
the defendant's salary, the judge told the defendant
that he had two months to pay the restitution. The
judge added that if the defendant couldn't pay back
the money in this time, he was to inform the court.
The hearing was completed in six minutes.
I

.\.
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Case 4
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was
initially charged with two counts of CAlD, but had
agreed to plead guilty to one count of Criminal Drug
Promotion.
The prosecutor said that the state took no position
on sentencing.
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading
guilty and advised her of her rights.
The defense attorney (court-appointed from the private
bar) told the judge that this was the defendant's first
contact with the criminal justice system. He added that
the offense occurred through her involvement with a boyfriend who was presently an ex-boyfriend. The defendant,
continued the attorney, was living with her parents.
She was presently being treated for injuries resulting
from a recent automobile accident. The attorney told
the judge that this experience had been an awakening for
the defendant, and that, in his opinion, she wouldn't
be back (re-involved in crime).
The judge asked the defendant if she had anything to say.
The defendant responded that she had learned her lesson
and that she was not involved in drugs. She also said
that she had epilepsy, for which she was presently under
treatment.
The judge told the defendant that he understood that
treatment for the epilepsy was necessary, but that that
other stuff (street drugs) was not going to help her.
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was
sentenced to two years on probation. The judge told the
defendant that probation involved no rules which were
too difficult to keep.
The judge advised the defendant not to "get messed up
in something like this again."
The hearing was completed in five minutes.
Case 5

rI:

The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was initially
charged with Burg I and had agreed to plead. guilty to
Burg I.
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The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the
plea.
The judge informed the defendant that since the plea was
to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation which would
take from four to five weeks was necessary.
The judge asked if the defendant was presently out on
his own recognizance and was informed that he was.
The judge asked if this was the defendant's first time
in the criminal justice system and was informed that it
was.
The defense attorney (a public defender) told the judge
that the defendant had been a reliable, trustworthy
client.
The judge asked about the defendant's living situation
and was informed that the defendant was living with his
brother, who had said that he would be responsible for
him.
The judge asked about the defendant's employment status
and was informed that the defendant was working with his
brother, but that he was going to start a new job recycling
tires.
The judge stated that he would continue the recog release
until sentencing.
The hearing was completed in three minutes.
Case 6
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been
initially charged with two counts of Theft I and had agreed
to plead guilty to one count of Theft I.
The prosecutor said that the state would not oppose
probation.
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the
plea.
The defense attorney (court-appointed from
bar) told the judge that the defendant was
and had a young child. The attorney added
defendant had been looking for a job, that

the private
recently married
that the
he had found a
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job as a cook which he could have, but that he hadn't
decided whether to take this job or to keep looking for
a better one.
The judge pointed out that the defendant originally
had two theft counts listed and asked the defendant if
he was sure he only got $25 from the thefts. The defendant
responded that he only got $25.
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was sentenced
to three years on probation, the only condition being that
the defendant get employment. The judge advised the
defendant to "take the job that you were offered."
The defendant asked the judge where he should go to
check in for probation. The judge responded that his
attorney would tell him what to do.
The hearing was completed in five minutes.
Case 7
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been
initially charged with Rape I but had agreed to plead
guilty to Attempted Rape I.
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the
plea.
The judge informed the defendant that since the plea was
to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation which would
take from four to five weeks was necessary.
The judge said that he was rescinding bail release and
that the defendant was to be in jail custody pending
sentencing.
The defense attorney (privately retained) expressed the
belief that this was a good case for pre-sentence release.
The attorney added that the psychological report on the
defendant was good, and that the defendant had held a
job for 11 years.
The judge reiterated his decision to have the defendant
held in pre-sentence custody.
The hearing was completed in four minutes.
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case 8
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been
initially charged with Burg I and had agreed to plead
guilty to Burg I.
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the
plea.
The judge informed the defendant that since the plea was
to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation which would
take from four to five weeks was necessary.
The judge asked the defendant if he would be able to
retain his position in the military police under the
circumstances.
The defendant informed the judge that he was still in
and that he thought they would let him stay in. He added,
however, that he realized that this would depend on what
happened at sentencing.
The judge asked the defendant about the length of his
enlistment, and the defendant responded that it was a
three year enlistment.
The judge advised the defendant to tell his commanding
officer that he would be contacted during the pre-sentence
investigation.
The hearing was completed in four minutes.
case 9
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been
initially charged with CAID (possession of over an ounce
of marijuana) but had agreed to plead guilty to CAID
(possession of less than an ounce of marijuana) •

i
I

L
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The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the
plea.
The defense attorney (privately retained) explained to
the judge that the defendant was stopped for a traffic
violation at which time his car was searched and the
marijuana found. The attorney added that the defendant
had not put the marijuana in the car but was aware that
it was there. The defendant, reported the attorney, was
employed, but had just begun his job and therefore a fine
would be a har~ship on him.
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The defendant waived sentence pestponement. The judge
suspended the impesitien ef sentence and erdered the
defendant to. pay his atterney, saying:
Yeu pay yeur lawyer. A man who. retains and
pays his atterney is net all bad. When yo.u pay
yeur atterney, step and remember that yeu were
lucky to. get eut ef what is a serieus charge.
The hearing was cempleted in five minutes.
Case 10
The presecuter intreduced the case: defendant had plead
quilty to. Attempted CAID but had net been granted misdemeaner status. The pre-sentence investigatien had been
cempleted, and this hearing was fer sentencing.
The presecuter teld the judge that the state recemmended
deferred misdemeaner status, three years en prebatien,
and a $200 fine.
The judge infermed the defendant ef his pest-sentence
rights.
The defense atterney (a public defender) asked the
judge fer immediate misdemeaner treatment. He
reperted that the defendant had a minimal prier recerd
(ene theft in 1975). He explained that the defendant
was feund with a small ameunt ef cecaine, which was
ebvieusly fer persenal use. The defendant, accerding to.
the atterney, was net a drug pusher er anything like that.
The defendant was presently living with his aunt and
uncle and was werking fer his uncle. These relatives
were censidering a meve to. anether state and weuld like
to. be able to. take the defendant with them.
The judge asked the defendant if he had anything to. say,
and the defendant respended that he did net.
The judge stated that he
case as a misdemeaner at
successfully cempleted a
misdemeaner status weuld

was net geing to. treat the
that time. If the defendant
three year prebatien sentence,
then be granted.

The judge asked the defendant if he weuld agree to. a
waiver ef his feurth amendment rights as a cenditien
ef prebatien. The defendant respended that he weuld agree
to. this cenditien, adding:
~. :
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You can search me anytime, every day,
because I've quit using drugs. Drugs are
no good; they've caused me a lot of trouble.
I'm off them completely.
The judge responded:
I'm glad to hear that. I want to help insure
that this is true. That's the reason for the
waiver of the right not to be searched. You're
not a bad guy, not a bad record. But listen to
this (judge read a statement written by the
defendant admitting to the use of a variety of
drugs). I just want you to quit.
The hearing was completed in six minutes.
Concluding Remarks
All of the preceding cases were heard by one judge.

While

the researcher did sit in on a few hearings and trials heard by
other judges, standardized recordings were not made of these
observations.

One impression, however, was that there were definite

variations in the style in which judges addressed the defendants.
The Chief Criminal Judge presiding over the example cases was
comparatively informal in his approach to the defendants.

He often

gave the defendants advice about how to behave; he was at times stern
in his reprimands and admonishments; yet his manner with the
defendants was extremely personalized.
however, regarding his authority status.

There was no question,
The judge was the "boss"

(a standard observation of all court processes in which any judge
was involved), and he was deferred to by everyone in the courtroom.
His dominant position was expected and accepted by all (defendants,
attorneys, other court personnel, and the judge himself), for it is
"

the judge who makes the ultimate decision on the outcome of the case.
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The findings from the observations of guilty plea hearings
and sentencings indicated that this part of the court process was
routinized and swift.

Although a certain amount of time and

effort had been spent on each case prior to these hearings (e.g.,
preliminary hearings, investigative reports, pre-trial conferences),
the final decisions of the judge to accept or reject guilty pleas
and to sentence the guilty were made within a few minutes.

As

several judges stated in the interviews, efficiency needs severely
limit the time and effort they can put into anyone case.

Guilty

pleas were rarely rejected by the judge; it was apparently assumed
in most cases that the issue of guilt had been satisfactorily decided
by the defendant and attorneys.

Defendant characteristics, e.g.,

prior record, age, employment, family ties, residential status,
were used by attorneys to influence the judge's sentencing decision.
Although these variables appeared to influence sentencing and thus to
some extent individualize justice, it was quite apparent that
there was a fair amount of routinization in the way in which
individual judges related defendant profiles to sentencing.
Attorneys must learn the particular relationships which particular
judges make.
In general, then, the observations of guilty plea and
sentencing hearings supported prior research contentions (Blumberg,
1967) that the great majority of criminal cases in the American
system are subjected to assembly-line justice.

In the court

,system under study, however, although ultimate decisions were made
routinely and swiftly, the formal structure did provide some
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mechanisms which mitigated the assembly-line picture of the final
steps in the disposition process.

The mandated pre-trial conference

and pre-sentence investigation were two such mechanisms.
This chapter on the findings from observations of felony
case dispositions in action concludes the presentations of the data
collected for this research project.

In the final chapter, the

findings from all data sources are used to construct a model of
felony case disposition without trial in one urban court system.

CHAPTER VIII
FELONY CASE DISPOSITION THROUGH NEGOTIATION:
A MODEL OF ONE URBAN COURT SYSTEM
At the beginning of this study, the research problem was
delineated in the form of four propositions and eight exploratory
areas.

The ultimate goal was to present a model of the social

reality of case disposition without trial in one urban court
system which could be analyzed in terms of its theoretical relevance
as well as its relationship to previous studies.
It was anticipated that the findings would yield support for
the four propositions in a very general way.

However, exploration

was deemed necessary to determine the specific nature of case
disposition without trial in the court system under study.

In

regard to the propositions, exploration included an examination of
(a) the way in which bargains were related to punishment reduction;
(b) the way in which case disposition through negotiation was
routinized;

(c) the way in which the negotiation process involved

cooperation among key court actors; (d) the way in which the
negutiation process provided for the needs of key court actors.
Additionally, an examination was made of relationships between
the formal and informal organization, the behaviors and beliefs
within the organization, and functional needs and ideal goals.
Finally, policy changes in the District Attorney's Office of the
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court system under study provided an opportunity for the examination
of the effects of attempts to limit plea bargaining.
The above areas, then, set the framework for the development
of the analytical model which follows.
NEGOTIATING THE GUILTY PLEA AS THE DOMINANT
METHOD OF CASE SETTLEMENT
Both the Criminal Court population and sample statistics
indicated that the great majority of cases which resulted in formal
charges were settled by guilty pleas.

Of those cases which ended

in convictions, over 80 percent were settled by guilty pleas.

Of

guilty plea dispositions, about 70 percent involved bargains in the
form of charge reduction or charge/count dismissal.

Data from

the Public Defender files indicated that a third type of bargain,
i.e., agreement not to file on other known charges, was also quite

[
r

common.

Sentence recommendations--an integral part of the formal

bargaining procedure--were made in the overwhelming majority of
guilty plea dispositions.

The plea bargaining process was given

formal recognition both in the policy and procedural rules of the
court system.

A pre-trial conference in which the facts of a case

were to be mutually examined and negotiations were to take place
was mandatory for all felony cases.

The interviewed public

defenders agreed that it was very important to them that their
clients get some kind of a bargain in exchange for a guilty plea.
The evidence, then, strongly supported the argument that negotiating
for a guilty plea was the dominant method of case settlement in
the court system under study.
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ROUTINIZATION THROUGH FORMALIZATION
The plea negotiation process was given open and formal recognition by the court system as was specified in state procedural law
and in the policy manual of the District Attorney's Office.

The

policy of the District Attorney's Office, which restricted bargaining
on certain offenses (and was more restrictive than statutory policy) ,
dominated the decision-making process.

The formal delineation of both

the procedures for the exchange and the substance of bargains might
account for the fact that an informal bargaining process separate
from the formal process was not indicated by the data.

As would

be expected in any organization, individual exchanges between
opposing attorneys regarding a given case suggested attitudinal
differences from those expressed in formal policy.

However, the

negotiation outcome usually followed the dictates of the District
Attorney's Office policy.

If an exception was to be made (and

exceptions were given formal recognition in the policy manual), it
required the approval of top-level staff in the D.A.'s Office.

The

Public Defender's Office had no formal plea bargaining policy;
however, the defense attorneys were compelled to negotiate within
the confines of the District Attorney's policy.

The formal and

adhered-to policy also contributed to the fact that the key actors
in the bargaining process were extremely familiar with the negotiation
process.

Public defenders indicated that they usually knew, after

an initial look at an assigned case, whether or not it was a bargainable case, and that they were more likely than not to know what
the substance of the bargain would be.
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Observations of the pre-trial conference indicated that the
negotiation process was highly routinized in terms of procedure.
The procedure did include a mutual examination of police and other
investigative reports regarding the case.

The conference also

included a bargaining format in which the prosecutor and defense
attorneys attempted to negotiate with one another to get the best
deal for their respective sides.

Generally, however, it was the

prosecutor who dominated the conference--questioning the defendant
about himself/herself and about the offense, and describing the
state's offer should the defendant be willing to plead guilty.

The

offer, decided in advance by the prosecutor, appeared not to be
modified much as a result of the conference.
CONTAINED COOPERATION WITHIN AN ADVERSARY FRAMEWORK
The social reality of plea bargaining in this court system
was notable in its emphasis on formalization, rigidity and restriction.

Formalization reduced the need for key actors to cooperate in

the development of an informal system to guide the negotiation process.
Rigidity also inhibited the responsibility of key actors for decisionmaking.

Restrictions on bargaining reduced the power of the defense

attorney in the exchange relationship.

In addition, both the formal

structure and the philosophies of the District Attorney's Office
and the Public Defender's Office were at odds.

The D.A.'s Office

was characterized by hierarchy, specialization and equality of
justice.

The P. D.'s Office was characterized by lack of hierarchy,

generalization and individualization of justice.

A careful analysis
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of the findings, however, indicated that the negotiation process
operated quite smoothly, with the prosecutors and public defenders
behaviorally cooperating and complying with the system.

On the

other hand, a commitment to the ideal adversary roles was supported
by the findings from the observations of and interviews with
prosecutors and public defenders.

It is the author's contention that

certain features of the court system under study encouraged a
disposition process characterized by functional cooperation within
an adversary framework.
While formalization of the negotiation process did r.educe the
need for key actors to cooperate in the development of an informal
system, it also enhanced functional cooperation by (a) allowing the
attorney to focus on the effectiveness rather than the efficiency of
the system and (b) providing the attorneys with a clear understanding
of the process.

The formalized structure of the negotiation process

provided in great part for the efficiency need of the system.
Indeed, attorneys agreed that a consideration of efficiency needs
was built into the formalized structure and that they shared with
the opposing attorneys a commitment to the effectiveness of the
overall system.

Additionally, they reported a clear understanding

of the process and expressed the belief that the formal process
coincided with the informal process.
Although generally formalized and rigidified, the negotiation
process with its mandatory conference did allow for active participation of the attorneys.

Data from interviews and observations

indicated that in handling a given case, attorneys were necessarily

222

involved in a process of mapping out strategies, anticipating actions
and attitudes of the opposing sides, and calculating the strengths
and weaknesses of both sides in terms of potential bargains.

However,

the nature of the D.A.'s policy left but one across-the-board
negotiable commodity--the strength of case factor.

The D.A.'s

policy, which outlined which offenses were bargainable as well as
the substance of the bargain permissible for different offenses,
forced the defense attorney to turn to the legal issues of the case
in search of a commodity with bargaining power.

In turn, the

prosecutor was also attentive to the strength of case factor.

This

focus on legal issues also strengthened the attorneys' commitment to
their professional roles as legal representatives of their respective
clients.

Observations of the pre-trial conferences supported this

emphasis on the strength of case factor.

Also, attorneys agreed in

the interviews that strength of case was of primary importance in
deciding how to handle a given case.

The other two factors which

were consistently reported as important in bargaining decisions
were the policy of the District Attorney's Office and the seriousness of the offense, both of which were based on a legalistic
referent.

Finally, when asked what their main role or responsibility

was, both sets of attorneys consistently referred to their professional role as legal representatives of their respective clients,
i.e., the state and the defendant.
A further example of this legalistic framework was found in
the data on the nature of charge reduction bargains.

Charge

reductions were overwhelmingly made to lower levels of the initial
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charge.

Although statutory law in the state declared that charge

reductions need be only "reasonably related" to the original
charge, in fact most reduced charges were necessarily included
in the original charge.
The findings from this study, then, led to the conclusion
that prosecutors and public defenders in this felony court maintained
the adversary roles and that cooperation existed only within the
limits of the adversary system.

The attorneys did interact frequently

in their professional capacities; they knew one another and had
formed certain opinions about each other which made anticipation of
exchanges more certain.

However, an awareness that they represented

different sides was reflected in a certain distanc'e and lack of
spontaneity observed in their interactions.

Interactions among

public defenders and among prosecutors appeared to be much more
casual and personal.
ness:

Certain factors facilitated this separate-

prosecutors and public defenders maintained offices in

different buildings; technically the Public Defender's Office was
independent of the public court system; plea negotiation interactions were formally structured; bargaining focused on legalistic
factors.

While both sets of attorneys believed that they had a

commitment to see that the adjudication process worked within the
law, they recognized that the immediate interests of the opposing
sides were at odds.

Prosecutors worked toward convictions, and

public defenders worked toward limiting the exposure of their
clients in terms of punishment.
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BENEFITS AND COSTS IN THE EXCHANGE PROCESS
The findings from this research suggested that the plea
negotiation process was prosecutor-dominated.

Throughout the

case disposition process, the balance of power was highly in
favor of the prosecutor.

The prosecutor had command of the charging

decision as well as the bargain offer.

The rigidity of the District

Attorney's bargaining policies left the public defender with little
leverage in the bargaining process.

Prosecutors could and did

respond to public defenders' counter offers simply by referring to
policy restrictions.

Beyond formal policy, prosecutors had other

bargaining commodities.

For example, if the defense did not accept

an offer, they could threaten re-indictment on a new charge uncovered
by subsequent investigation; they might also rescind an offer if
the defense would not accept it within a certain time period
(possibly a day or two).

The only real baragining power of the

public defender came when he or she was able to find a legal
loophole in the prosecutor's case.

Prosecutors, however, were aware

of the importance of settling the majority of cases by guilty pleas.
In all observed conferences, the prosecutor made some kind of an
offer with at least a suggestion that the potential severity of the
sentence could be reduced.

However, because maximum sentences were

uncommon, some bargain offers did not actually benefit the defendant.
Nevertheless, in that the data indicated a positive relationship
between sentence recommendation and actual sentence, the prosecutor's
sentence recommendation was another commodity reflecting his or
her power.

Although all groups indicated agreement with the

225

statement that "the prosecutor has the upper hand in the plea
negotiation process," public defenders were the most adamant in
their agreement with this statement.

This is to be expected, as

it is the defense attorneys (and of course their clients) who bear
the brunt of this power imbalance.
Public defenders expressed the belief that getting convictions
was the major concern of the District Attorney's Office.

Indeed,

prosecutors interviewed said that one of their major goals was to
convict the guilty.

This appeared to present a definite dilemma

for the public defenders.

A common lament of the public defenders

was that when the prosecutor had a weak case, he or she was more
,, .

likely to offer the defendant an extremely "good deal."

The

defense attorney, while seeing a good chance of getting a not
guilty verdict should the case go to trial, had to weigh the risks
of going to trial against the good deal offered by the prosecutor.
In these cases, the responsibilities of the public defender proved
incompatible.

On the one hand, he or she felt it was his or her

duty to subject a weak case to a legal test through a trial; on the
other hand, it was also his or her duty to settle the case with the
most favorable outcome for the client.

The other side of the coin

was that on very strong cases, the prosecutor was not, according to
public defenders, likely to offer any bargain of substance.

Without

some benefit, the public defender was not anxious to see his or her
client enter a guilty plea.

Thus, in the words of one public

defender, "we end up going to trial on the losers."

'; . :.
j
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Indeed, the

risks of going to trial are high; only a very small number of
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defendants were acquitted at trial.

In addition, the sentencing of

offenders convicted at trial was harsher than of those who were
convicted by guilty pleas.
From the preceding discussions, it appears that the exchange
process provides rewards for the prosecutor but not for the defense
attorney.

Yet there were compensations for the defense attorney.

The pressure to "win" was not so great due to the perceived (and
actual) power imbalance.

Also, the public defenders got satisfaction

from small achievements, i.e., obtaining benefits for their clients
short of acquittal, since they were accomplished in spite of perceived
adversity.

Public defenders expressed the greatest dissatisfaction

with the prosecutors' Career Criminal Unit, as cases placed in this
unit were generally not open for any kind of bargaining.

Finally, the

public defenders' commitment to and belief in the importance of their
adversary role provided them with a source of satisfaction.

The fact

that they were a part of the system--that they were there providing
legal counsel to poor defendants who were up against the state--was
seen as an essential safeguard against dishonesty and injustice
developing in the system.
Thus, the freedom to bargain and at least have a chance to
obtain some benefit for their client which explicitly or implicitly
involved punishment reduction was functional in terms of meeting
the needs of public defense attorneys.

Fortified by a belief in the

importance of their role and a recognition that they were "fighting
for the underdog" as well as fighting from an underdog position, the
public defenders appeared to be able to accept the inequality of the
exchange relationship as long as some exchange was at least possible.
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PERCEPTIONS OF KEY COURT ACTORS: AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT
REGARDING THE SOCIAL REALITY OF THE DISPOSITION PROCESS
Overall, prosecutors, public defenders and judges agreed that
f,
i

the reality of case disposition through negotiation coincided with the
formally-outlined process.

The informal and formal structure and

procedures were seen as consistent.

Regarding the nature of bargains,

all groups of actors agreed that generally the policy of the District
Attorney's Office was in fact followed.

Specifically, all agreed

that the strength of case factor was very important in deciding how
to handle a given case (this factor was also stated as important in
the policy manual of the District Attorney's Office).

However,

whereas prosecutors tended to limit their descriptions of important
factors to those included in formal policy, public defenders were
likely to refer additionally to strategical game plans required in
the decision-making process.

Compared to the prosecutors and public

defenders, judges tended to be slightly more idealistic in their
assessments of important factors in the attorney's decision regarding
the handling of a case.
Prosecutors expressed the opinion that the charging decision
was generally not problematic for them, as it was delineated quite
specifically in substantive law.

It was mentioned, however, that

a charging decision could be problematic on cases in which the
mental state of the defendant was questionable.

The observational

data indicated that more discretion was used by prosecutors in the
charging decision than the interviewees suggested.

For example, a

decision to charge a defendant with one of several degrees of Burglary,
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or a decision to charge Burglary rather than a more serious Robbery
or less serious Criminal Trespass required discretion.

The impression

of the observer was that these decisions were based in large part on
the prosecutor's perception of the strength of the case.

Generally,

interviewees did not believe that overcharging was a common activity
in this court system.
Moreso than public defenders, prosecutors and judges were
inclined to think that standard charge reductions did not exist in
this court system.

However, all respondents did believe that

standard reductions were more common for Drug cases (particularly
marijuana possession) and for non-premeditated Assaults and Homicides
than for other offenses.

Also, it was suggested that Homicides

resulting from traffic accidents were commonly reduced from Manslaughter to Criminally Negligent Homicide.

The statistical data

were consistent with these opinions about common charge reductions.
The relationship between the prosecutors and public defenders
was generally characterized by all groups of respondents as amicable,
professional and cooperative within role restraints.

The relationship

between attorneys at the staff level was often described as better
i

l.

than between the Offices

per~.

Respondents in all groups did

t-

,.
i

point out that there were occasions of conflicts and tensions
between particular individual attorneys.

Public defenders expressed

some dissatisfaction with the structure and policies of the District
Attorney's Office.

They believed that the D.A.'s Office was

structured in a way that limited the decision-making responsibility
of the staff prosecutors.

Policies intended to curb plea bargaining
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were viewed by the public defenders as particularly destructive to
the working relationship of the Offices and the attorneys within
them.

The interviewees supported the contention that prosecutors

and public defenders worked toward settling cases in a functionally
cooperative manner while maintaining an adversary perspective.
PERCEPTIONS OF KEY COURT ACTORS REGARDING PLEA
BARGAINING AND SYSTEM NEEDS AND GOALS
Public defenders believed that plea bargaining satisfied
system needs and advanced the achievement of ideal goals.

They

suggested that everybody--defendants, attorneys, the court, and
the public--benefited from above-board plea negotiation.

Defendants

benefited by having their cases settled in an individualized manner
and by having the severity of punishment reduced.

Perceiving

individualized justice as an ideal goal of the system, public
defenders viewed plea negotiation as furthering the justice goal.
Prosecutors benefited by getting convictions, and public defenders
benefited by being able to reduce the exposure of their clients
to the criminal justice system.

Both sets of attorneys benefited

from active participation in the case disposition process.

i.

The

public defenders expressed the belief that restrictions on plea

.'

bargaining implemented by the District Attorney's Office limited the
extent to which the attorneys could play an active role in case
disposition and reduced the decision-making responsibility on a
case by case basis.

The major disadvantage of plea bargaining, in

the opinion of the public defenders, had to do with possible
injustices to the defendant should the process not be properly
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administered.

For example, plea bargaining could put pressure on

a defendant to plead guilty even though he or she was not guilty
or was unsure of his or her guilt.

Several public defenders also

mentioned the potential danger of a situation in which defense
attorneys began thinking in terms of routinized bargains rather
than possible defenses for the client.

Overall, however, public

defenders were inclined to think that the advantages of properly
administered plea bargaining outweighed the potential disadvantages.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, were considerably less inclined
to view plea bargaining in a positive light.

None of those prosecutors

interviewed felt that there were any major advantages to plea
bargaining.

They expressed the opinion that plea bargaining

worked against criminal justice goals in that cases were compromised,
and dispositions did not reflect the reality of what the defendant
r

l

!f
[

had actually done.

Prosecutors did suggest that plea bargaining

could be useful for getting a conviction on a case in which a
victim had been traumatically involved and felt unable to testify.
It should be noted that the five prosecutors interviewed represented
only a small proportion of the prosecutorial staff.

In addition,

they were all top-level deputies and therefore close to the policymaking process.

Since current policy in the District Attorney's

Office was aimed at limiting plea bargaining, it might be expected
that these prosecutors would take a negative view of the bargaining
concept.
Overall, judges tended to take a more neutral position on
plea bargaining than did public defenders or prosecutors.

Most

·
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judges believed that it was a necessary part of the system in that
it did meet functional court needs for efficient production.

They

also emphasized that it provided benefits for the taxpayer.
While there was high within-group agreement among both prosecutors
and public defenders regarding the advantages and disadvantages
of plea bargaining, the responses of judges varied considerably.
Some judges believed that properly-administered plea bargaining
did not work against the achievement of ideal goals and could be
beneficial to all involved.

Others were more inclined to share

the opinion of prosecutors that plea bargaining resulted in an
inaccurate picture of what the defendant had actually done and thus
worked against the achievement of justice and crime control.
These findings, then, further indicated that prosecutors
and public defenders were not a single-minded body reflecting shared
views as a result of their shared membership in the public court
organization.

Since their definitions of justice were at odds

(,'lith prosecutors emphasizing equality and public defenders
emphasizing individualization), their opinions regarding whether
or not plea bargaining worked toward the achievement of ideal
goals were also at odds.

Also, each set of attorneys was inclined

to think that their own Offices gave greater consideration to the
achievement of ideal goals and less consideration to functional
needs.

Judges, on the other hand,

ch~se

to emphasize their belief

that plea bargaining diq attend to functional court needs, thus
eschewing the issue of ideal goals.
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PLEA NEGOTIATION AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION

The data strongly supported the contention that case disposition
through guilty pleas advances efficient production within the court
system.

The findings further suggested that efficient production

is an essential requirement for the stability and viability of the
court system.

Finally, the case disposition process had been

formally structured in this court system with an eye toward meeting
·the efficient production need.
The data on total disposition time indicated that disposition
by trial was unequivocably the most time-consuming of all closing
types.

While straight guilty plea closings had the highest proportion

of cases settled within 30 days, very few bargained or non-bargained
guilty plea cases took over 60 days.

Although closing with a straight

guilty plea might be slightly more efficient than closing with a
bargained guilty plea, the findings also suggested that on cases in
which bargaining was prohibited from the outset, the likelihood
of going to trial was greater.

For example, of the non-negotiable

Career Criminal cases settled in 1977, 60 percent were closed by
trial.

Also, while charge reductions were effectively curbed on

certain offenses in 1977, these same offenses showed an increase in
the proportion of trial closings from 1976 to 1977.

However, overall

proportions of closing types showed little variation (with only a
very slight increase in trials) prior and subsequent to the
institution of policies which rigidified and expanded the "curb
plea bargaining" position.

A balancing factor appeared to be at

work according to the data on cases closed following the policy
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changes in 1977.

Whereas charge bargaining decreased for the non-

reducible offenses, it increased for a number of offenses not
included in the non-reducible category.

Similarly, while trials

increased for the non-reducible offenses, they decreased for other
f

offenses.

l,.

Thus, overall stability in terms of the proportion of

guilty plea dispositions to trial dispositions was maintained.
The case disposition process was formally structured to
promote efficient production.

The newly-instituted Speedy Trial

f

i

Act which requires that barring unusual circumstances, cases must

I

\.

be settled within 60 days or dismissed appeared to be effective.
Between 1976 and 1977, there was a significant decrease in the
number of cases which took over 60 days to settle.
number of setovers decreased from 1976 to 1977.

Likewise, the

Additionally,

the formalization of plea bargaining, i.e., the designation of a
time and place for a negotiation conference, as well as a statement
of produces and guidelines, removed the responsibility for organizing
the negotiation process from the attorneys.

The formalized system

was highly routinized in terms of procedure and substance.
The negotiation conferences were notably brief (those observed
1

l

took less than a half hour to complete).

Guilty plea hearings and

sentencings were even briefer (few took over five minutes to
complete).

Large numbers of cases (both in terms of absolute

numbers and in terms of the ratio of cases to attorneys and judges)
were run through the felony court system on a daily basis.

The

need to move along quickly was compelling due to the rapid timing
of events (attorneys often had several negotiation conferences and

_~
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several plea or sentence hearings in one day).

Functional cooperation

between the key actors in the process was obviously essential for
the completion of tasks within time constraints.

The above description

certainly fits the picture of assembly line justice set forth in
previous research on the American court process in large organizations.
However, in the court system under study, case disposition was
formally and carefully structured to include both a consideration of
functional needs and ideal goals.

Emphasizing a legalistic frame-

work, disposition without trial in this court system appeared to be
judicially proper in comparison with characterizations of assembly
line processes in other court systems.

PLEA NEGOTIATION AND IDEAL GOALS

An

assessment of the way in which disposition through

negotiation does or does not work toward the achievement of the
larger criminal justice system goals of crime of crime control,
protection of the public and maintenance of rule by law was not
possible from the present research findings.

However, key court

actors interviewed did express a commitment to these larger goals.
The way in which disposition through negotiation works toward the
achievement of justice and due process (ideal goals of both the
overall system and the court subsystem) could be assessed on the
basis of the present research.
A common criticism of disposition by guilty plea (with or
without negotiation) is that it violates the due process rights
of the defendant.

One such right is the right to presumed
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innocence until guilt has been proven.

Indeed, the findings from

this study supported the contention that an assumption of guilt
precluded the settlement process.

All interviewed prosecutors and

judges expressed the opinion that over 80 percent of accused felons
were guilty either of the formal charge or of some related charge.
Twelve of the fifteen interviewed public defenders also agreed with
the over 80 percent figure.

Generally, the issue at hand in the

pre-trial conferences was punishment rather than guilt/innocence.
Additionally, several interviewees stated that guilty plea
convictions were functional in a rehabilitative sense in that an
admission of guilt on the part of the offender was an essential
initial step toward rehabilitation.
Another criticism of disposition by negotiation is that
defendants may be coerced into forfeiting rights to presumed
innocence, to trial, to face accusers and to not self-incriminate
by the offering of reduced punishment for pleading guilty and by
the threat of severe punishment for not pleading guilty.

The

present research did not uncover any incidences of formal or
explicit coercion aimed at getting defendants to plead guilty.
At the beginning of each guilty plea hearing, the judge asked
for written and verbal assurances from the defendant that he or she
(a) was pleading guilty willingly and without coercion and (b)
understood the consequences of the guilty plea.

Additionally, all

bargains regarding the charge were presented to the defendant and
the court in written form.

Sentence recommendations (also presented

in writing) were not, the judge informed the defendant, binding on
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the court, and if the defendant had been led to believe otherwise,
he or she could retract the guilty plea.

These formal safeguards,

however, cannot insure against implicit coercion.

An admission of

guilt as well as a description of the defendant's involvement in
the offense was sought (and often received) in the pre-trial conference.
While such admissions and descriptions could not be used should
the defendant decide to go to trial, the very fact that the attorneys
who would be trying the case had this information was likely to be
perceived by the defendant as working against his or her chances
at trial.

In fact, the risks of going to trial were indeed high

for the defendant.

An extremely small percentage of cases (4 percent)

ended in trial acquittal.

Also, according to the defense attorneys,

the ordeal of trial was a perceived and real concern of defendants
when making a plea decision.

Finally, statistics showed that

sentencing was more severe following trial convictions than guilty
plea convictions.

According to public defenders, inducements in

the form of "good deals" were offered by prosecutors when the state's
case was weak; thus, rewards for pleading guilty were increased
when the risk of trial was decreased.

On the other hand, the

emphasis placed by the public defender on his or her role as a
legal representative of the defendant did appear to be an important
safeguard in terms of the rights of the accused to a fair and just
disposition process.

While admittedly the guilty plea disposition

requires that the defendant surrender some due process rights, the
public defender system in this county appeared to work toward the
preservation of defendants' rights which were not circumvented by the
inherent nature of the guilty plea disposition.
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Whether or not a given case disposition process works toward
the achievement of justice depends initially on one's definition of
justice.

The present research uncovered differences in the meaning

of justice from the perspectives of prosecutors versus public
defenders.

Prosecutors tended to believe justice was being achieved

when guilty offenders were convicted of the same offense with which
they were charged and when similarly-charged offenders were given
equal treatment.

Public defenders, on the other hand, emphasized

the importance of individualizing justice through a consideration

l

of all aspects of a given case.

Public defenders maintained that

l

similarly-charged offenders were not necessarily deserving of
equal treatment.

In line with their respective roles, prosecutors

held to a hard line on punishing offenders in the interests of
justice for the state, whereas public defenders believed that severe
punishment was often unjust in view of mitigating circumstances.
There was also a tendency toward a prosecutorial view of punishment
severity as facilitating crime control and a defense view of the
reduction of punishment severity as facilitating crime control.
Regarding charge and bargain

decision~

the data indicated that

the prosecutorial position of equal treatment was favored.

That

is, charges appeared to be made based upon the legal facts of the
case, and bargains appeared to be offered in accordance with the
offense classification scheme set up by the Office of the District
l.

Attorney.

Characteristics of the offender, e.g., age, sex, employ-

ment, education, did not appear to be influential in the prosecutors'
charging and bargaining decisions.

On

the other hand, one could

- .....---_._

...... _..
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argue (as public defenders often did) that the classification of
offenses as negotiable, non-reducible or non-negotiable in any way
was arbitrary and therefore unjust.

The classification scheme was

not based on seriousness of offense (some Class C felonies were nonreducible and some Class A felonies were fully negotiable).

A

distinction was made between Property offenses and Crimes against
the Person, all of the latter being fully negotiable.
i'
,

The most

arbitrary, however, was the Career Criminal classification which

t

!.

I!

was not based either on the nature of the offense or the seriousness of the offense.

The single shared characteristic of cases

placed in this category was the recidivism of the defendant.
of these cases were non-negotiable.

All

The overall result of the

classification scheme was that defendants charged with Crimes against
the Person or Drug offenses were those most likely to be offered
the chance to plead guilty to a lesser charge.

In fact, the majority

of charge reduction pleas were in the Crimes against Person or Drug
offense categories.
r,
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An additional influential factor in the decision

to offer or not offer a bargain was, according to the interview and
observational data, the strength of the state's case.

Thus, unequal

f

t
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treatment of similarly-charged offenders could result from the
state's perception of the strength of the case.
The data on sentencing indicated that punishment decision,

t

relative to charge and bargain decisions, reflect a concern with
the individualization of justice.
','

i..
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While type offense and type closing

were related to sentencing severity, characteristics of offenders
were also influential factors.
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Overall, punishment was less severe than its legal potential.
Only about half of those cqnvicted received an incarceration
sentence in either 1976 or 1977.

Additionally, a large proportion

of those initially charged with a felony plead guilty to a misdemeanor.

Convictions on Homicides, Kidnaps, Robbery I, Escape

and Ex-Con in Possession of Firearm had the highest proportions
of incarceration sentences.

In contrast, those convicted of

reducible Drug and Property offenses were the least likely to
receive incarceration sentences.

While the above findings

indicated that sentence severity was related to seriousness of
offense, other findings indicated that this relationship was not
clear-cut.

First, changes in sentence severity for certain

offenses occurred between 1976 and the latter half of 1977.
Incarceration sentences for Burg I convictions ( a Class A felony),
while common in both years, decreased in 1977.

On the other hand,

incarceration for Theft I and Forg I convictions (both Class C
felonies) increased considerably in 1977.

All three of these offenses

were Impact 0ffenses classified as non-reducible, the governing
pOlicies of which were strengthened 'as of June, 1977.

Still another

difference occurred for CAID convictions (a Class B felony);
while the number of incarceration sentences for CAID was not high
in either year, the incarceration percentage decreased considerably
in 1977.
Second, the findings showed a clear relationship between type
closing and sentencing.

The great majority of those defendants who

plead guilty to a lesser charge were not incarcerated upon sentencing.
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Pleading guilty to a lesser plus having counts and/or charges
dismissed was the next most advantageous closing in terms of the
likelihood of incarceration.

There was almost no variation in

the proportion of straight guilty pleas and guilty pleas to the
original charge with a dismissal of counts and/or charges which
resulted in incarceration sentences.

Both of the above were less

advantageous than either PGTL or PGTL + Dis, but were more
advantageous than conviction by trial, the latter having the highest
proportion of incarcerations of all closing types.

Since the

offenses which were most likely to close with PG + Dis were not
the offenses with high likelihood of incarceration, it appeared
that PG + Dis was not a good bargain in terms of sentencing.

Being

charged with multiple counts--whether or not they were dismissed-worked against the defendant at the time of sentencing.

The relation-

ship bebleen type closing and sentencing was examined controlling
on four offense types--Burg I, Forg I, Theft I and CAID.

The

findings from this examination showed the same patterns described
above; additionally, these statistics offered evidence that a
[

I

relationship existed between type closing and sentencing independent
of offense type.
Finally, the statistical data offered some support for interview and observation findings that characteristics of defendants were
influential variables in sentencing.

Having a prior felony record

worked against a convicted offender in terms of sentence leniency.
There were also indications that offenders who were older, female,
undereducated and unemployed were at a disadvantage in terms of
light sentencing.
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A RE-EVALUATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE
PROPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM THAT FRAMEWORK
,

,,
r

The theoretical framework on which the present study was

,I-r·

based was functional in nature.

It was suggested that the court

f

I
f

be viewed as a formal organization dedicated to the achievement of

f

ideal criminal justice goals and to the achievement of functional

I
[

needs to maintain organizational stability and viability.

The argu-

ment was that case disposition through a routinized and cooperative
process of obtaining guilty pleas worked toward the satisfaction
of the functional need for efficient production while allowing
for a consideration of ideal goals.

Exchange theory was used to

explain the ways in which negotiating for the guilty plea contributed to the stability and viability of the court organization by
attending to the needs of key court actors involved in the disposition
process.
Based on this theoretical framework as well as previous
research, four general propositions were set forth.

The findings

from this study unequivocably supported the first two propositions,
which read as follows:
PROPOSITION I.
The majority of felony cases which result in
formal charges are settled by guilty pleas, and
the majority of guilty plea dispositions are
the result of some kind of bargain which
explicitly or implicitly involves punishment
reduction.

(:
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PROPOSITION II.
Case disposition through negotiation is
routinized, i.e., there are identifiable
patterns both in the substance of the
bargain and in the procedures for the
exchange which are known to and accepted
by key court actors.
The model which emerged from the research offered a picture of
a court organization in which case disposition through negotiation

\'

i

for guilty pleas was the dominant method of case settlement, was
formally structured, routininzed and well-known to key court actors.
The data indicated that case disposition witnout trial met
the efficiency needs of the court system and thus helped maintain
the stability and viability of the functional organization.

Key

court actors generally agreed that settlement prior to trial worked
toward the achievement of efficiency needs of the court.

Further

support for the argument that settling the great majority of cases
through guilty pleas is necessary for efficient production carne
from a comparison of percentages of closing types in 1976 and 1977.
Although trials increased for certain offenses on which bargaining
was more severely restricted in 1977, trials decreased for other
offenses in 1977.

Thus, overall the trial versus non-trial rates

remained stable in both years.
Based upon the theoretical assumption that cooperation of key
actors was necessary for organizational stability and on prior research
which suggested that case disposition through negotiation promoted
cooperation between key actors, Proposition III was constructed as
follows:
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PROPOSITION III.
Key actors in the negotiation process, the
prosecutor and the defense attorney, work in
cooperation with one another and interact
frequently.
The findings from the present study called for some modification of
this proposition.

The negotiation process in this court system was

characterized by formalization both procedurally and substantively.
The mandatory pre-trial negotiation conference--with a designated
time and setting--removed the need for attorneys to cooperate
in constructing an informal system.

It also limited the need for

frequent interaction of attorneys beyond that which was formalized
(although this one formalized interaction was mandatory for every
felony case).

The rapid timing of events also reduced the possibility

for attorneys to engage in informal negotiation exchanges on anyone
case.

Other factors helped maintain the adversary as opposed to the

cooperative nature of the attorneys' relationship.
appeared to be:

Relevant factors

the structural independence of the Office of the

Public Defender; the differences in both the structure and philosophy
of the Offices of the District Attorney and the Public Defender; the
rigidity and restrictiveness of the plea negotiation policies of the
District Attorney's Office; the emphasis on legal factors in the
bargaining exchange.

The data indicated that prosecutors and public

defenders shared an attitudinal commitment to the adversary system
which was generally reflected in their behaviors.

While dissatis-

factions were expressed by all groups of key actors with certain
aspects of the case disposition process, all expressed a commitment
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to the efficient and effective operation of the overall system.
Compliance was facilitated by this commitment, but also appeared to
be facilitated by a commitment to the adversary system.
Case disposition through negotiation, then, was carried out
in formalized interactions between attorneys in an atmosphere of
contained cooperation, with attorneys perceiving themselves as
representing opposing sides while working toward a shared goal of
case resolution.

Although professional cooperation between

prosecutors and public defenders existed, the adversary framework
remained intact.
The research findings also showed some support but some need
for modification of the fourth proposition:
PROPOSITION IV.
The negotiation process provides for the
needs of key actors to be active participants, to work toward ideal goals, and to
receive rewards for their work.
The data indicated that an open exchange process in which the key
court actors were allowed to be active participants helped provide
for the actors' needs.

Public defenders expressed the greatest

dissatisfaction with the handling of cases designated by the District
Attorney's Office as non-negotiable.

Although the prosecutorial

bargaining policies were rigid, public defenders continually
searched cases for some commodity (usually a legal factor) which
would give them the power to be active participants in the
negotiation process.
Another theoretical assumption was that the negotiation
provided rewards both for the prosecutor and the defense attorney
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through an exchange in which benefits and costs were not zero-sum.
However, the findings from this study indicated that the balance of
power in the exchange process was highly-tipped in favor of the
prosecutor.

Although public defenders reported that it was important

to them that their clients receive some benefit in exchange for a
guilty plea, benefits were not always easy to come by.

One result

of this dilemma was that public defenders tended to broaden the
definition of benefits.

Small gains and achievements, perceived

as accomplished in spite of adversity, provided satisfaction.

Also,

public defenders gained satisfaction from their belief that they were
playing an essential role as legal representatives of defendants in
need of public aid.

Fighting for the underdog from an underdog

position can provide psychological rewards regardless of the outcome.

While they stated that the "ultimate" in rewards was winning

an acquittal, public defenders gained satisfaction from winning
any benefit for their client through the negotiation process.
Although a failure to achieve benefits was mitigated by their role
and system perceptions, a chance to achieve benefits through
negotiation worked toward the achievement of public defenders'
needs.
A final theoretical assumption was that the routinized process
of case disposition through negotiation would allow key actors to
consider ideal criminal justice goals as they worked toward case
settlement.

The data did indeed indicate that the case disposition

process allowed court actors to work toward ideal goals.

However,

prosecutors and public defenders had different perceptions of the

"

"

'"
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ideal goals and thus different perceptions of the impact of plea
bargaining on ideal goals.

In line with prosecutorial policy aimed

at curbing plea bargaining, prosecutors were not inclined to view
plea negotiation as working toward justice or crime control.
Justice was perceived by prosecutors as treating similarly-charged
defendants equally and convicting the guilty as they were charged.
Additionally, they believed that crime control was undermined by
allowing defendants to "cop a plea."

Thus, they believed that the

policies of their Office (which were in fact adhered to in bargaining
decisions) to restrict and equalize bargaining offers worked toward
ideal goals.

Public defenders, on the other hand, generally believed

that plea negotiation advanced ideal goals by allowing for individualized justice and offering deserving defendants a chance at sentence
leniency.

Bargaining policies which closed off active decision-

making on a case-by-case basis and which used only type offense
and strength of case as bases for bargaining decisions were seen
by public defenders as working against the justice goal.
The findings from the present research generally supported
the theoretical argument that case dispOSition without trial
attends to the functional needs of the court while allowing for
a consideration of ideal goals.

Negotiating for the guilty plea,

however, appears to be more functional in meeting defense attorney
than prosecutor needs.

However, if the public defender can get no

benefits for his or her client in exchange for the guilty plea, his
dissatisfaction may work against the prosecutors' need to get
. convictions in an efficient manner.
is necessary.

Thus, professional cooperation
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THE PRESENT STUDY:
A COMPARISON OF FINDINGS
The research findings from the present study supported some
findings from previous research on case disposition through
negotiation.

However, there were findings which refuted some of

the claims of other researchers.

In this section, these

similarities and differences are discussed.
Data from the present study were consistent with previous
studies in which it was found that plea bargaining is the dominant
method of criminal case disposition in American court systems.
The present research also supported previous studies which found
that the strength of case factor was extremely influential in
determining the way in which a case would be handled (McIntyre,
1967; Alshuler, 1968; Mulkey, 1974).

Seriousness of the offense

was also found in this study and others (Mulkey, 1974) to be an
influential factor in the negotiation process.

The suggestion that

plea bargaining is prosecutor-dominated (Newman, 1956; Mulkey,
1974; Neubauer, 1974) was also strongly supported by this research.
While a highly-routinized plea negotiation process was
indicated by the present research, some findings differed from
those previous studies regarding the nature of the routinized
process.

Obviously, plea bargaining is structured differently in

different court systems.

While the present findings cannot be

generalized beyond the court system under study, the data did
suggest that as plea bargaining gains formal status and open
recognition, it may undergo certain changes.
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In this court system, the plea negotiation process was given
formal recognition.

Plea negotiation in reality deviated very

little from formal procedure and policy.

In addition, plea

bargaining did not appear to conflict with substantive law.

The

findings of Sudnow indicating that offenses were often reduced to
lesser crimes which were not necessarily or situationally included
in the initial charge were not supported in the present study.
Sudnow suggested that social rather than statutory referents
were used when deciding what a given case would be reduced to.
In the present study, the majority of charge reductions were found
to be to lower levels of the initial offense.

Although statutory

law in the state declared that charge reductions need he only
"reasonably related" to the original charge, in fact most reduced
charges were necessarily included in the original charge.
The present research did support the contention of other
researchers (Heumann, 1975; Rosett and Cressey, 1976) that the
plea neogtiators were likely to assume some guilt at the outset,
and that thus their focal concern was on the punishment issue.
Thus, when the state's case was strong and the punishment not
severe (Mather's dead-bang cases), disposition by guilty plea was
common.

However, defnese attorneys interviewed in this study

indicated that it was important to them that their client receive
some kind of benefit in exchange for a guilty plea.

In fact, the

number of trials increased for those offenses which became nonreducible in 1977.

Although the majoirty of these offenses were

still settled by guilty pleas, it does appear that the likelihood
of trial increases when defendants are offered no benefits in
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exchange for guilty pleas.

The fact that offenses placed in the

non-reducible category in 1977 showed an increase in dispositions
with other kinds of bargains over the previous year suggested that
prosecutors were aware that some bargain offer may be helpful in
obtaining a guilty plea.
The data provided some support for previous research indicating
that court actors perceived of plea bargaining as fulfilling the
efficiency needs of the court (Mulkey, 1974; Rosett and Cressey,
1976).

However, this court system was so-structured that efficiency

needs were provided for within the formal structure.

Thus, it

[

I

appeared that the court actors themselves felt less pressured to
consider efficiency needs in the day-to-day handling of cases.
Prosecutors, working in line with Office policies to curb plea
bargaining, were less inclined than suggested by previous research
to believe that plea bargaining was essential to the stability and
viability of the court system.
Previous research indicates that there are conflicting
opinions regarding the extent to which plea bargaining serves
ideal criminal justice goals (Neubauer, 1974).

In the present

study, conflicting opinions were found regarding this issue
between prosecutors and public defenders.

Public defenders believed

(similar to the conclusions of Rosett and Cressey) that plea bargaining helped achieve justice on an individualized basis by allowing
for a personalized ;oapproach to
the other hand, prosecutors

the treatment of offenders.

believe~

On

that plea bargaining distorted

the reality of the crime and thus worked against criminal justice
".<

goals.
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Attributes of the offender have been suggested to be important
in charge, plea and bargain decisions (NeWman, 1956; Sudnow, 1965).
In the present study, offender characteristics, e.g., prior record,
sex, age, education, employment, were not strongly related to
whether or not a case was closed with a bargained plea.

However,

defendant characteristics did appear to be influential in the type
of sentence recommendation as well as in the actual sentence.
Being a repeater, over age 21, under-educated, and unemployed
seemed to work against a defendant in terms of sentence severity.
In previous research it has been suggested that plea
bargaining works against the ideal adversary concept of forcing
opposing attorneys to work as cooperative members of the same
formal organization (Sudnow, 1965; Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and
Cressey, 1976).

In the present study, both an attitudinal and

a behavioral commitment to the adversary system were indicated.
While the need for a good working relationship was recognized, the
attorneys in the study maintained their adversary roles.

Again,

the fact that the negotiation process was formalized in this court
system (with a required time and setting designated for exchanges)
reduced the need for attorneys to engage in informal exchanges outside of the formal structure.

Additionally, the adherence of

prosecutors to formal Office policy inhibited the growth of
prosecutor/defense attorney relationships in which cases were
handled on a personal level.

Overall, then, the formal structure of

plea negotiation in this court system facilitated the maintenance of
the adversary system.

-~--...,--,.,.....
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The role of

,.

t~e

judge in the plea negotiation process has also

been researched by social scientists.

In his study, Church (1976)

!

,.

found that when bargains on the charge were not allowed, bargains

i'

I,

on punishment occurred in which the judge became a focal actor in
the exchange process.

Others have suggested that the judge must

necessarily cooperate with attorneys if the guilty plea system is to
work (Cole, 1970; Rosett and Cressey, 1976).

In the court system

under study, the judge was not a participant in the actual
negotiation of guilty pleas on felony cases.

In addition, formal

policy was adhered to by the judge in his statement to the defendant
that sentence recommendations are not binding on the court.

If a

defendant plead guilty because he/she was led to believe that
he/she would be given a certain sentence in exchange for a guilty
plea, he/she was informed of the right to rescind this plea.

However,

the data strpn,]ly indicated a positive relationship between sentence
recommendations and actual sentences.

Attorneys expressed the

opinion that certain judges were more likely than others to follow
the sentence recommendations of the District Attorney's Office, and
thus the tendencies of individual judges were considered by
attorneys in planning their prosecution and defense strategies (all
respondent groups believed that tendencies of judges were more
important to defense attorneys than to prosecutors).

Yet, overall,

the data did indicate that the judges tended to go along with the
state's recommendations for punishment more often than not.
The present study has been primarily exploratory in nature.
The findings were consistent with theory and with previous research
in many major areas.

However, some findings suggested a need for
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theoretical modification and for further research to clarify
inconsistencies between the present study and previous literature.
In the concluding section, suggestions for further research are
offered.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The researcher believes that a court system in which the plea
negotiation process is given formal recognition and formal
structure operates differently than one in which participants must
develop informal processes for disposition by negotiation.

Since

it is only recently that plea bargaining has been given formal
status, the need for further studies of court systems in which plea
bargaining has been formally structured is imperative in order to
assess the generalizability of the findings from the present study.
Of particular interest would be comparisons of court systems in
which the informal process conformed to the formal process (as
was the case in this study) with court systems in which the informal
process deviated from the formal process.
Another research problem which calls for further study has
to do with the unsettled question of the cooperative versus
adversary models of the plea negotiation process.

This study

suggested that the adversary system can be maintained within a case
disposition process in which negotiation plays a dominant role.

On

the other hand, several defense attorneys interviewed in this study
warned of the danger that, over time, a negotiated guilty plea
system may lead to a reduction in the adversary concerns of the
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opposing attorneys.

Over-time studies of the same court system

would be useful to assess this possibility.
Further information is also needed on the way in which changes
in bargaining policies produce changes in (a) the substance of
bargains and (b) the outcome of bargains.

The policy of the

District Attorney's Office in the present study was aimed at
reducing (and for certain offenses eliminating) charge reduction
bargaining.

The data indicated that this policy has been effective.

However, a negotiation conference was mandatory for all felony
cases, and most often the state offered something in exchange for a

t:
t.

guilty plea.

An

increase in other kinds of bargains, e.g., count

I' .

f.
~

dismissals, agreements not to file--was concomitant with a decrease
in charge reduction bargains.

However, agreements to dismiss counts

and/or nct file on other known charges did not appear to be good
bargains in terms of sentencing.

A follow-up study on the actual

time served by defendants whose cases were settled with different
kinds of bargains would shed some further light on the extent to
which various bargains resulted in actual punishment reduction.
Although difficult to assess, an important research question
concerns the way in which the plea negotiation process does or
does not work toward the achievement of ideal criminal justice
goals.

In this study, prosecutors and defense attorneys expressed

conflicting opinions regarding this question.

In part, this appeared

to be due to their respective roles, in which emphases were placed
on different aspects of criminal justice.
."
~.

A case study approach to

this research question would be useful in order to obtain objective
information on plea negotiation and criminal justice goals.
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The present study began with a broad format, attempting to
examine a number of specific research questions along with presenting
a model of the total field of study.

It is the researcher's opinion

that one of the major contributions of this kind of study is in its
empirically-based suggestions for future research.

Through this

exploration of a relatively new field of study, the researcher has
identified patterns which might be usefully subjected to refined
testing.

REFERENCES

Alschuler, Albert 1968. "The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,"
The University of Chicago Law Review, 36, pp. 50-112.
Banton, Michael 1964.
Basic Books.

The Policeman in the Community, New York:

Barber, Bernard 1973. "Research on Research on Human Subjects:
Problems of Access to a Powerful Profession," Social
Problems, 21 (Summer), pp. 103-112.

r
l

II

Becker, Howard S. 1970. Sociological Work:
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.

Method and Substance.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1970. An Introduction to Social Research,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

l
l

Blumberg, Abraham S. 1967. "The Practice of Law as Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession," Law
and Society Review, 15, pp. 15-39.

I

t

l

![
f

!

(
!

I

Cavan, Sherri 1966. Liquor License: An Ethnography of Bar
Behavior, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
__________~__ 1972. Hippies of the Haight, St. Louis:
Critics Press.

New

Chambliss, William and Robert Seidman 1971. Law, Order and Power,
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.

f

tt,

!r

I
t,

[,

Chiricos, Theodore G. and Gordon p. Waldo 1970. "Punishment and
Crime: An Examination of Some Empirical Evidence," Social
Problems, 18 (Fall), pp. 200-217.
Church, Thom.;ts 1976. "Plea Bargains, Concessions and the Courts:
Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment," Law and Society Review,
10:3 (Spring), pp. 377-401.
Cole, George F. 1970. "The Decision to Prosecute," Law and
Society Review, 4 (February), pp. 331-334.
Deutscher, Irwin 1966. "Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social
Policy," Social Problems, 13 (Winter), pp. 235-254.

256
Douglas, Jack D. 1976. Investigative Social Research: Individual
and Team Field Research, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Etzioni, Amitai 1961. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations:
On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates, New York: The
Free Press.
Feeley, Malcolm M. 1973. "Two Models of the Criminal Justice
System: An Organizational Perspective," Law and Society
Review, 7, pp. 407-424.
Gans, Herbert 1962.

Urban Villagers, New York:

The Free Press.

Gibbons, Don C. 1977. Society, Crime, and Criminal Careers: An
Introduction to Criminology, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm Strauss 1967. The Discovery of
Grounded Theory, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
Glazer, Myron 1972. The Research Adventure: Promise and Problems
of Field Work, New York: Random House.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1960. "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary
Statement," American Sociological Review, 25 (Apri 1), pp. 170.
Heumann, Milton 1975. "A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case
Pressure," Law and Society Review, 9, pp. 515-528.
Johnson, John M. 1975
Press.

Doing Field Research, New York:

The Free

Kaplan, Abraham 1964. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for
Behavioral Science, Scranton, Penn.: Chandler Publishing Co.
LaPiere, Richard T. 1934. "Attitudes vs. Actions,"
Social Forces, 13 (March), pp. 230-237.
Mannheim, Karl 1952. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, New York:
Oxford University Press.
March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon 1958. "The 'fheory of
Organizational Equilibrium," from March and Simon, eds.,
Organizations., New York: Wiley, pp. 77-86.
Mather, Lynn 1973. "Some Determinants of the Method of Case
Disposition: Decision-Making by Public Defenders in
Los Angeles, Law and Society Review, 8, pp. 187-216.
Matza, David 1961. Becoming Deviant, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.

•

··.E'J\':~;-·_-----

257
McIntyre, Donald M. 1968. "A Study of the Judicial Dominance of
the Charging Process," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology
and Police Science, 59 (December), pp. 463-490.
Merton, Robert K. 1957. "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,"
from Merton, R. K., Social Theory and Social Structure,
New York: Macmillan Co.
Merton, Robert K. and Patricia L. Kendall 1946. "The Focused Interview," American Journal of Sociology, 59 (May), pp. 541-557.
Mulkey, Michael E. 1974. "The Role of the Prosecution and
Defense in Plea Bargaining," Policy Studies Journal, 54:3,
pp. 54-60.
Nash, Manning 1966. Primitive and Peasant Economic Systems,
San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.
Neubauer, David W. 1974. Criminal Justice in Middle America,
Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press.
Newman, Donald J. 1956. "Pleading Guilty for Considerations:
Study of Bargain Justice," Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science, 46, pp. 780-790.

I
t
I

i
if
I.

-----------------or Innocence

A

1966. Conviction: The Determination of Guilt
Without Trial, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Olson, Sheldon R. 1976. Ideas and Data: The Process and Practice
of Social Research, Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press.
Parsons, Talcott 1956. "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach
to Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 1, pp. 63-85.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice 1968. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
New York: Avon Books.
Quinney, Richard 1975. Criminology: Analysis and Critique of
Crime in America, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Reiss, Albert J. 1968. "Stuff and Nonsense About Social Surveys
and Observation," from Becker, Howard S. et al., eds.,
Institutions and the Person, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
pp. 351-367.
Rosett, Arthur and Donald R. Cressey 1976. Justice by Consent:
Plea Bargains in the American Courthouse, New York: J. B.
Lippincott.

2S8
Rovner-Pieczenik, Roberta 1976. "Another Kind of Education:
Researching Urban Justice," from Golden, Patricia, ed.,
The Research Experience, Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock
Publishers, pp. 465-473.
Samuels, Frank G. 1976. The Negro Tavern: A Microcosm of Slum
Life, San Francisco: R and E Research Associates.
Sanders, William B. (ed.) 1974. The Sociologist as Detective:
Introduction to Research Methods, New York: Praeger
Publishers.

An

Seeley, John R. 1961. "We Hidden Persuaders: Social Thought and
Politics," an address to the National Federation of
Canadian University Students, McMaster University,
mimeographed.
Selznick, Philip 1948. "Foundations of the Theory of Organization,"
American Sociological Review, 13, pp. 25-35.
ir

l
l

Skolnick, Jerome H. 1966.
John Wiley & Sons.

Justice vlithout Trial, New York:

i'
1967. "Social Control in the Adversary System,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11:1 (March, pp. 52-70.
Subin, H. G. 1966. Criminal Justice in a Metropolitan Court,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Sudnow, David 1965. "Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the
Penal Code in a Public Defender Office," Social Problems,
12 (Winter), pp. 255-276.
Webb, Eugene J., Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, Lee Sechrest
1971. Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the
Social Sciences, 2nd ed., Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.
Wicker, Allan W. 1969. "Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude
Objects," Journal of Social Issues, 25:4, pp. 41-79.
Wilson, James Q. 1968. Varieties of Police Behavior, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wiseman, Jacqueline P. 1970. Stations of the Lost: The Treatment
of Skid Row Alcoholics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Wiseman, Jacqueline and Marcia S. Aron 1970. Field Projects for
Sociology Students, Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co.

APPENDIX A

COMMENTS ON THE FIELD RESEARCH MODEL

Previous discussions of the field research model and the
specific methodology for this study (see Chapter II) indicated that
this type of research was no small undertaking.

It is not surprising,

therefore, that a number of criticisms have been leveled against this
methodological model.

In this appendix, criticisms are confronted,

and advantages of the field research methodology for this kind of
study are discussed.
MULTIPLE TECHNIQUES FOR DATA COLLECTION

The use of multiple techniques of data collection furthers
the field research goal of examining the totality of the field of
study.

In the present study, in which formal and informal attitudes

and activities were examined, different techniques were required to
retrieve different kinds of information.

Also, by using independent

measures, both validity and reliability are strengthened.
comments of two methodologists are appropriate:
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or
more independent measurement processes, the certainty
of its interpretation is greatly reduced. The most
persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of
measurement processes. If a proposition can survive
the onslaught of a series of imperfect measures, with
all their irrelevant error, confidence should be placed
in it (Webb, 1971: 3).

The
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In short, the very large number of observations and
kinds of data an observer can collect, and the resulting
possibility of experimenting with a variety of procedures
for collecting them, means that his final conclusions can
be tested more often and in more ways than is common in
other forms (Becker, 1970: 52).
The use of the data sources selected for the present study
has been common in other similar studies.

Sudnow used observations,

interviews and case records to examine the way in which cases were
judged to be typical of given classes of offenses and treated in
routinized ways based upon their typicality or normalcy (Sudnow,
1965).

Rovner-Pieczenik used these same sources to uncover the

way ill

;.;~i.ch

felony cases were adjudicated in an urban court by

a labeling process which regularized the adjudication process
(Rovner-Pieczenik, 1976).

Several other studies used observations,

interviews and case records to identify and analyze important
I

!
t

I

t

factors in decisions to charge, plea and bargain (Cole, 1970; Mather,
1973; Neubauer, 1974).

:f

L

Observations and interviews complement one another and act
upon one another in a "check and balance" fashion.

According to

Olson:

i
t

/'

Interviews and what might more correctly be called
conversations are interlocked with observations. They
provide access to information that would be otherwise
unavailable. They also provide the chance for
elaboration and validation of your observations and
interpretations of events. In a similar manner,
observations supplement and guide material gained
through interviews and conversations (Olson, 1976: 51).
Formal records provide another independent check on the validity and
reliability of field research.

Formal records may be used to

corroborate the findings from observations and interviews; additionally,
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they may be used to ascertain the way in which the perspectives
of key actors do or do not coincide with the statistical facts
of case disposition.

In her field research on the adjudication

process in an urban court, Rovner-Pieczenik found the use of
court records to be helpful:
Although I could observe "bargain justice" on a
case-by-case basis, quantitative data concerning the
outcome of the bargaining sessions was not available in
either the legal or the sociological literature. I
concluded that the statistics on dispositions and
sentences actually represent the outcome of bargainings,
since the majority of cases was resolved by a plea of
guilty. It was at this point in my observational
experience that I decided to collect statistical
information about the processing and outcome of a large
number of individual cases. These statistics collectively
would represent what was too difficult to observe directly;
how, in fact, different case types were adjudicated by the
courts (Rovner-Pieczenik, 1976: 470).
It was the conclusion of this researcher that the use of

l
t
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multiple methods of data collection leads to a more accurate
depiction of the case disposition process and strengthens both the
validity and reliability of the research.

It is also a partial

response to the critics of field research who express a concern about
the lack of objectivity in such research.

~

.'

MULTIPLE TECHNIQUES FOR DATA ANALYSIS
The controversy over the use of quantitative versus qualitative
methods for data analysis is indeed an old one.

Proponents of

quantitative methods have argued strongly that numerical representation provides the objectivity necessary for reliability.

Without

quantification, theY'continue, findings cannot be standardized, and
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they therefore rely heavily on the judgment of the researcher.
Further, critics suggest that only through a statistical analysis
can relationships be assessed in terms of their significance.
Those who support qualitative analysis argue that for certain
kinds of research, e.g., in-depth, exploratory, ethnographic-the meaning of social relationships can best be understood through
a qualitative analysis of the findings.

They also point out

that the benefits of quantification, e.g., standardization,
precision, comparability, statistical probability, may be outweighed by the costs of losing important information.
• • qualitative analysis is more likely to
explain relationships in terms of social meanings,
social realities, social norms, and definitions of
the situation. Such understandings are not readily
quantified (transformed into numbers), and, if they
were, they might lose their sense and complexity
(Sanders, 1974: 164).

i
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Others have argued that quantitative analysis requires judgmental

i
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decisions initially, as qualitative data must be transformed into

I

i

numerical

,It'

codings in much research (Cavan, 1972).

Kaplan states

that "certain things are necessarily omitted in the numerical

,
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description, for this is always based on a determinate set of
properties and relations to the exclusion of others" (Kaplan, 1964:

~

I

t

207).

Kaplan further suggests that the argument over qualitative

versus quantitative methods of analysis may be a false one in that
the two methods per se are not antithetical:

.~

The point is that both quality and quantity are misconceived when they are taken to be antithetical or even
alternative. Quantities are of qualities, and a measured
quality has just the magnitud;-expressed in its measure •
In a less metaphysical idiom, we could say that whether
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something is identified as a quality or as a quantity
depends on how we choose to represent it in our
symbolism (Kaplan, 1964: 207).
Even if one believes that qualitative and quantitative analyses are
not as easily fused as Kaplan suggests, it would be difficult to
argue against incorporating both methods into a data analysis model
for this particular type of study.

Like the use of multiple methods

for acquiring data, the use of multiple methods for analyzing data
can only strengthen the validity and reliability of the research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS-TESTING
The theoretically-based propositions provided the conceptual
framework within which the phenomena under study were to be explored.
Within this focal framework, flexibility was allowed as the research
process progressed.

Since the purpose was to explore a particular

social reality, the testing of well-formulated hypotheses was
inappropriate.

Becker has pointed out that having well-formulated

hypotheses in advance may bias or limit the field researcher'S
attempt to examine social reality as it actually exists:
[Field researchers] attempt to make their research
theoretically meaningful, but they assume that they
do not know enough about the organization ~ priori to
identify relevant problems and hypotheses and that they
must discover these in the course of the research
(Becker, 1970: 26).
While in the present study general problems were identified, the
precise nature of these problems was not clearly understood prior
to the research undertaking.

Thus, the research process itself led

to further development of and modifications in the theoretical framework.

This process has been referred to as the discovery of grounded

.. ~-------
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theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

The purpose of the research was

not merely descriptive; rather, it was to make theoretical sense
of the circumstances.

However, the descriptive data could not be

ignored when they did not fit into the initial theoretical
perspective.

According to Nash:

The theory strives for a nomological form--it
attempts to state laws, but it must account for the
facts gathered. That is, it is an uneasy mixture
between deductive and inductive nomological theories
(Nash, 1966: 10) •
Becker's description of the field research process reflects the
analytical approach taken in the present study:
. • . the observer characteristically begins by
constructing models of parts of the organiz~tion as
he comes in contact with them, discovers concepts and
problems, and the frequency and distribution of the
phenomena these call to his attention. After constructing a model specifying the relationships among various
elements of this part of the organization, the observer
seeks greater accuracy by successively refining the model
to take account of evidence which does not fit his previous
formulation (Becker, 1970: 34).
The final stage of analysis consists of "incorporating individual

[
1

t

!
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findings into a generalized model of the social system or organization
under study or some part of that organization" (Becker, 1970:

33) •

A number of studies are illustrative of the research process
described above.

Sudnow used this process to generate a model of

l'
~

the classification scheme which guided charge, plea and bargain
decisions in case disposition.

Sudnow examined individual cases

to describe the way in which classes of offenses were categorized
according to their "typical features."

From this description, he

moved to an analysis of the total bargaining phenomenon (Sudnow, 1965).

",
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In her study of skid row alcoholics, Wiseman sought to understand
the social world of a particular deviant community by examining
the perspectives of those involved in the social world of the
skid row alcoholics.

Wiseman reported that as the study progressed,

important concepts and constructs emerged (Wiseman, 1970).

In

two separate studies, Cavan attempted to apprehend the social
world of specific groups by observing them in their natural
settings.

In her ethnographic study of bar behavior, Cavan focused

on activities in the bar setting which gave meaning to the total
social reality of the social system.
on three categories of activities:

The descriptive data focused
seating and spatial distribution,

internal movement, and face-to-face interaction.

After identifying

the frequency and distribution of regular behavior patterns, Cavan
moved to the analytic stage, suggesting that the data indicated
the existence of a well-defined social system in which rules for
behavior were informally established and consequences of particular
actions and attitudes were readily anticipated by participants
(Cavan, 1966).

In her study of hippies in San Francisco, Cavan

used a similar research process--describing everyday life, social
exchange, social trouble and social control as relevant phenomena
in the hippie subculture (Cavan, 1972).

These studies covered

a variety of topics and differed in their conceptual frameworks;
however, they all were directed toward the exploration of the
social reality of a social system by examining the way in which
the parts gave meaning to the whole.
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OBJECTIVITY
One of the basic concerns of methodologists is how to insure
that the findings from a research undertaking are objective.
This problem is compounded by the fact that a variety of meanings
have been attached to the term objectivity.
While objectivity is certainly not synonymous with validity
or reliability, issues regarding validity and reliability are
often raised in discussions of the objectivity of a given research
project.

A carefully constructed field research design is every

bit as capable of attending to validity (the study measures what
it purports to measure) as any other kind of research design.

In

the present study, content and construct validity were checked
by referring to previous similar studies and consulting with
experts regarding the construction of the measurements.

Although

controls required to insure internal validity after the instruments
have been constructed are not as easily applied in field research
as in experimental research, the field researcher compensates by
continually assessing and reassessing internal validity throughout

I
It

the research process (Johnson, 1975).

Field research is especially

strong in external validity (generalizability of the findings) since
the research takes place in a natural rather than contrived setting.
The reliability issue is more problematic.

In order to insure

reliability (the study can be repeated under the sarne circumstances
with the same results), controls can be introduced in a true
experiment which cannot be introduced in field research.

In a

true experiment, variables are manipulated, and attempts are made
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to insure that all variables extraneous to the hypothesis being
measured are controlled.

In field research, however, the purpose

is to consider all variables as they occur in the natural setting.
Admittedly, there are fewer guarantees that a field study can be
replicated in the same way that an experimental study can be
replicated.
I·

Becker suggests that we should not expect identical

results from different field studies of the same organization but
only that the findings be compatible (Becker, 1970).
The present study had to contend with another reliability
problem.

Due to the fact that the data were collected by a single

researcher, reliability could not be checked by making interobserver comparisons.

There were, however, compensations.
V

Observation and interview schedules were structureed with standardf

ized lists of activities and attitudes to be measured.

f

consulted throughout the research process regarding data collection

~

and analysis.

I.
I

Experts were

Finally, the use of multiple data sources provided

for a variety of measurements of the same phenomena.

f.
A specific criticism of field research focuses on lack of
objectivity due to the obvious intrusion of the researcher into
the research process (reactivity).

The field researcher, who is

often a participant in or at least a direct observer of the
phenomenon under study must deal with the possibility that 1) his
or her presence is influencing the way in which respondents react
and/or 2) his or her involvement is leading him or her to be
~

..

judgmental or biased in the collection and analysis of the data.
Field researchers have had much to say on these issues.
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First, it is generally accepted that reactivity can be a
problem in all research in which people are the objects of study.
Becker argues that field research may actually reduce respondents'
inclinations to respond "falsely" since they are being observed
in a natural setting in which "business must go on as usual."
Experimenters neutralize external constraints by
isolating the subjects of their experiments from their
usual surroundings, by experimenting on topics
unconnected with any strong beliefs held by the subject,
and by assuring the subject that his behavior in the
experiment, however, he performs, will have no influence
on his life outside the experimental laboratory. To
precisely the degree that these aims are achieved,
subjects are free to shape their words and deeds in
accordance with cues unwittingly given off by a biased
experimenter (Becker, 1970: 45-46).
In the present study, lack of objectivity in terms of respondent
bias was checked through the use of multiple data sources.

However,

because of the research goal to understand the total social
reality, the researcher was interested in attitudes and opinions
of respondents regardless of whether or not they coincided with
"objective" truth.

If only actions are considered to constitute

objective truth, field research does have an objectivity problem,
for it is well-documented that words and deeds are not necessarily
consistent with one another (LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969; Deutscher,
1973).

However, objectivity does not have this meaning for most

field researchers.

Rather, it means an accurate description of an

entire phenomenon--including both words and deeds.

It is, of

course, recognized that attitudes and actions constitute two
classes of data which must be separated analytically.

Although

one purpose of the present study was to make comparisons between
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attitudes and actions, the central focus was on the way in which
both fit into the social reality of the case disposition process
within the court setting.
Although respondent bias is recognized as an objectivity
problem in all types of research, researcher bias has been claimed
to be a more serious problem for field research than for other
types of research.

Observation methods, it is alleged, lead to

descriptions and interpretations which depend on subjective
judgments of the field researcher.

Field researchers deny these

claims, pointing out that the use of structured schedules, the
recording of specific events, and the use of multiple data sources
all work toward observer objectivity.
On the other hand, it has been recognized that the notion of
science as a totally objective, value-free enterprise is a myth.
Based upon the seminal work of Karl Mannheim (1952), the realization
that knowledge itself is socially-constructed and subjectivelybased calls for a reassessment of the meaning of objectivity.

If

the arguments of Mannheim and others are accpeted, it follows that
the perceptions of researchers are biased in the sense that they
are influenced by subjective experiences and world views which
are a part of their life history.

The fact that subjectivity

cannot be entirely eliminated does not mean that the objectivity
criterion must be abandoned.

The research design can incorporate

techniques previously referred to which strengthen objectivity.
Additionally, an awareness of the possible intrusion of subjectivity leads to a more careful consideration of biases and judgments
which may be influencing the findings.
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Another perspective is that subjectivity and objectivity are
both useful in arriving at scientific truth in field research.
In uncovering the social reality of a given phenomenon, it is
suggested that the subjective experiences of the researcher may
actually enhance the research endeavor.

In his discussion of

naturalistic observation as a research methodology, Matza concludes:
Naturalism must choose the subjective view, and
consequently it must combine the scientific method
with the distincitve tools of hurnanism--experience,
intuition, and empathy-. Naturalism has no other
choice because its philosophical commitment is
neither to objectivity nor subjectivity, neither to
scientific method, nor humanist sensibility. Its
only commitment is fidelity to the phenomenon under
consideration (Matza, 1961: 8).
Finally, a comment on subject-object dualism seems
appropriate.

The traditional scientific view is that bias can

be eliminated (or at least reduced) by maintaining a strict

l

I

separation between the subject and object of study.

Recently,

social scientists have rejected this dualism and argued that

I

L

subject and object must be considered in terms of their relationship to one another (Johnson, 1975).

To consider the subject and

object as interdependent parts of a total phenomenon does not in
itself reduce objectivity.

Kaplan states:

All measurement yields, not a property intrinsic
to the object being measured taken in isolation, but
a relation between that object and the others serving
as standards of measurement. When the relation is
to other human beings, or even to the observer himself,
it is not therefore a subjective one (Kaplan, 1964:
212) •
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SAMPLING
In an exploratory study, traditional sampling techniques are
not always appropriate as "it is difficult to know in advance just
what the sample should be representative of" (Wiseman, 1970:

282).

Yet representativeness is exactly what is being pursued in examining
the frequency and distribution of phenomena under study.

To satisfy

the exploratory purpose, some sampling flexibility must be allowed
during the course of the collection of data.

However, an initial

description of units to be sampled along with procedures for
sampling is necessary to strengthen reliability and to reduce the
possibility of mistaking idiosyncratic findings for representative
ones.

In this study, there were three levels of sampling units

which corresponded with the sources of data:

events observed;

respondents interviewed; felony cases recorded in criminal files.
Two specific events (pre-trial conferences and plea hearings)
were selected for observation.

These events were selected due to

their direct relevance to the phenomenon under study.

It was not

possible to take a random or representative sample of pre-trial
conferences.

Since access to these conferences was not readily

available, the researcher had to take whatever she could get.
Conclusions from this set of observations, therefore, had to be
described as tenuous and only suggestive.

The researcher sat in

on plea hearings on a number of different days.
all hearings which took place were recorded.

On these days,

Thus, there is no

reason to suspect that the observed hearings did not constitute a
representative sample.

However, observations of hearings took

L------.. -.. .-.....
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place during a time period in which only two different judges
were on the bench in Chief Criminal Court.

In this respect, the

findings are limited.
Since the entire verbal content of these two events was
recorded, bias which may result from recording only selected aspects
of events was non-existent.

More casual observations were made

of other events in the case disposition process (trials, other
hearings, meetings).

Data from these latter observations were

used to corroborate or expand upon the findings from other data
sources.
The populations to be interviewed were selected for the
purpose of 1) examining the perspectives of key actors in the case
disposition process who were members of the same public court
system; and 2) comparing the perspectives of groups who played
different roles in the case disposition process.

The original

intent was to interview the total populations of these groups.
This was accomplished for the public defender group, and fell only
slightly short of the mark for the felony judge group.

As

indicated earlier, however, the prosecutor group consisted only of
individuals selected by the District Attorney's Office.

Only

about half of the total population of felony prosecutors was
represented in the questionnaire responses, and less than one fifth
was represented in the open-ended

p~rt

of the interview.

Traditional random samples were taken of all felony cases
settled in the time periods under study.

There is no reason to

suspect, therefore, that error contained in the data from these
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samples was not random.

Summary statistics on type closing of the

total populations from which these samples were drawn indicated
that, on this one important variable, the samples were representative
of the total populations.
ETHICAL ISSUES
When doing a field study, the researcher must take into
consideration the implications and consequences that the research
might have on those being studied.

There are several ethical

issues which are relevant for this particular study.
The first issue has to do with disclosure.

Members of an

organization are likely to be wary of outside investigators;
such potential participants are increasingly seeking an answer to
the question of whose side the researcher is on (Becker, 1970;
Glazer, 1972).

The researcher may answer this question by referring

to the tenet of scientific objectivity.

However, regardless of

techniques for objective data collection and analysis built into
the research design, the selection and conceptualization of the
problem reflects a political point of view •
• . research, like all other human activities, is
political; that it supports one point of view and
vested interest at the expense of others (Gans, 1962:
56-57).
Increasingly, social scientists are openly advocating that research
be used to bring about social change in programs and policies.
Not only is a commitment to social "progress" seen as an appropriate
part of the researcher role, but further, a neutral stance is
seen as fostering the myth of value-free research (Seeley, 1961).
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Obviously, the political perspective of the research/researcher has
implications for the object of study.

Political perspectives aside,

the "exposing" or "unmasking" nature of the exploratory field study
may have political or professional consequences for the organization
and/or its members.

While ethics demand that the researcher explain

to those being studied the general nature of the research, as well
as its possible implications, there are several factors which work
against full disclosure.
First, in order to gain access to the organization and thus
to the desired data, it is essential to gain the trust and cooperation of the organization members (Becker., 1970; Wiseman, 1970;
Glazer, 1972; Sanders, 1974; Johnson, 1975).

Trust and cooperation

are facilitated by developing rapport.
Generally, rapport is a matter of being noncritical, interested in what the subjects do and say,
and, most important, genuinely open to an understanding of how they see and experience their social
world (Sanders, 1974: 159).
However, rapport may not be easily established if full disclosure
suggests to the participants that their organization may be
described in ways which work against their interests.

The

researcher, then, may be tempted to withhold information which he
or she feels may inhibit cooperation.

When the participants are

mdividuals or organizations with power and influence (as was the
case in this study), the researcher may be even more likely to lose
accessibility by full disclosure (Glaser, 1972; Barber, 1973).
Administrators in government, business, and the
unions who pass on requests for research funds or who
must acquiesce before field workers can study their
own organizations are reluctant to assist those who
might expose their decisions in an unfavorable light
(Glazer, 1972: 150) •
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In addition to the researcher's own vested interest in gaining
accessibility in order to complete a research project, the
researcher should have a commitment to uncovering the reality of
all aspects of society--especially those aspects in which great
power to influence social decisions and activities is vested.
Those in power, whether in public or private positions,
have been defined as fair game by social scientists.
This is as it should be. Their position often includes
the expectation of accountability. Social scientists,
among others, have and should continue to strive to
ensure that those who control vast administrative
organizations are not shielded from the appropriate
limelight (Glazer, 1972: 172).
The approach in the present study was to attempt to develop
a relationship of trust, cooperation and rapport with the participants in the study by reassuring them that there was a genuine
interest in their perspectives and in depicting their organization
t

l

accurately and objectively.

Participants in the study were in

fact extremely cooperative.

All public defenders of whom an inter-

[

I

view was requested agreed to be interviewed.

Of the judges who

were approached, only one declined to be interviewed (this judge
offered time constraints as an explanation of his refusal).

Three

judges, however, declined to fill out the questionnaire form,
commenting on their lack of trust in data obtained from questionnaire forms.

The District Attorney's Office proved to be the

least accessible (the District Attorney stated that time constraints
were responsible for this inaccessibility).

However, all of the

public defenders and prosecutors who were eventually interviewed
were cooperative and willing to take the time to respond to all
questions (the interviews ranged in time from a half hour to an
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hour and a half).

Overall, the interviewed judges were cooperat

personable and open in their responses.

Yet, as a group, the

judges were the most difficult to interview.

The authority

status of the judges was reflected in their demeanor and in
their actual verbal responses.

Additionally, the judges' offices

(in which the interviews took place) confirmed by their spaciousness,
opulence and formal decor the powerful and authoritative position
of the occupant.

Finally, compared to attorneys, judges were

more inclined to confine their comments to descriptions of the
ideal, formal system and less inclined to comment on informal
processes in which they were not directly involved.
Overall, the respondents seemed to be satisfied with the
brief explanation given them of the nature and purpose of the
study.

They did not express concern about the consequences or

implications of the research project either for themselves or

!

for the system.

When interviewees did ask for further explanations

of the nature or purpose of the study, an elaboration of the initial

II
:-t

introduction was given.

Care was taken, however, not to bias

responses by indicating what the researcher expected to find by

i

asking a particular question.

The validity and reliability of the

findings depends upon something less than full disclosure of what
particular observations or interview questions are attempting to
explain (Blalock, 1970; Glazer, 1972).
Another ethical issue has to do with the protection of the
rights of individual respondents to privacy.

In this study, these

rights were protectsd by guaranteeing anonymity to the interviewees
and observed.

Respondents were referred to only by the label
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which designates their status in the court system, e.g., prosecutor,
public defender, judge.

In addition, care was taken not to include

information which would reveal identities of respondents.

The

study was concerned with attitudes and actions of individuals only
as they were representative of a group or of a system.

Likewise,

names or other imformation which might reveal identities of defendants
whose cases were researched were carefully excluded.

Finally, since

information on formal structure and procedure of the court process
is open to the public, the use of such information was not believed
to be an invasion of privacy.
It should be noted that while anonymity of individual
participants can be guaranteed, confidentiality regarding responses
cannot really be provided.

To insure total confidentiality

would require that the research findings not be released.

Viewing

confidentiality in this light, it appears that social scientists
talk somewhat erroneously about providing confidentiality of research
findings.

Samuels comments:

Where the research findings to applied goals would
be rendered useless if true confidentiality is maintained, the researcher must assume the responsibility
of either entirely withholding the findings from
publication or releasing them at a time when the
informants can no longer be harmed by such disclosures
(Samuels, 1976: 22).
The ethical issues in social research are not easily resolved.
However, these issues must be carefully considered as the researchers
weigh commitments to the scientific endeavor on the one hand and to
those being studied on the other.
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Perhaps most significantly, field workers have to
confront one of the most pressing issues of social
science research; how to resolve the profound tension
between exposure of what is beyond the fc.cade of social
conduct and avoidance of harm to those we study
(Glazer, 1972: 150) •

APPENDIX B
VARIABLE CODINGS:

CRIMINAL COURT FELONY CASE SAMPLE DATA

Variable
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Settled
Settled
Settled
Settled

most serious
charge: 2nd
charge: 3rd
charge: 4th
most serious
charge: 2nd
charge: 3rd
charge: 4th

initial
initial
settled
settled

Coding
charge
count
count
count
charge
count
count
count

counts
felony counts
counts
felony counts

Offense by name and level,
e.g., Forgery I, Attempted
Assault II.

Actual number counts,
e.g., 1, 2, 3.

12.

#
#
#
#

13.

No contest plea

Yes/No.

14.

Type closing

PG/PGTL/PGTL+Dis/PG+Dis/CBJ/
CBC/ABJ/ABC/DIS

15.

# setovers

Actual number setovers,
e.g., 1, 2, 3

16.

Type attorney

Public defender/court-appointed
from private bar/privately
retained.

17.

Judge

Number substituted for name,
e.g., Judge A, Judge B.

18.

Pre-trial custody status

Recognizance/bail/jail.

19.

Sentence:

Penitentiary 5 years or morel
Pen less than 5 years/Jail
and probation/Jail only/No jail
and probation/ No jail and no
probation.

9.

10.
11.

incarceration

280
Variable

Coding

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Fine
Drug or alcohol program
Mental health program
Restitution
Community service

Yes/No.

25.

Month arrest

Actual month, e.g., January,
February.

26.

Total disposition time

1-30 days/31-60 days/6l-90
days/over 90 days.

27.

Sex of defendant

Male/Female.

28.

Age of defendant

l7-20/2l-30/31-40/over 40.

29.

Prior record of defendant

Felony record/No felony record/
No record.

30.

Education of defendant

No high school/Less than 4
years high school/4 years high
school/Some college/College
graduate.

31.

Employment of defendant

Unemployed/Employed less than
6 months/Employed over 6 months.

32.

Residence of defendant

N.E./S.E./N./N.W./S.W./Out city/
Out state/Transient

33.

DA unit

Actual unit, i.e., A, B, C, D,
E, U.

APPENDIX C
VARIABLE CODINGS:
PUBLIC DEFENDER FORGERY I AND BURGLARY I DATA
Variable

Coding

l.

Most serious settled charge

2.

4.
5.

#
#
#
#

6.

Type Closing

PG/PGTL/PGTL+Dis/PG+Dis/
PGTL+Not file/PG+Not file/
PGTL+Dis+Not file/PG+Dis+Not
file/CBJ/CBC/ABJ/ABC/DIS.

7.

Judge

Number substituted for name,
e.g., Judge 1, Judge 2.

8.

Sentence recommendation by
prosecutor: incarceration

Penitentiary 5 years or morel
penitentiary less than 5 years/
Jail and probation/Jail only/
No jail and probation/No jail/
No position or not oppose/
After conviction/COnfinement.

9.

Sentence recommendation by
prosecutor: other conditions

3.

10.

initial
initial
settled
settled

counts
felony counts
counts
felony counts

Offense by name and level,
e.g., Burglary II.
Actual number counts, e.g.,
1, 2, 3.

Misdemeanor status

Immediate/deferred/no.

Fine
Restitution
Drug or alcohol program
Mental health program
Community service

Yes/No.

Sentence:

incarceration

Penitentiary 5 years or morel
Penitentiary less than 5 years/
Jail and probation/Jail only/
No jail and probation/No jail.
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variable
11.

Sentence:

Coding

other conditions

Misdemeanor status

Immediate/deferred/no.

Fine
Restitution
Drug or alcohol program
Mental health program
Community service

Yes/No.

12.

Sex of defendant

Male/Female.

13.

Age of defendant

l7-20/2l-30/3l-40/over 40.

14.

Prior record of defendant

Prior felony record/No felony
record.

15.

Education of defendant

No high school/Less than 4
years high school/4 years high
school/Some college/College
graduate.

16.

Employment of defendant

Unemployed/Employed less than
6 months/Employed part time or
off and on/Employed less than
6 months and part time or off
and on/Employed over 6 months
and full time.

17.

Race of defendant

White/black/other.

18.

Defendant drug or alcohol
problem

Yes/No.

19.

Dismissal reason

PG to other charge/State
unable sustain burden of
proof/Civil compromise/Speedy
trial violation/Remand juvenile/
other.

20.

Offense in dwelling
(Burglary only)

Yes/No.

APPENDIX D
':.'

QUESTIONNAIRE FORM
For the following questions, please circle the number which
most closely approximates your opinion.
1.

In deciding how to handle a give case, how much consideration
do you think the following factors are given by
a)
b)

the Public Defender's Office;
the District Attorney's Office:
Very
Much

Some

None

Strength of prosecutor's case
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

Seriousness of offense
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Prior record of defendant
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Actual guilt of the defendant
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Typicality of the offense
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

General character of the defendant
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

5
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Very
Much

None

Some

Attitude of the defendant
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

Defendant's wishes regarding handling
of case
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Report of arresting officer
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Tendencies of juries
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Tendencies of presiding judge
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Community attitudes
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Victim needs
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Office policy
a)
;,'

b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Political concerns
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Career advancement concerns
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office
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Very
Much

Some

None

Demands of special interest groups
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5

4

5

4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5
5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1
1

5

4
4

3
3

2
2

1

Relationship with particular attorney
handling other side of the case
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

1

Need to maintain good relations with
others in the court system
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Avoiding court overload
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Conserving staff resources
a)
b)

public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Speedy case settlement
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Due process
a)
b)

Public Defender's Office
District Attorney's Office

Crime control
a)
b)

Public Defertder's Office
District Attorney's Office

5

1

For the following questions, please circle the response which most
closely reflects your opinion.
2.

If your client decides to plead quilty, how important is it to you
that he/she receive some benefit in exchange for a guilty plea?
Very
Important

Important

Somewhat
Important

Not Very
Important

Not At All
Important

!'::i:':
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3.

After having studied a case assigned to you, how often do you
feel that you can reasonably anticipate
a)

whether or not the case will be plea negotiated?
Always

b)

Not Usually

Never

Usually

Sometimes

Not Usually

Never

How often would you say you are satisfied with the disposition
outcome of cases you handle?
Always

5.

Sometimes

what kind of a bargain will be made?
Always

4.

Usually

Usually

Sometimes

Not Usually

Never

Approximately how many accused felons do you think are actually
guilty, either of the formal charge or of some related charge?

t~

I

i'

Over BO%

I

[
[
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6.

I

l.

i.

80%-60%

60%-40%

40%-20%

Less Than 20%

Approximately how many accused felons assigned -to the public
Defender's Office do you think are actually guilty, either
of the formal charge or of some related charge?

~

1
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Over BO%
7.

60%-40%

40%-20%

Less Than 20%

Of cases which are settled by guilty pleas, how many do you
think involve some kind of bargain, however minimal?
Over BO%

B.

BO%-60%

BO%-60%

60%-40%

40%-20%

Less Than 20%

The district attorney has the "upper hand" in the plea
negotiation process.
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

APPENDIX E

OBSERVATION SCHEDULE:

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

Following is a sample form of the observation schedule used
to record data from the pre-trial conferences in felony court.
The data in the cells are ficticious but resemble data in the
actual completed forms.

Unlike this sample form, the actual

forms provided space for an unlimited number of comments.
letters in the cells indicate the speaker (A
Public Defender; C = Defendant).

=

The

Prosecutor; B

=

The headings at the top of each

column (with the exception of the first column) indicate the subject
matter of the comment.

A question mark in a cell indicates that

the verbalization was a question.

The column labeled "Researcher

Comments" allows for elaboration on the subject matter.
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APPENDIX F
OREGON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
FINAL DRAFT AND REPORT
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION
NOVEMBER, 1972
The present Oregon criminal procedure code gives formal
recognition to plea bargaining as a method of case disposition.
The Cornmrnission which drafted the present code viewed plea bargaining
as necessary and useful in terms of the needs of the criminal
justice system.

Due to its common use for case disposition, the

Commission felt that plea bargaining should be given legal status.
In its final report, it stated:
In Oregon criminal justice administration, as elsewhere
in this country, the practice known as "plea negotiation,"
"plea bargaining," "cop out" and "deal" is regularly engaged in by prosecutors and defense lawyers. The Oregon
Criminal Law Handbook recognizes that the negotiated plea
serves a useful public purpose and suggests that the terms
employed in connection with the practice should be stripped
of their anti-social implications. (158)
The Commission also quoted in its report a statement made by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice which lends support to the philosophy behind the procedure
code drafted by the Oregon Commission.

This statement reads as follows:

The negotiated guilty plea serves important functions.
As a practical matter, many courts could not sustain the
burden of having to try all cases corning before them.
The quality of justice in all cases would suffer if overloaded courts were faced with a great increase in the number
of trials. Tremendous investments of time, talent, and
money, all of which are in short supply and can be better

__ ___._ .
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used elsewhere, would be necessary if all cases were
tried. It would be a serious mistake, however, to
assume that the guilty plea is no more than a means of
disposing of criminal cases at minimal cost. It
relieves both the defendant and the prosecution of the
inevitable risks and uncertainties of trial. It
imports a degree of certainty and flexibility into a
rigid, yet frequently erratic system. (158) (Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society, 135:1967.)
The following four sections of the criminal procedure code give
plea bargaining legal status and set out procedural guidelines for
its use.

The sections are quoted in full below.

Section 263.

plea discussions and plea agreements.

1)

In cases in which it appears that the interest of the
public in the effective administration of criminal
justice would thereby be served, and in accordance
with the criteria set forth in section 264 of this
Act, the district attorney may engage in plea discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement.

2)

The district attorney shall engage in plea discussions
or reach a plea agreement with the defendant only
through defense counsel, except when, as a matter of
record, the defendant has effectively waived his right
to counselor, if the defendant is not eligible for
court-appointed counsel, has not retained counsel.

3)

The district attorney in reaching a plea agreement may
agree to, but is not limited to, one or more of the
following, as required by the circumstances of the
individual case.
a)

To make or not to oppose favorable recommendations
as to sentence which should be imposed if the
defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest
to the offense charged;

b)

To seek or not to oppose dismissal of the
offense charged if the defendant enters a plea
of guilty or no contest to another offense
reasonably related to the defendant's conduct;
or

c)

To seek or not to oppose dismissal of other
charges or to refrain from bringing potential
charges if the defendant enters a plea of guilty
or no contest to the offense charged.

~~---"-"
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4)

Similarly situated defendants should be afforded
equal plea agreement opportunities.

Section 264. Criteria to be considered in plea discussions
and plea agreements.
In determining whether to engage in plea discussions for
the purpose of reaching a plea agreement, the district
attorney may take into account, but is not limited to, any
of the following considerations.
1)

The defendant by his plea has aided in ensuring the
prompt and certain applications of correctional measures
to him.

2)

The defendant has acknowledged his guilt and shown a
willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct.

3)

The concessions made by the state will make possible
alternative correctional measures which are better
adapted to achieving rehabilitative, protective,
deterrent or other purposes of correctional treatment,
or will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the
form of conviction.

4)

The defendant has made public trial unnecessary when
there are good reasons for not having the case dealt
with in a public trial.

5)

The defendant has given or offered cooperation when
the cooperation has resulted or may result in the
successful prosecution of other offenders engaged in
equally serious or more serious criminal conduct.

6)

The defendant by his plea has aided in avoiding
delay in the disposition of other cases and thereby
has increased the probability of prompt and certain
application of correctional measures to other offenders.
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These criteria seem to suggest that the defendant who cooperates
and thus enhances criminal justice goals and system needs should be
rewarded with a reasonable bargain.

In the commentary following

this section of the code, the Commission offers the rationale
behind each criterion.

The rationale behind Subsection 1) is:

Promptness and certainty in punishment are both
important in accomplishing the goals of the criminal
justice system. The swift and certain punishment of
a given defendant aids in the deterrence of others and
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in accomplishing rehabilitation of that defendant. A
defendant who pleads guilty may substantially contribute
to both the promptness and the certainty of his punishment. (160)
The rationale behind Subsection 2) emphasizes the importance of the
attitude of the defendant concerning his or her criminal conduct:
This factor recognizes the defendant's acknowledgement
of guilt and willingness to assume responsibility for
his conduct as a valid consideration in dealing with the
guilty plea defendant. It is consistent with prevailing
and accepted sentencing criteria, which emphasizes the
relevance of the "attitudes of the defendant" and his
willingness to assume responsibility for his actions. (160)
In Subsection 3),

the Commission seems to be advocating the

reduction of severity of punishment:
In view of the wide range of sentencing options that
Oregon judges have for most crimes, the main purpose
in including this standard is to recognize that in
many cases a plea to a reduced charge is to avoid a
felony conviction, or conviction of a crime that carries
a particularly reprehensible label. (160)
The rational behind Subsection 4) has to do with protection of
victims in certain offenses, e.g., sex offenses where it might be
traumatic for the victim to have to appear in court; theft by
extortion in which public exposure of the victim might be best
avoided.

Subsection 5) is said to be in line with the recommendations

of the American Bar Association (ABA) which suggest that "whatever
is lost by the reduced punishment of one offender is gained by
the resulting conviction of one or more other offenders" (160).

The

rationale behind Subsection 6) may be the most far-reaching in its
willingness to reward defendants for co-operating by pleading gUilty.
"'.'

'.'

It is said that guilty plea defendants as a class make a "meaningful
contribution toward the attainment of the objectives of the criminal
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justice system" by reducing court congestion and enhancing speedy
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This, in turn, is said to further thp. goal of

case settlement.

prompt and certain punishment for all guilty defendants.

The

Commission refers to an ABA commentary which states that
• • • it is not inappropriate to grant concessions
to those defendants who by their plea increase both
the proximity and probability of punishment for other
guilty defendants. (161) (Commentary 1.8.)
The Commission also makes reference to a study of plea bargaining
in Oregon in which it was found that "when asked how the administration
of justice is aided by the plea bargaining process, over half of the
responding district attorneys indicated that it saved time, money and
reduced the case load of the courts (Klonoski study.
supra at 131).

r"
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The Commission then concludes that:

The standard set out in this subsection (6) is consistent with the above observations and recognizes that
avoiding delay in the disposition of other cases is a
proper matter to be taken into account by a district
attorney or trial judge in determining whether to agree
to a "barqained for" plea.

l

I

L

The policy of the Office of the District Attorney of Multnomah County
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appears to conflict with the intent of the law as outlined above,

1,

r

for Office policy states that plea negotiations shall never be used

I

to reduce case backlogs or reallocate manpower.

The Office considers

such considerations to be a "flagrant abuse of the process."
Section 265.

Responsibilities of defense counsel.

1)

Defense counsel shall conclude a plea agreement
only with the consent of the defendant, and shall
ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea
of guilty or no contest is ultimately made by the
defendant.

2)

To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense
counsel, after appropriate investigation, shall advise
the defendant of the alternatives available and of
factors considered important by him or the defendar..t
in reaching a decision.

;"
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In their commentary on Section 265, the Commission elaborates on
the kinds of information that are important for counsel to give the
defendant.

Among these are:

the probability of being convicted

should the defendant stand trial; consequences which would follow a
plea of guilty as opposed to conviction by trial; concessions
offered by or agreeable to the district attorney.
Section 266.
1)

The trial judge shall not participate in plea
discussions.

2)

If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which
contemplates entry of a plea of guilty or no contest
in the expectation that charge or sentence consessions
will be granted, the trial judge, upon request of
the parties, may permit the disclosure to him of the
tentative agreement and the reasons therefore in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The
trial judge may then advise the district attorney and
defense counsel whether he will concur in the proposed
dispos~tion of the information in the presentence
report or other information available at the time for
sentencing is consistent with the representations made
to him.

3)

If the trial judge concurs, but later decides that
the final disposition of the case should not include
the sentence concessions contemplated by the plea
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and allow
the defendant a reasonable period of time in which
to either affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty or
no contest.

4)

When a plea of guilty or no contest is tendered or
received as a result of a prior plea agreement, the
trial judge shall give the agreement due consideration,
but notwithstanding its existence, he is not bound by
it, and may reach an independent decision on whether
to grant sentence concessions under the criteria set
forth in section 264 of this Act.
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Subsection 2) of Section 266 is a new provision in the criminal
procedural code.

It recognizes that a bargain agreed upon by the
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prosecuting and defense attorneys which includes sentence
The Commission

recommendation requires cooperation from the judge.
comments:

It recognizes that it is proper for the judge, when
requested by the parties, to permit certain procedures
that will allow a greater degree of certainty when the
proposed concessions involved the sentence or the dismissal
of other charges before the court. (163)
Subsection 3) allows the defendant a further safeguard in the event
that the trial judge changes his or her mind regarding the proposed
concessions.
The criminal procedure code of Oregon devotes three sections
to the due process rights of defendants who plead guilty.

The first

section outlines the court's responsibilities in advising the
defendant of the implications of his or her plea.

The second states

that the court must be satisfied of the voluntariness of the plea,
and the third states that the court must be satisfied of the
accuracy of the plea.

These three sections are given in full below,

along with commentary of the Criminal Law Revision Commission.
Section 260.

Defendant to be advised by court.

1)

The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
contest to a felony or other charge on which the
defendant appears in person without first addressing
the defendant persona'lly and determining that he understands the nature of the charge.

2)

The court shall inform the defendant:
a)

That by his plea of guilty or no contest he
waives his right:
To trial by jury;
Of confrontation; and
Again self-incrimination.
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b)

Of the maximum possible sentence on the charge,
including the maximum possible sentence from
consecutive sentences.

c)

When the offense charged is one for which
a different or additional penalty is
authorized by reason of the fact that the
defendant may be adjudged a dangerous offender,
that this fact may be established after his
plea in the present action, thereby subjecting
him to different or additional penalty.

Section 260 is based on previous court rulings (both federal
and state) in which opinions have been expressed that due process
has been violated if defendants have not been advised of the above
(Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238:1969; McCarthy v. United States, 394
US 459:1968; Lay v. Cupp, 1 Or App 296, 462 P2d 443:1969; Nealy
v. Cupp, 2 Or App 240,467 P2d 649:1970).
Section 261.

Determining voluntariness of plea.

1)

The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
contest without first determining that the plea is
voluntarily and intelligently made.

2)

The court
result of
ment. If
the court
ment.

3)

If the district attorney has agreed to seek charge or
sentence concessions which must be approved by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally
that the recommendations of the district attorney are
not binding on the court.

shall determine whether the plea is the
prior plea discussions and a plea agreethe plea is the result of a plea agreement,
shall determine the nature of the agree-

Subsection 1) of Section 261 is based upon the ruling of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Boykin vs. Alabama in which it was said that
it was error, plain on the face of the record,
for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea
without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent
and voluntary. (156)
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Subsections 2) and 3) are in line with ABA recommendations
which suggest that plea negotiations be given "visibility" by
court inquiry.

It appears that knowledge of plea negotiations is

also perceived of as useful in determining voluntariness of plea.
Section 262.

Determining accuracy of plea.

After accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the
court shall not enter a judgment without making such
inquiry as may satisfy the court that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
Section 262 is a new provision in Oregon law.

Commentary by

the Commission states that procedures for determining accuracy of
plea may vary:
The court would be free to use any appropriate procedure
which seems best suited to the court and for the kind of
case involved. (157)
In the Commission report there is also a reference regarding
this section to ABA commentary.

ABA comments that although inquiry

into plea accuracy may reduce some of the efficiency of the guilty
plea process, the benefits of such investigation for the defendant
and for the system outweigh efficiency reduction.
Primarily, inquiry ensures that the defendant actually
committed a crime at least as serious as the one to
which he is willing to plead. Furthermore, investigation
into the factual basis of guilty pleas helps to increase
the visibility of charge reduction practices, a common
form of plea agreement. Also, inquiries provide .a more
adequate record of the conviction process and minimize
the chances of a defendant successfully challenging his
conviction later. Finally, increased knowledge about the
circumstances of the defendant's crime allows the court to
better evaluate his competency, his willingness to plead
guilty, and his understanding of the charges against
him. (157)
.....
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APPENDIX G
FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR LEVELS:
STATUTORY CLASSIFICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES*

Murder
Manslaughter I
Manslaughter II
Crim Neg Horn

Unclass Fel
(max life)
A Fel
B Fel
C Fel

Assault I
Assault II
Assault III
Menacing
Harassment

A
B
A
A
B

Fel
Fel
Misdrn
Misdrn
Misdm

Kidnap I
Kidnap II

A Fel
B Fel

Rape I
Rape II
Rape III
Sex Abuse I
Sex Abuse I I
Sod I
Sod II
Sod III
Public Indec

A
B
C
B
C
A
B
C
A

Rob I
Rob II
Rob III

A Fel
B Fel
C Fel

Disord Condt
Crm Mischf I
Crrn Mischf I I
Crm Mischf III
Coercion
Promot Prost

B
C
A
C
C
C

Fel
Fel
Fel
Fel
Fel
Fel
Fel
Fel
Misdrn

Misdm
Fel
Misdrn
Misdrn
Fel
Fel

* A Fel (max 20 years)
B Fel (max 10 years)
C Fel (max 5 years)
~.
....,.

,"'"

Burg I
Burg II
Crrn Trespss I
Crrn Trespss II

A
C
A
C

Fcl
Fel
Misdrn
Misdrn

Theft I
Theft II
UUV

C Fel
A Misdm
C Fel

Forg I
Forg II

C Fel
A Misdrn

Arson I
Arson II
Recklss Burn

A Fel
C Fel
A Misdrn

CAID
Crrn Use Drugs
Crrn Drug Prom

B Fel
A Misdm
A Misdm

Escape I
Escape II
Escape III
Fail Appear I
Fail Appear II
Resist Arrest
Hindr Prosecut
Supply COntrbd

B
C
A
C
A
A
C
C

ECPFA
Carr Cone Wepn

Unclass Fel
(max 5 years)
Unclass Misdm

DUlL

Unclass Fel

Fel
Fel
Misdm
Fel
rtisdm
Misdm
Fel
Fel

--".~C----.-.-
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APPENDIX H
JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF EMPLOYED DEFENDANTS

An

attempt was made to get some idea of the nature of jobs

held by those offenders who were employed.

Many of the case files

only gave the name of the defendant's employer, and thus it was
not possible to ascertain the nature of the job.

However, job

descriptions were obtained for 72 defendants from the 1976 sample.
The great majority of these defendants either had "blue collar"
jobs (skilled or semi-skilled labor) or had low-level service jobs.
It should be remembered that defendants are relatively young, and
therefore it would not be expected that they would have high-level
employment.

Nevertheless, the data do suggest that accuse:::'! felons

have jobs which social scientists would cateogrize at the lower end
of the social class scale.
Nineteen defendants were skilled or semi-skilled laborers.

Of

these, three were construction workers, two were truck drivers, two
were machinists, and two did automobile body work.
worked as:

The others

auto mechanic, carpenter, freight loader, painter,

printer, roofing contractor, tree service employee, meat company
employee, livestock market employee, and railroad worker.
Eleven people did some kind of building maintenance work.
Seven of these described their positions as janitor, two as
maintenance workers in care centers, one as hotel maintenance,
and one as housekeeper.

31')0

Nine defendants did some kind of restaurant, tavern or bar
work.

Positions included waiter/waitress, bartender, busboy,

dishwasher, cook.
Another nine people worked in retail sales.
were store clerks.

Of these, seven

One described his position as sales manager of

a bakery, one sold produce at an outside stand.
Six defendants described themselves as self-employed.

Of

these, the three who gave further information were a junk dealer,
a craftsman and a mechanic.
Five people worked at various jobs assigned to them either
through a government-funded poverty program or through a temporary
work agency, e.g., Manpower.
Three were gas station attendants, and three were field
laborers.

One was a cashier in an amusement park; one was a

theater concession stand worker, and one worked in a massage
parlor.

Another was a security guard.

Only three could be considered to be "white-collar" workers.
Two of these held positions in state agencies, and one was a
businessman.
Admittedly, the data are not complete, and thus it is
possible that those employed defendants for whom there was no job
description held higher-level jobs.

The available data, however,

strongly indicate that people who get into trouble with the law
tend to be either unemployed or have employment which this society
characterizes as working or lower class.
'.,
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APPENDIX I

SUMMARY PROFILE OF SELECTED OFFENSE TYPES:
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977
Following is a summary profile of six offenses:
Other Burg; Theft I; Other Property; CAID; Other Drugs.

Burg I;
The

variables on which the summary data are given are listed in the
first column.

Under the column labeled Hi

%,

the category of the

variable with the highest percentage of cases for the particular
offense is given.

Under the column labeled Variation Tot %, the

pluses and minuses symbolize the following.

Four pluses (++++)

means that the Hi % variable category is over 35% higher than the
total percentage (for all offenses) of that variable category;
three pluses (+++) indicates that it is from 25% to 34% higher;
two pluses (++) refers to a percentage that is from 15% to 24%
higher than the total; one plus (+) means that it is from 5% to
14% higher.

Minuses have the same meaning in the opposite direction,

e.g., one minus (-) indicates that the Hi % variable category is
from 5% to 14% lower than the total percentage of that category.
Where the variable category was less than 5% higher or less than
5% lower, the word "same" has been used.

Thus, for example, the

highest percentage of Burg I in 1976 was closed by PG, and this
percentage was over 35% higher than the total percentage of PG
closings in 1976.
.~ .~,

Similarly, the highest percentage of Burg I

defendants had public attorneys, but this percentage was only from
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5% to 14% higher than the total percentage of cases handled by
public attorneys.

For easier interpretation of these summary

profiles, the plus and minus codings are given below in concise
fonn.
++++

Over 35% higher than total %

+++

25% to 34% higher than total %

++

15% to 24% higher than total %

+

Same

5% to 14% higher than total %
Less than 5% higher or lower than total %
5% to 14% lower than total %
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15% to 24% lower than total %
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Burg I

1976

1977

(N = 14)

(N = 11)
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Theft I
1976
(N
variables

1',:

I

i

iI,

Hi

=

1977

23)

(N
Variation
Tot %

%

Type Clos

PG

Attorney

Public

Custody

Jail

Sentence

No Incarc

Prior Record

Felony

Education

HS

Employment

Unempl

Age

21 - 30

++++

Hi

=

14)
Variation
Tot %

%

PG

++

Public
same
+

++

++

Jail

++

Incarc

+++

Felony

same

HS

same

Unempl

same

21 - 30

++
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Other Property

l

f
~

i.

1976

1977

=

(N = 15)

(N

f

l

36)
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Variation
Tot %

Variables

Hi

Type Clos

PGTLs

+

PGTLs

Attorney

Public

+

Public

\

Custody

Jail

Sentence

No Incarc

f

Prior Record

Felony

Education

HS

Employment

Un emp 1

Age

OVer 30

f

l

%

Hi

%

!
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[
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same
++

Recog
No Incarc
Felony

same
+++
++++

Variation
Tot %
++++

+
++

same

Less HS

++

Unernpl

++

21 - 30

+
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CAID
1977

1976
(N

variables

= 17)
variation
Tot %

Hi %

= 15)

(N

++

variation
Tot %

Hi %
PGTLs

+

Public

+

Type Clos

PG + Dis

Attorney

Public

Custody

Recog

sentence

Incarc

+

prior Record

Felony

same

Felony

Education

HS

same

HS

Employment

Un emp 1

Age

21 - 30

++

+

same

+++

Recog
No Incarc

++

+++

Unempl

same

21 - 30

++

Other Drugs

(N

i;·

'.,

1976

1977

=

(N = 13)

29)
Variation
Tot %

Hi %

Variation
Tot %

Variables

Hi %

Type Clos

PGTLs

++++

PGTLs

Attorney

Public

same

Public

Custody

Recog

+++

Recog

++

Sentence

No Incarc

No Incarc

++

Prior Record

Felony

Education

HS

+

HS

+

Employment

Unempl

+

Unempl

+

Age

21 - 30

++

Felony

++

21 - 30

++++

same

same

APPENDIX J
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON QUESTION ONE
FROM INTERVIEWS WITH KEY COURT ACTORS
In Question One respondents were asked to rate the amount
of consideration on a five-point scale (from five meaning very
much consideration to one meaning no consideration) given each
of 26 factors by the Public Defender's Office and by the District
Attorney's Office.

The means, modes, ranges and standard

deviations of these ratings are given below.

The order in which

respondent groups are listed was determined by ranking means from
high to low.
Standard
Deviation

Mean

Mode

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

5.0
4.7
4.5

5

0

.0

5
5

1
2

.5

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

5.0
4.5
4.4

5
5
5

0
2
2

.0
.6
.8

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.6
3.4
3.3

3
4/3/2
3

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

4.3
4.0
3.5

4
3

Range

strength of Prosecutor's
Case
P.D. 's Office:

D.A.'s Office:

.7

Report of Arresting Officer
P.D.'s Office:

D. A. 's Office:

5

3
4

.9
1.1
.9

3
2
3

1.0
.8
.9

2
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Mean

Mode

Range

Standard
Deviation

Seriousness of Offense
P.D. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

4.2
4.1
3.7

5/4
4
4

2
2
3

.8
.6
1.0

D.A. 's Office

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

4.7
4.7
4.5

5
5
5/4

1
1
1

.5
.5
.5

Prior Record of Defendant
r;

L
I

P.o. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

3.5
3.4
3.1

4
3
3

3
3
4

.9
.9
1.2

t·
F

D.A.'s Office:

Prosecutors
Pub Defenders
Judges

4.5
4.3
3.8

5
5
4

2
2
3

.7
.7
1.0

t
t,
f

i
i

!
I

Actual Guilt of Defendant

l

P.D. 's Office:'

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

4.3
2.9
2.8

5
5/1
3

3
4
4

1.0
1.8
1.2

D.A. 's Office:

Prosecutors
Judges
Pub Defenders

4.5
4.4
2.7

5
5
2

3
3
3

.9
1.1
1.0

I
~,
r

[,

I

[
e,

~: .
i

[.

[

f

[
f
i'

General Character of Defendant

"

P.D.'s Office:

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

3.3
3.2
2.3

3
3
3

3
4
2

1.0
1.4
.9

D.A.'s Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

3.0
2.5
2.2

3
2
2

2
2
3

.8
2.0

r

r

rf,

r

r

F'

i
~;,:

f·-

.::

(~

.,

~~

I,

.7

Attitudes of Defendant
P.D. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

3.4
3.1
2.4

4
3
2

4
3
3

1.2
1.0
.9

D.A. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

3.0
2.8
2.5

3
3
2

4
3
2

1.0
.9
.8

.,.

;~'-----".

~B

fR

I,

t'

f.

L'
;~.;
'·.'·"
f
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Range

Standard
Deviation

P.D. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

4.7
4.3
4.3

5
5
5

1
3
4

.5
.9
1.4

D.A. 's Office:

Prosecutors
Judges
Pub Defenders

1.9
1.5
1.5

2/1
1
1

2
2
1

.8
.8
.5

f'~.

I;"',

Mode

Defendant's Wishes

l,'

t.

Mean

Tendencies of Juries
P.D.'s Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

4.1
4.0
3.5

4
5/4
3

2
3
3

.6
1.1
.8

D.A.'s Office:

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.9
3.8
3.2

4
4/3
3

3
2
2

.7
.8
1.0

Tendencies of Judges
P.D. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

4.3
3.6
3.3

4
3
4

2
2
4

.6
.9
1.3

D.A.'s Office:

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.8
3.5
2.2

3
3
1

2

.9
1.1
1.0

2.1
2.1
1.8

2
2/1
2

2

4
1

.7
1.4
.4

4.0
3.8
3.6

5
5
4

3
3
2

1.0
1.3
.6

3
3

Community Attitudes
P.D. 's Office:

I

I
L

t

I

".
.

::.,

D.A. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

Victim Needs
P.D. 's Office:

Prosecutors
Pub Defenders
Judges

2.2
2.0
1.6

2
1
1

4
3
1

1.2
1.0
.5

D.A.'s Office:

Prosecutors
Pub Defenders
Judges

4.2
3.4
3.3

4
4/3
4

2
2
2

.6
.6
.9

-,=-fO'" "

___._.'-"'.'"

F~
~i~

~f:'

K\'
:
/,';'

r«>~
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1,:',

/':,;'':

F'
f"

Mean

Mode

Range

Standard
Deviation

Office po1icl

h'

~.J

t·;

V';
l~

P.D. 's Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

4.0
2.6
1.2

5/4
3/1
1

3
4
1

1.1
1.4
.4

D.A.'s Office:

Pub Defenders
'Judges
Prosecutors

4.6
4.4
4.1

5
5
4

1
2
2

.5
.7
.7

Prosecutors
Judges
Pub Defenders

1.6
1.1
1.1

2/1
1
1

1
1
2

.4

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

4.2
3.6
2.1

5
4
3

3
3
2

.9
.9
.9

rI" '
F
I"

;:

L

f
i'

t,

I

~ "',

I

Political Concerns

r.

i-:
!,

P.D. 's Office:

1;
(,

r·
t

.7
.3

"

D.A.'s Office:

,L:
i
i
i

t..

Career Advancement Concerns

f

:~

P.D. 's Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

2.0
1.5
1.3

3/1
1
1

2
1
1

.9
.5
.5

D.A. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

3.4
2.9
1.4

3
5/2/1
1

4
4
1

1.0
1.6
.5

r -

i

I!

f

r
f,

t

r,

L
r

I.
~
r

Special Interest Groups
P.D.'s Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

2.0
1.8
1.1

2
1
1

2
3
1

.8
.9
.3

D.A. 's Office:

Pub IDefenders
Judges
Prosecutors

3.7
3.3
1.6

4
4/3/2
2

4
3
2

1.2
1.1
.6

I
~

"

t·
l

RelationshiE With
Attornel

Adversa~

P.D.'s Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

2.8
2.8
2.2

3
3
2

3
4
3

.8
1.2
.9

D.A.'s Office:

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.0
2.9
2.1

3

4
3
3

1.4
.7
1.0

3

1
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Mean

Mode

Range

Standard
Deviation

Maintenance of Good Relations
with Others in Court System
P.D. 's Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

2.8
2.5
2.1

3
2
2

2
3
4

.7
.9
1.1

D.A. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

3.0
2.9
2.6

2
3
3

4
2
3

1.2
.6
.8

Avoiding Court OVerload
P.D. 's Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

2.4
1.5
1.4

1
1
1

4
2
2

1.5
.9
.6

D.A. 's Office:

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.3
2.1
1.6

5/4/3/1
3
1

4
2
2

1.6
.8
.8

Conserving Staff Resources
P.D. 's Office:

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.3
2.1
2.1

5/3
2
3

4
4
2

1.5
1.1
.9

D.A.'s Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

3.4
2.4
2.3

3
3
2

3
2
3

1.1
.8
.9

Speedy Case Settlement
P.D. 's Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

3.1
2.5
2.4

3
3/2
3/2

4
3
3

1.1
.8
1.0

D.A. 's Office:

Judges
Pub Defenders
Prosecutors

3.9
2.9
2.5

3

2
3

2
3
3

1.0
1.0
1.0

P.D. 's Office:

Pub Defenders
Judges
Prosecutors

4.5
4.5
4.2

5
5
5

2
2
3

.8
.8
1.1

D.A.'s Office:

Judges
Prosecutors
Pub Defenders

4.4
3.8
2.9

5
5/3
4/2

2
3
3

.7
1.1
1.0

Due Process

,

,,'
:-:

','
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Mean

Mode

Range

Standard
Deviation

Crime Control
P.D.'s Office:

D.A. 's Office:

I·

.: .

. '.
~

Pub Defenders
Prosecutors
Judges

2.0
1.9
1.8

1
2
1

Prosecutors
Judges
Pub Defenders

4.3
4.1
3.9

5
5
4

4
2
2

2
2

3

1.3
.8
.9
.8
.6
1.0

